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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays that contribute to the empirical literature on
employment and wages in the German labor market. The first essay investigates the
impact of a large and unexpected inflow of refugees into the West German labor market
between 1988 and 1993 on native wages and employment. The analysis indicates
that a one percentage point increase in local immigrant employment reduces average
native wages and employment in the short run by about 0.68% and 1.13%, respectively;
however, the effect tends to vanish in the longer term. In addition, cross-regional
job-to-job moves compensate on average for two-thirds of the negative short run local
employment effect. The second essay analyzes the causal effect of a relaxation of the
German Protection Against Dismissal Act in 2004 on different labor market outcomes
at the firm level. Specifically, the essay exploits a change of the minimum establishment
size threshold determining coverage by the employment protection legislation from
five to ten employees as a quasi-experiment. The results from the empirical analysis
do not provide robust evidence for an effect on overall hiring, separation, job flow,
and churning rates as well as wages and temporary employment relations. However,
there is some evidence of increases in the gender-specific hiring and job flow rates
of women. The third essay studies trends in STEM employment and wages in West
Germany between 1980 and 2010. A descriptive analysis indicates an increase in
STEM employment and wages in both absolute and relative terms for men and women
that coincides with the rise in wage inequality during the same period. Moreover,
the essay shows that the increase in the wage differential between STEM and non-
STEM workers can be explained by supply and demand factors under a STEM-biased
technological change within a CES production framework. Finally, the essay provides
an alternative assessment of the STEM premium by exploiting estimates from a model
with additive worker and firm fixed effects. Most importantly, estimates from a Gelbach
decomposition suggest that the fraction of the STEM premium that is explained by firm
effects has increased considerably over time.
Keywords:
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Aufsätzen, die zur empirischen Literatur über
Beschäftigung und Löhne auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt beitragen. Der erste Aufsatz
untersucht die Auswirkungen eines großen und unerwarteten Zustroms von Flücht-
lingsmigranten auf den westdeutschen Arbeitsmarkt zwischen 1988 und 1993 auf
die Löhne und Beschäftigung der einheimischen Arbeitnehmer. Die Analyse zeigt,
dass ein Anstieg der lokalen Beschäftigung von Migranten um ein Prozentpunkt die
durchschnittlichen Löhne und die durchschnittliche Beschäftigung kurzfristig um etwa
0.68% bzw. 1.13% reduziert, der Effekt langfristig jedoch verschwindet. Darüber hin-
aus kompensieren überregionale Job-zu-Job-Wechsel durchschnittlich zwei Drittel des
negativen kurzfristigen lokalen Beschäftigungseffekts. Der zweite Aufsatz analysiert
den kausalen Effekt einer Lockerung des deutschen Kündigungsschutzgesetzes im Jahr
2004 auf unterschiedliche Arbeitsmarktergebnisse auf Firmenebene. Dazu nutzt der
Aufsatz eine Änderung des Schwellenwerts der Mindestbetriebsgröße zur Anwend-
barkeit des Kündigungsschutzgesetzes von fünf auf zehn Beschäftigte als ein Quasi-
Experiment. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen Analyse liefern keine robuste Evidenz
für einen Effekt auf die Einstellungs-, Abgangs-, Nettobeschäftigungs- und Churning-
Raten sowie auf Löhne und temporäre Beschäftigungsverhältnisse. Dagegen gibt es
Evidenz, dass die geschlechtsspezifischen Einstellungs- und Nettobeschäftigungsraten
von Frauen zugenommen haben. Der dritte Aufsatz untersucht die Entwicklung der
MINT-Beschäftigung und -Löhne in Westdeutschland zwischen 1980 und 2010. Eine
deskriptive Analyse deutet auf einen Anstieg der MINT-Beschäftigung und -Löhne
in absoluten und relativen Werten für Männer und Frauen hin, der zeitlich mit dem
Anstieg der Lohnungleichheit zusammenfällt. Darüber hinaus zeigt der Aufsatz, dass
die Zunahme des Lohnunterschieds zwischen MINT und nicht-MINT Arbeitern durch
Angebots- und Nachfragefaktoren im Rahmen eines MINT-verzerrten technologischen
Wandels auf Basis einer CES-Produktionsfunktion erklärbar ist. Zuletzt bietet der Auf-
satz eine alternative Analyse der MINT-Prämie unter Nutzung von Schätzwerten aus
einem Modell mit additiven Arbeiter- und Firmeneffekten. Insbesondere deuten die
Ergebnisse einer Gelbach-Zerlegung darauf hin, dass der durch Firmeneffekte erklärte
Anteil der MINT-Prämie mit der Zeit bedeutend zugenommen hat.
Schlagwörter:
Arbeitsmarktökonomik, Beschäftigung, Löhne, Einwanderung, Geflüchtete, Kündi-
gungsschutz, Arbeitnehmerfluktuation, temporäre Beschäftigung, MINT, Lohnunter-
schiede.
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1. Introduction
Due to the intricacy of the topic and its significance for economic welfare, the assessment
of employment and wages remains central to the academic, political, and public debate.
Germany offers an important test case for studying determinants of employment and wages,
not only because it has the largest labor force in the European Union, but also since the
German labor market was marked by far-reaching economic changes during the last decades.
In this dissertation, I study the core topics of employment and wages in Germany in three
different periods of time. In chapter 2, I assess the impact of an immigrant-induced supply
shock on native wages and employment at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.
In chapter 3, I analyze the causal effect of a relaxed employment protection legislation that
was implemented in 2004 as part of comprehensive social welfare and labor market reforms.
Finally, in chapter 4, I document the role of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math
(STEM) occupations in the West German labor market over three decades until 2010.
To provide some temporal perspective, Figure 1.1 displays the evolution of the unem-
ployment rate (panel A) and deflated average gross wage per hour worked (panel B) in
West Germany between 1980 and 2016 and unified Germany between 1991 and 2016. West
Germany experienced a sharp increase in the unemployment rate in the aftermath of the two
oil crises in 1973 and 1980/81, which peaked at 8.2% in 1985. In contrast, the second half of
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s was characterized by a steady expansion of employ-
ment, leading to an unemployment rate of 6.4% in 1992, coupled with a continuous growth
in average hourly wages. This time was also marked by large inflows of refugees, ethnic
Germans (then called Aussiedler), East Germans and other migrants into West Germany
(Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2004, 2006). In the years that followed, Germany
was first hit by a short-term recession in 1993 and subsequently experienced a large rise in
its unemployment rate that climaxed at 12.7% in 1998, while wages remained almost flat.
Unsurprisingly, the period around the 1990s was (and still is) at the center-stage of many
empirical studies (see, e.g., D’Amuri et al. 2010; Glitz 2012; Prantl and Spitz-Oener 2014;
Dustmann et al. 2017).
After a temporary decline of unemployment rates between 1998 and 2001, Germany
entered another recession in 2003 after the burst of the internet bubble and the 2001 terrorist
attacks (Räth 2009). Eventually, with an unemployment rate of 13% in 2003, its highest
level in the German post-war era, policymakers gradually implemented far-reaching social
welfare and labor market reforms. However, while unemployment rates indeed diminished
following the so-called Agenda 2010 reforms, researchers have contrasting views on the
contribution of the legislative changes to fostering employment (see discussions in, e.g.,
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Figure 1.1.: Evolution of Unemployment and Wages in Germany
A. Unemployment rates B. Average gross wages per hour worked
Notes: Unemployment rates refer to the dependent civil labor force. Average gross wages per hour worked are
deflated by the German Consumer Price Index (CPI), with 1995 as the base year. Wages of marginal employees
are excluded. Data on West German unemployment rates refer to West Germany without Berlin. Data on West
German wages refer to West Germany with West-Berlin until 1991 and to West Germany without Berlin after
1991. West German wages between 1992 and 1999 are a linear interpolation of the West German-German
wage ratio in the years 1991 and 1999 times the German wage in the years 1992 to 1999. Vertical bars indicate
recession years, defined by a reduction in year-on-year GDP growth. Horizontal lines indicate the periods under
study in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Data source: German Federal Statistical Office.
Fitzenberger 2008; Dustmann et al. 2014; Burda and Seele 2017).1 Lastly, even though
Germany was not spared by the financial crisis in 2007/08, it only led to a mild deterioration
in labor market outcomes, and since 2010 both employment and wages have been growing
sustainably. Notably, by 2016, Germany — in the meanwhile by some described as an
“economic superstar” — reached the lowest unemployment rate since reunification and the
highest average wages ever recorded (Möller 2010; Dustmann et al. 2014).
However, this success story was accompanied by other divisive developments. For one
thing, the last decades have been marked by a sharp increase in wage inequality, in particular
since the mid-1990s, a phenomenon that has attracted continuing attention from researchers
(see, among many others, e.g., Dustmann et al. 2009; Card et al. 2013; Dustmann et al. 2014;
Glitz and Wissmann 2017). In addition, numerous studies point out the relative increases in
atypical forms of employment (i.e. part-time employment, fixed-term employment, marginal
employment, temporary agency work, freelance work) that are often associated with lower
wages and higher job insecurity (e.g., Brehmer and Seifert 2008; Keller and Seifert 2013;
Eichhorst et al. 2015).
Against the backdrop of these macro trends, this dissertation analyzes three different
time periods to provide new insights on factors that affected employment and wages in the
German labor market, which may hold lessons in the broader international context as well.
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, my co-author and I revisit the question of how immigration
affects native workers by examining a large and unexpected inflow of refugee migrants into
the West German labor market between 1988 and 1993. We use detailed administrative data
1For an overview of the literature on the Agenda 2010, see http://www.iab.de/infoplattform/agenda_2010.
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to study the short and long run effects of immigration on native wages and employment at
the level of local labor markets. Using distance to the southern and eastern German border
as instrumental variables, our results indicate that a one percentage point increase in local
immigrant employment reduces average native wages and employment by about 0.68% and
1.13% in the first five years after arrival, but tends to have no or even positive effects in
the longer perspective. Moreover, we find extensive effect heterogeneity across different
groups of the labor market. While short run employment losses are more pronounced for
low-skilled and middle-aged workers, short run wage reductions are stronger for skilled
and middle-aged workers. Looking across occupations and industries, the estimates further
suggest that wage effects are concentrated among workers in simple occupations and in the
nontradable sector, whereas employment effects are more important in the tradable sector. In
addition, we exploit the panel structure of the data and track transitions between employment
and nonemployment as well as cross-regional job-to-job moves. Decomposing the former
into inflows and outflows from unemployment, we find that around two-thirds of the net
employment decline are attributable to a decrease in inflows, whereas only one-third is
attributable to an increase in outflows. In other words, incumbent workers are to some extent
protected from the adverse effect of immigration at the expense of unemployed natives who
bear most of the short run burden. Finally, turning to cross-regional mobility, we provide
evidence that the economy-wide employment decline is substantially smaller than suggested
by the local estimates: Notably, even in the short run, on average two-thirds of the local
employment effect is compensated for by cross-regional job-to-job moves.
In Chapter 3, I analyze the impact of a change in dismissal protection on different labor
market outcomes in small establishments. The identification strategy relies on a quasi-
experimental change in the German Protection Against Dismissal Act (PADA) in 2004 that
was implemented as part of the Agenda 2010 reform package. Notably, due to a raise of the
minimum firm size threshold determining coverage by the PADA, dismissal protection was
only relaxed for some establishments. Accordingly, I exploit the temporal and cross-sectional
variation in the PADA and apply a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach by comparing
the average outcomes of establishments subject to the policy change (treatment group) with
establishments that are similar in all dimensions but the exposure to the legislative change
(control group) before and after the reform. Specifically, I use matched employer-employee
administrative data linked to establishment survey data and estimate the impact of the reform
on worker turnover as well as wages and the use of temporary employment. Using different
assignment methods to the treatment and control group, I find no robust evidence for an
effect on overall hiring, separation, job flow, and churning rates. Moreover, I assess potential
heterogeneity in the treatment effects by estimating effects on gender- and age-specific
turnover rates as well as differential effects by union status and East-West divide of firms.
I only find some evidence of increases in the gender-specific hiring and job flow rates of
women which could potentially be explained by more elastic labor supply elasticities. Finally,
since treated establishment might have adjusted to the relaxed dismissal protection along
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other margins, I study the impact of the reform on average wages as well as the establishment-
level shares of workers on fixed-term contracts and workers from temporary agencies. Again,
I do not find evidence for an adjustment along these alternative margins.
In Chapter 4, I study the role of STEM occupations in the West German labor market
and explore potential drivers underlying an increase in wage differentials between STEM
and non-STEM workers, which I call the STEM premium. Using detailed administrative
data, I first document an increase in STEM employment and wages in both absolute and
relative terms for men and women. Moreover, I show that the time pattern between the
STEM premium (adjusted for skill-age profiles) coincide with the rapid expansion of wage
inequality which suggests that STEM jobs contributed to the accelerated increase in the
West German wage inequality since the mid-1990s. Next, I use a CES production function
framework in a competitive market environment which allows for imperfect substitutability
between STEM and non-STEM workers and show that the rise in the STEM premium can be
explained by supply and demand factors under STEM-biased technological change. This
finding offers a refined perspective on the often discussed shortage of skilled workers, in
particular in the field of STEM occupations. Notably, within the boundaries of the CES
model, the results confirm a relative shortage of STEM workers, in particular since the
mid-1990s. Finally, I use estimates from a model with additive worker and firm fixed effects
from Card et al. (2013) and demonstrate that both male and female STEM workers are
clustered at the upper part of the distributions of worker and firm effects. In addition, I apply
a Gelbach decomposition to provide an approximate quantification of the contribution of
unobserved worker and firm effects as well as observable time-varying worker characteristics
to the STEM premium. My results suggest that firm-specific wage components explain an
increasing fraction of the growing STEM wage gap over time. This finding is in line with
previous studies in that it highlights the rising importance of firm-specific rents in explaining
the growing wage inequality (Card et al. 2013; Goldschmidt and Schmieder 2017).
The following three chapters are self-contained and can be read independently. Chapter 2
is joint work with Benjamin Bruns.
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2. The Impact of Immigrants on Native
Wages and Employment: An Analysis of
Refugee Inflows in the Early 1990s
2.1. Introduction
The considerable rise in immigration following the Balkan conflicts and the fall of the Iron
curtain in the late 1980s triggered an unprecedented inflow of refugee migrants to West
Germany, and led to significant and lasting changes in the composition of its population:
between 1985 and 1995, the stock of immigrants rose by 2.8 million individuals, equivalent
to a 64% rise in the initial foreign population and implying a total population growth of
5%.1 About two decades later, an even larger influx of refugees — sourced in the “Arab
Spring” (Dustmann et al. 2016) — has put the topic of immigration back center-stage in
the political discourse in Germany and all other refugee-receiving countries across Europe,
with right-wing anti-immigration parties successively gaining important long term political
mandates.2 Despite the significance of the topic and the availability of a historical blueprint,
there is only limited empirical evidence on one core question nourishing public uncertainty
and the political debate: What are the labor market effects of such a refugee-driven supply
shock on the resident native population? Building on detailed administrative data for the
West German labor market, we provide the first comprehensive answer to this question by
analyzing the short and long run effects of an unexpected refugee shock hitting the German
economy in the early 1990s.
A large body of literature has investigated the effects of immigration, but researchers are
still far from reaching consensus: for example, a synthesis of wage effects for the US (see
Dustmann et al. 2016) shows a range of values reaching from strongly negative (Altonji
and Card 1991; Borjas 2003; Aydemir and Borjas 2007; Borjas 2014, 2017) to zero and
even positive (Card 2007; Card and Lewis 2007; Card 2009; Boustan et al. 2010; Peri and
Yasenov 2017).3 The considerable variation in empirical results not only permeates US
1We define refugees as all displaced individuals in a third country who reside in a refugee camp, who have
been formally given refugee status, or who have been granted temporary forms of protection (Dustmann et al.
2016). For simplicity, we broadly consider as refugees all immigrants coming from a refugee sending country,
though we acknowledge that this classification might be imprecise in some cases.
2Very recent examples include the rise of the AfD in Germany, FPÖ in Austria, Front National in France,
and the PVV in Netherlands.
3See, e.g., Card and Peri (2016) for a summary of the ongoing dispute between George Borjas on the one
hand, and David Card and Giovanni Peri on the other hand. Particular attention has been given to the mariel
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studies, but also prevails in research focusing on European countries, and, most importantly
for us, the German labor market. On the one hand, Bonin (2005), Haas et al. (2013),
and Steinhardt (2011) report only modest (if any) wage effects, and Pischke and Velling
(1997) find no detrimental effects on employment, though their analysis focuses on the
1985-1989 period, and thus misses the massive rise of inflows between 1990 and 1993.4 On
the other hand, Dustmann and Glitz (2015) [DG], considering a similar inflow as we do in
this paper, and Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2014) who look at East German immigrants, discover
significant wage losses in the nontradable and the competitive sector of the labor market.
Meanwhile, Velling (1995), looking at the 1989-1993 immigration shock, and also Glitz
(2012), considering the 1996-2001 inflow of ethnic Germans, document a negative effect on
employment rates. One study that simultaneously reports negative wage and employment
effects, and is at the same time the most relevant for us, is a recent paper by Dustmann,
Schönberg, and Stuhler (2017) [DSS]. Their preferred estimates imply moderate wage and
large employment losses of about 0.13 and 0.93%, suggesting nearly perfect displacement of
natives at the local level. While offering compelling identification, however, their analysis is
based on a relatively small border region in south-east Germany.
While all these papers make important contributions, the large heterogeneity in results,
even when based on similar data and time periods, makes it difficult to discern a consensus
or compare results across studies. The problem starts with the definition of immigrants
and natives. Roughly between 1985 and 1995, three groups of immigrants entered the
German labor market: foreign migrants (that we consider below), ethnic Germans, and East
Germans.5 Since all three groups differed, among other things, in their migration incentives,
skills, and regional allocation, the empirical implications from studies considering these
different groups are obviously not comparable. On top of that, some studies run into data
issues identifying East and ethnic Germans as migrants (both held or received German
citizenship upon arrival), raising concerns that any effect of immigration is driven by the
allocation of these “German” inflows rather than changes in the resident native workforce.
And even if studies use the same definition of immigrants and natives, they still rely on
alternate measures of migration flows (skill-specific or overall), exploit different sources
of variation (skill-cells, regions, or both), and include varying sets of control variables,
implying that they identify conceptually different parameters that answer different questions
boatlift, first investigated in Card (1990). The original study finds no effects of marielitos on natives as does
a recent analysis of Peri and Yasenov (2017) based on an improved identification strategy. This finding has
been substantiated by Lewis (2004) and Bodvarsson et al. (2008) showing potential channels through which
the immigrant shock might have been absorbed without affecting wages. In contrast, Borjas (2017) argues that
marielitos did have a negative effect on wages, but only for high school dropouts.
4In addition, they use aggregate data for rather large regional units which, at a time when long distance
commuting was more costly, might lead them to estimate a smaller employment response because cross-border
job-to-job moves are not measured.
5Glitz (2012) analyses the inflow of ethnic Germans after 1995, exploiting a dispersal policy that allocated
immigrants across districts. Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2014) investigate the inflow of East Germans using
information on an individual’s training occupation and residence in early childhood to identify a supply push to
West Germany. D’Amuri et al. (2010) use the total inflow comprising of foreign immigrants, ethnic and East
Germans.
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(Dustmann et al. 2016).6
In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive assessment of the refugee-driven immi-
gration shock between 1988 and 1993 on the resident native workforce in the West German
labor market. In contrast to some earlier studies (e.g. Bonin 2005; Glitz 2012; Dustmann and
Glitz 2015), we exclude East and ethnic Germans from our analysis, thus getting as close
as possible to the impact of immigration on the resident native labor force. Our empirical
design exploits spatial variation in immigrant inflows across commuting zones, enabling us to
estimate the overall effect of immigration on various subgroups of the labor market, including
skill and age groups, industries, and occupations. In doing so, we recast several wage and
employment estimates from the literature in a general and consistent empirical framework.
Unlike most existing empirical papers (also those based on longitudinal micro-data), we
additionally trace out the dynamic effects of immigration, evaluate short run (5 years) and
long run (10 years) effects, control for worker selection into employment, and evaluate the
underlying adjustment mechanisms in our employment analysis. As indicated above, the
inflow that we consider was of exceptional magnitude and dominated by refugees. However,
while all refugee shocks share particular similarities, they also exhibit important differences
that prevent direct conclusions about other refugee shocks such as today’s. Most importantly,
the refugee wave between 1988 and 1993 was presumably more substitutable to resident
German workers as it encompassed many East European migrants who were often well
educated and had basic knowledge of the German language. Despite this, we believe that a
thorough understanding of the labor market effects of this particular immigration shock, and
especially its dynamics, may help policymakers today to design more effective regulations in
order to harvest the benefits of immigration.
Any study of the impact of immigration must deal with potential endogeneity of immigrant
inflows. Since the immigration shock that we consider was largely composed of refugees
— Yugoslavs fleeing the Balkan conflicts, Turks escaping violence against the Kurdish
population, migrants leaving transition economies in the former Eastern Bloc states, and
Kazakhs, Afghans, Iranians, and Lebanese driven out of their home country by ongoing
conflicts — it is reasonable to assume that the timing and skill composition of the overall
shock was largely exogenous.7 Not so, however, the choice of the particular destination
country, and, even more precarious for our case, the selection into a particular region within
the destination country. For example, if these refugees, conditional on entering Germany,
selected themselves into thriving regions with favorable employment prospects, simple
correlations between local immigrant inflows and native wages or employment would be
biased upward. To address this concern, many papers have exploited historical immigrant
allocations to predict local immigration shocks that are uncorrelated with current demand
6For example, many of the previous studies consider skill-specific migration flows (rather than overall flows),
and therefore identify the distributional effects of immigration on native outcomes. In contrast, the political and
public debate is often more broadly concerned with the overall migration flows. In this paper, we focus on the
latter.
7As noted in Borjas and Monras (2016), refugee-driven supply shocks are plausibly exogenous along various
relevant dimensions such as skills, magnitude, and the economic condition in the destination country.
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factors (Card 2001; Peri and Sparber 2009; Glitz 2012; Dustmann and Glitz 2015). However,
in our setting, we find such an instrument to lack reasonable power of predicting the pattern
of current inflows, and therefore devise an instrument exploiting a region’s distance to the
south and east German border. This instrument rests on two particular features of the German
migration history: first, the guest worker period between 1955 and 1968 which generated a
substantial south-north gradient in immigrant employment shares and led immigrants two
decades later to settle where earlier immigrants already resided;8 second, the total blockade
of East-West migration since 1961, which induced exceptionally low shares of foreign
workers from the Eastern Bloc states, and led later immigrants to trickle into the country
from east to west, often staying close to their home country for commuting reasons. Taken
together, by exploiting a refugee-driven immigrant shock, by estimating the overall impact
on various important subgroups of the labor market, and by analyzing the dynamic effects
over time, we are able to provide a comprehensive and consistent assessment of the impact
of immigration on the resident native workforce for a leading European economy.
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating simple models relating the short run
change in local native wages and employment to the associated overall inflow of immigrant
employment between 1988 and 1993, instrumented using distance to border. Overall, our
main result indicates that an inflow of foreign migrants has a negative short run effect on
average native wages and employment: within five years, a one percentage point rise in local
immigrant employment — around half of the average foreign employment inflow over that
time period — reduces local wages and employment by about 0.68% and 1.13%, respectively.
Taken at face value, the employment effect suggests an almost perfect short run displacement
of native workers at the local level, where for every additional immigrant finding a job in
a region, one native leaves or no longer enters employment in that region. These baseline
results are robust to a variety of specification checks concerning the unit of observation,
the choice of regions, the inclusion of further covariates, and alternative measures of the
immigration shock and native outcomes.
It is important to bear in mind that our empirical estimates refer to a relatively short
time frame (1988-1993), whereas many analyses of immigration consider decadal changes.
In the short run, we expect negative responses to be more severe than in the longer term
when firms might adjust their capital or production technology (Lewis 2011; DG), workers
might continue to settle in other regions or specialize in higher skilled occupations (Peri and
Sparber 2009), and future entrants might invest into more education (Hunt 2017). In line
with this reasoning, we find positive wage and employment effects in the post-shock period,
1993-1998, that are sufficiently large to compensate for the entire wage and employment
reduction in the 1988-1993 period.9 In addition, we find that local employment reductions
8We acknowledge that the initial allocation of immigrants that we exploit is driven by demand considerations,
since guest workers moved to (or were assigned to) areas requiring additional labor at the time. To the extent
that this implies a positive correlation with wage and employment developments during our analysis period, this
would generate an upward bias in our estimates and lead us to understate the negative effect. Our results do not
point to such effects, and we provide evidence suggesting that our instrument is indeed exogenous.
9This dynamic adjustment process is consistent with a recent study by Ruist et al. (2017), who document
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might be associated with native job-to-job mobility between regions, and we show that on
average roughly two-thirds of the local employment response can be traced back to such
cross-regional moves. Importantly, this implies that the economy-wide employment decline
is substantially smaller than suggested by our local estimates, even in the short run.10
To provide a coherent picture of the native response to immigration and to better understand
the sources of these effects, we then assess the impact of immigration on natives with different
levels of education and age, and in different types of occupations and industries. We find that
employment losses are more important among unskilled than skilled workers, and stronger
for workers above 30 than for labor market entrants, while wage reductions are, somewhat
surprisingly, more pronounced among skilled and middle-aged workers. Looking across
occupations and industries, we find that wage effects are concentrated among workers in
simple occupations and in nontradable sectors, whereas employment effects are concentrated
in tradable sectors, consistent with earlier evidence reported in DG.
Finally, we decompose the employment effect into inflows and outflows, distinguishing
between cross-regional employment moves (job-to-job) on the one hand, and transitions
between employment and nonemployment on the other hand. Overall, we find that both
inflows and outflows contribute to the net employment decline, with around two-thirds
attributable to declining inflows, and one-third to rising outflows. If we further differentiate
between job-to-job moves across regional borders and employment-nonemployment transi-
tions, our key finding is that on average about two-thirds of the reduction in inflows sources
in job-to-job transitions from other regions. This suggests that, as in DSS, firms react to an
immigrant-induced labor supply shock by adjusting their hiring behavior, insulating incum-
bent workers from negative effects of immigration. While geographic flows are an important
determinant of inflows, we find that outflows are primarily affected by nonemployment flows.
In particular, we see a significant rise in these nonemployment flows among workers above
50, consistent with strong incentives prevailing for this group of workers to retire early.
In the next two sections, we provide some background on the German history of immigra-
tion and introduce the data. We then describe our empirical design in section 2.4, and discuss
our identification strategy in section 2.5. Section 3.5 presents our results, and section 3.6
concludes our analysis.
that an overlap of (negative) short run and (positive) long run responses to immigration shocks might explain
why immigration studies reach different conclusions regarding the wage impact of immigrants. Their argument
focuses on the shift share type of instrument, which is also central to our identification. Note, however, that in
our setting, an overlapping response bias is unlikely to be an important concern as the two decades preceding our
analysis period have seen comparably small fluctuations in immigrant inflows.
10To the extent that immigrants induce natives to switch jobs, the newly created job matches could potentially
benefit natives. For example, underneath Peri and Sparber (2009)’s idea of native specialization in communication-
intensive or complex tasks is the notion of natives moving from one job to another.
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2.2. Background and Macro Trends
Immigration to Germany: To provide context, Figure 2.1 plots net foreign migration flows
between 1972 and 2002, broken out by three major regions of origin.11 The first group
includes immigrants from guest worker countries including the former Yugoslavia, Turkey,
Greece, Italy, and Portugal; the second group consists of all major Eastern Bloc states such
as Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Poland, and Romania; and the last
group summarizes all remaining inflows, primarily composed of Asian source countries,
including Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Lebanon. While the figure reveals sizable
fluctuations in net migration throughout all years — caused by, e.g., the discontinuation of
guest worker contracts in 1973, family reunification in the years to follow, and the economic
recession of 1982 — the most striking observation emerges from the relatively short period
between 1985 and 1995: within a decade, the stock of immigrants rose dramatically by 64%
from 4.4 million to 7.2 million people, implying a net population growth of 5% relative to
1985.
The unprecedented surge of immigration between 1988 and 1993, in particular, was almost
entirely composed of refugees from various flashpoints in Europe and Asia, among them,
Yugoslavs fleeing the Balkan conflicts (27.2% of the total inflow), as well as Turks (21.9%),
Kazakhs, Afghans, Iranians, and Lebanese, but also migrants leaving transition economies in
the former Eastern Bloc states (Bauer et al. 2005).12 This immigration shock (net inflows
peaked at 600,000 immigrants in 1992) hit the German labor market and administration
rather unexpected, and resulted in a gradual deterioration of the public opinion towards
immigration which culminated in severe xenophobic riots and a profound reform of the
asylum law. Indeed, the implementation of this law on July 1, 1993, explains the substantial
reduction of inflows from this year onwards (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge
2004). In sum, the sudden rise and the abrupt reduction between 1988 and 1993 may be
seen as a large-scale natural experiment (D’Amuri et al. 2010; Borjas and Monras 2016) that
allows studying the labor market effects on natives in an economic and public environment
that was initially unprepared to deal with such large numbers of immigrant arrivals.
Immigrants and the Native Labor Market: An immediate concern arising from the previ-
ous discussion is whether these immigrants actually gained access to the labor market after
arrival. Their refugee status, the lack of official certificates, delayed recognition of foreign
degrees, or uncertainty about the permanence of stay generated severe impediments for
refugee migrants to enter the job market. Also, legal working requirements were particularly
restrictive until 1991, confining refugees’ right to work throughout the asylum process (Aufen-
thaltsgestattung) and toleration status (Duldung).13 As Figure 2.2 illustrates based on our
11Data are available at the German Federal Statistical Office.
12For this reason, we will use the terms immigrant and refugee migrants in our analysis interchangeably.
However, we note that this is a slight abuse of language as the total immigration flow also comprises of a rather
small fraction of migrants from non-refugee sending countries.
13For background information on the regulatory framework, see Appendix A.2.
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Figure 2.1.: Total Immigrant Inflows by Region of Origin Between 1973 and 2002
Notes: Figure shows total net inflows (in thousands) from foreign countries to Germany between 1973 and 2002.
We classify all nationalities into three major regions of origin (see main text). The figure illustrates the sharp rise
of immigration between 1988 and 1993. Data source: German Federal Statistical Office.
administrative data, the surge in overall population inflows indeed coincided with a parallel
rise in immigrant employment rates by about 2 percentage points, equivalent to roughly 450
thousand additionally employed immigrants.14 While less than the overall population growth
(5%), this shock still constitutes a substantial immigrant-induced expansion of local labor
supply and suggests that we capture the bulk of inflows most likely to affect resident native
labor. However, it is conceivable that some immigrants found a job outside the social security
system, e.g., through the system of bilateral labor treaties (Werkvertragsarbeitnehmerabkom-
men) first established in 1988 with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and
Austria in an attempt to recruit workers for the building industry. According to official
figures, these agreements sparked a rise in the number of temporary labor migrants from
about 15,000 workers in 1988 to 95,000 in 1992 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge
2006; Menz 2009). We would suspect that these labor migrants provided less competition
for natives than immigrants employed subject to social security, however, to test whether this
“undercounting” of the employment shock still affects our results, we show in section 2.6.4
that our results are robust to excluding the building sector from our analysis.
2.3. Data Set and Descriptive Overview
German Social Security Records: Our analysis is based on a representative 2% subsample
of administrative records of all dependent employees subject to social security (SIAB 7510),
provided by the IAB (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung). The data cover the
14For example, between 1988 and 1993, total West German employment (subject to social security) rose from
about 20.4 million to 21.7 million workers, suggesting that total immigrant employment increased from about
1.63 (20.4×8.0%) to 2.08 (21.7×9.6%) million workers.
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Figure 2.2.: Immigrant Employment Shares and Total Employment Counts Between 1985
and 1995
Notes: Figure shows the immigrant employment shares calculated from our analysis sample (see main text) and
the evolution of total dependent employment of natives for the West German labor market between 1985 and
1995. Total native employment multiplied by 50 is reported net off East and ethnic German employment. Data
source: SIAB 7510.
years 1975-2010 and integrate information on employment as well as periods of registered
unemployment.15 Two reasons make this data set particularly useful for our analysis. First,
it allows us to construct accurate measures of employment not only for natives but also for
immigrants. While the number of immigrants entering the social security system between
1988 and 1993 underestimates the total number of new arrivals (recall that many immigrants
were not allowed to work), we suspect that our data capture well that part of the inflow which
is most relevant for the development of native wages and employment.16 Second, our data
allow us to track individuals across space, employment states, and over time, enabling us to
improve on many earlier studies by controlling for worker selection in wage regressions, and
by casting light on the mechanisms underlying the employment effects.
Sample Restrictions and Variables: We restrict our analysis to all regularly employed and
unemployed male and female workers aged 18-64 in 204 geographically disjoint commuting
zones covering the entire West German labor market, excluding Berlin (Koller and Schwen-
gler 2000).17 From the resulting sample, which we refer to as “labor force”, we draw two
primary subsamples, one for our wage analysis and one for our employment analysis. For
15The data are representative for about 80% of the German workforce. Excluded are self-employed, civil
servants, full-time students, and the military; see vom Berge et al. (2013b) for details.
16As commonly done in German data, we identify immigrants based on citizenship rather than country of birth
(Bonin 2005; D’Amuri et al. 2010; Glitz and Wissmann 2017). We describe how we impute missing values in
Appendix A.1. We also calculated the descriptive results below based on data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study, which records the country of birth (rather than citizenship). We found similar trends, though as
expected, the increase between 1988 and 1993 is somewhat more pronounced.
17We exclude workers in training and in marginal employment because wages of trainees are unlikely to
reflect an individual’s productivity and marginal employment is not consistently observed prior to 1999.
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our wage analysis, we drop part-time workers since we only observe daily wages and the
part-time status (no working hours), and include only workers observed in two consecutive
periods in the same local labor market (see below).18 In our employment analysis, we keep
part-time employees, but weight them down by 1/2 or 2/3, depending on the particular
part-time status (small vs. large). We distinguish between unskilled and skilled workers
(based on the level of education) and between three age groups (18-29, 30-49, and 50-64).
Individuals with at most a high school degree (Abitur) are considered unskilled, whereas
individuals who completed an apprenticeship training or obtained a tertiary degree (e.g.,
Bachelor, Ph.D.) are considered skilled.19 While our main reason for choosing a two-skill
classification is to avoid sample size issues in small local labor markets, this grouping also
facilitates comparability of our results with Anglo-Saxon countries, where many occupations
that require apprenticeship training in Germany demand a college degree.
Identifying East and Ethnic German Inflows: An important issue for our analysis con-
cerns the definition of immigrants and the resident native labor force. As indicated earlier,
our analysis period has not only witnessed a dramatic rise in refugee migration, but also
experienced substantial inflows of East and ethnic Germans — both recorded as Germans
in our data set.20 These coincident inflows of “Germans” might confound our analysis for
two main reasons: first, due to their German citizenship, they potentially enter our left hand
side variable, thus generating an upward or downward bias in our wage and employment
analysis, depending on their wage development and whether their allocation is positively
or negatively correlated with the inflow of refugee migrants;21 and second, these migrants
constitute a shock to the resident native labor force in and of themselves, so their exclusion
might result in an omitted variable bias. To address these concerns, we draw on selection
rules to identify East and ethnic Germans in our West German analysis sample. Specifically,
following Glitz and Wissmann (2017) we define all individuals whose first employment spell
indicates an East German location as East Germans, and exclude the complete employment
biographies of these workers from our analysis.22 Moreover, we identify ethnic Germans by
exploiting administrative information on the receipt of registered integration programs such
as language courses (Brücker and Jahn 2011).
Local Labor Market Trends: Table 2.1 summarizes our analysis sample for the years
1988 and 1993, calculated across employment weighted commuting zones. The next rows
18Wages are top-coded at the social security contribution ceiling. We impute censored wages following the
approach in Glitz (2012); see Appendix A.1 for details.
19Due to data limitations in the education variable, we impose some minor corrections; see Appendix A.1.
20According to statistics from the Federal Office of Administration (Bundesverwaltungsamt) and the German
Federal Statistical Office of Germany, about 1.65 million ethnic Germans and 1.45 million East Germans entered
West Germany between 1988 and 1993.
21Note that, as explained below, our wage analysis is based on two-period regional stayers, suggesting that
the influx of Germans with lower wage levels per se does not affect our estimates. However, if East and ethnic
Germans featured smaller wage growth on average, our wage estimates would be downward biased.
22We note that since we only observe employment spells in East Germany after 1991, this method allows us
to only partially identify East German migrants.
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Table 2.1.: Summary Statistics of Local Labor Markets
Year Percent Change
1988 1993 1988-1993
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Immigrant Shares (×100)
Labor force share 8.0 (3.9) 9.8 (4.2) 32.1 (49.6)
Employment share 8.0 (3.9) 9.6 (4.2) 31.1 (65.6)
Unskilled 23.1 (10.7) 30.5 (11.8) 50.4 (111.0)
Skilled 4.5 (2.4) 5.6 (2.7) 36.8 (58.0)
Age under 30 6.7 (3.3) 11.1 (4.9) 89.9 (106.8)
Age between 30 and 49 9.6 (4.5) 10.0 (4.3) 12.8 (69.8)
Age 50 and above 6.1 (3.6) 7.2 (3.6) 34.4 (65.7)
Age Distribution (×100); above 50 omitted
Share of natives below 30 30.5 (3.7) 25.8 (3.0) −15.3 (4.9)
Share of immigrants below 30 25.1 (6.7) 30.1 (5.7) 26.1 (42.2)
Share of natives b/w 30 and 49 47.6 (2.6) 50.8 (2.2) 6.8 (5.3)
Share of immigrants b/w 30 and 49 59.1 (6.6) 53.1 (5.2) −9.5 (12.5)
Skill Distribution (×100); skilled omitted
Unskilled share of natives 15.3 (15.3) 12.0 (2.4) −21.5 (5.7)
Unskilled share of immigrants 53.8 (10.0) 50.9 (8.0) −3.6 (19.6)
Occupational Distribution (×100)
Share of natives in simple occupations 63.8 (4.8) 65.5 (4.5) 2.6 (2.4)
Share of immigrants in simple occupations 50.8 (10.4) 57.6 (9.8) 16.0 (26.0)
Employment/Labor force rate (×100)
Average employment rate of natives 89.4 (2.7) 88.0 (2.0) −1.5 (1.6)
Average employment rate of immigrants 88.6 (4.7) 85.7 (4.7) −3.2 (6.1)
Wages (in 1995 Euros)
Log average wage of natives (imputed) 4.33 (0.1) 4.41 (0.1) 8.1 (2.1)
Log average wage of immigrants (imputed) 4.21 (0.1) 4.22 (0.1) 0.4 (6.4)
Native-Immigrant wage gap 0.12 (0.1) 0.20 (0.1) 7.7 (6.2)
Local labor markets 204 204
Notes: Table shows summary statistics of the baseline analysis sample, calculated across local labor markets
(commuting zones), weighting each observation by total native employment. The sample is restricted to West
Germany and excludes ethnic and East German migrants (see main text and Appendix for details). Wages are
deflated to 1995. Data source: SIAB 7510.
show that local immigrant shares rose by more than 30%, with the largest increases among
unskilled (50%) and workers under age 30 (90%), but also sizable gains among skilled and
older workers. Comparisons of the age and skill structure between natives and immigrants
show that the recent inflow of immigrants was disproportionately younger and lower educated
than resident natives, offsetting the overall trend of aging and skill upgrading in the population.
Similarly, we find that the share of immigrants working in simple occupations (defined below)
rises considerably over time, though, surprisingly, starting from a lower level than natives to
begin with. The bottom rows show the evolution of average native and immigrant wages (in
logs) as well as the difference between the two. During our analysis period, native wages
rose by about 8.1 log points, compared to only 0.4 log points for immigrants, implying that
the wage gap increased by 7.7 log points (1.54 log points p.a.). As illustrated in Appendix
14
2.3. DATA SET AND DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW
Figure 2.3.: Kernel Density Estimation of Changes in Immigrant Employment Shares Be-
tween 1988 and 1993
Notes: Figure shows kernel estimates of region level changes in immigrant employment shares between 1988 and
1993. Estimation is weighted by a region’s total native employment in the base year, and uses an Epanechnikov
kernel with bandwidth 0.005. Data source: SIAB 7510.
Table A.1, using a series of fixed effects models, these basic patterns also hold within detailed
education-experience groups, and within the same regions, occupations, and industries.
The standard deviation of immigrant shares noted in Table 2.1 points to large variations
across regional labor markets. To draw a more comprehensive picture, Figure 2.3 plots the
density of region level changes in immigrant employment shares between 1988 and 1993,
weighting each region by total native employment in the base year. Overall, the distribution
is roughly centered around the mean, and reveals a somewhat longer right tail, with some
regions experiencing an increase in immigrant employment of up to 10%.
In Table 2.2, we list the 1988 and 1993 immigrant shares for the 30 largest commuting
zones, ranked by their total labor force (natives+immigrants) in 1988. The table illustrates
substantial variation in immigrant shares and inflows over time. For instance, within the
5-year period, the share of immigrants rises by 2.9 percentage points in Heidelberg, Nürnberg,
and Aachen, and by only 0.4 percentage points in Braunschweig. Another interesting feature
coming out of this table is the broader geographic distribution of immigrant shares: of the
30 regions listed in the table, 14 exhibit two-digit immigrant shares by 1993, and these
are all located in south (8) or middle (6) Germany. Computing the average growth in the
immigrant labor force share (col. 4) for north, middle, and south regions listed in the table
yields values of 1.2, 1.8, and 2.5 percentage points, respectively. The dominating role of,
especially, southern Germany with respect to the rise in immigrant employment goes back
to the early settlements of guest workers in the 1950s and 1960s, and it constitutes a core
element of our identification strategy.
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Table 2.2.: Distribution of Immigrant Labor Force Across Local Labor Markets
in 1975
Total LF Immigrant Share Difference
ID Name of Region 1988 1993 1988-1993
usually largest single region (1) (2) (3) (4)
8 Hamburg 930,000 7.5 9.1 1.6
120 Stuttgart 929,450 16.4 18.5 2.1
159 München 914,150 13.9 16.8 2.8
92 Frankfurt/Main 852,150 14.0 16.4 2.4
45 Düsseldorf 606,650 10.6 12.3 1.7
57 Köln 587,900 11.6 13.5 1.9
17 Hannover 412,000 7.1 8.1 0.9
46 Duisburg 389,550 7.9 9.6 1.7
73 Dortmund 361,250 6.7 7.9 1.2
185 Nürnberg 359,650 9.1 12.0 2.9
63 Gelsenkirchen 335,400 7.5 9.0 1.4
47 Essen 278,750 6.5 8.0 1.5
42 Bremen 266,600 4.8 5.9 1.0
118 Saarbrücken 250,350 6.1 8.6 2.5
128 Karlsruhe 240,800 10.2 12.9 2.8
130 Mannheim 223,850 9.3 11.7 2.4
52 Wuppertal 220,950 10.9 12.8 1.9
67 Bielefeld 212,600 7.7 9.4 1.7
59 Bonn 208,450 8.3 9.7 1.5
6 Kiel 200,050 2.9 3.7 0.8
114 Ludwigshafen 188,300 7.9 9.2 1.3
64 Münster 187,500 4.1 5.8 1.6
200 Augsburg 185,100 9.5 11.7 2.1
129 Heidelberg 183,450 9.5 12.4 2.9
56 Aachen 163,650 9.0 11.9 2.9
9 Braunschweig 162,550 4.1 4.4 0.4
75 Lüdenscheid 153,300 11.1 12.4 1.3
72 Bochum 147,600 5.8 7.5 1.7
135 Freiburg 146,750 7.6 10.0 2.4
81 Kassel 146,600 6.2 7.1 0.9
Notes: Table shows the 30 largest local labor market regions in 1988. The labor force
is calculated as the sum of employed and unemployed individuals and multiplied by 50.
Columns 2 and 3 show the share of immigrants in the total labor force calculated based
on the labor force data for the year indicated in the column heading. Entries in column 4
show the percentage point change between 1988 and 1993. Data source: SIAB 7510.
2.4. Empirical Framework
2.4.1. Set-up
In our main analysis, we estimate models of the change in wages and employment of natives
in group i and region r on the total region-specific immigrant inflow between 1988 and
1993.23 Formally:
∆ logwirt = αi+θirT 85−88r +βit∆I
88−93
r + eir (2.1)
23See DSS for a theoretical underpinning.
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and
∆Nirt = δi+ψirT 85−88r + γit∆I
88−93
r + uir (2.2)
where
∆I88−93r =
0, if t ∈ {86,87,88}Ir,93−Ir,88
Nr,88+Ir,88
, if t ∈ {89, . . . ,93}
and
∆Nirt =
Nir,t −Nir,t−1
Nir,t−1
and ∆ logwirt = logwir,t − logwir,t−1 for t ∈ {86 . . . 93}
We implement these models in first differences (losing the first year) and separately for each
group i. Hence, in our baseline specification we eliminate region- and group-specific fixed
effects, and allow the response of natives to differ across groups. We additionally allow for
subgroup-specific growth rates in wages and employment, αi and δi, and take out differential
wage and employment trends for subgroup i in region r by including linear region-specific
time trends for the pre-shock period, θirTr and ψirTr, where Tr = 1 for years 1986-1988.24 To
identify the region-specific trend separately from the immigration shock, we accordingly set
the immigrant inflow in these years equal to zero — in line with our discussion in section 2.2.
We estimate equations (2.1) and (2.2) using a two-step instrumental variable procedure:
in a first step, we regress the log wage change or an indicator for a particular employment
transition in each year on a full set of age and education indicators interacted with a gender
dummy; we then aggregate the residual of these regressions at the region-year level and
regress region-level first differences on the immigrant inflow, instrumented using distance
to border. Our models therefore identify the impact of immigrants conditional on the
demographic structure in a regional labor market.
Our main interest concerns the parameters measuring the average subgroup-specific impact
of an inflow of immigrants on native wages and employment in a region: βi and γi. In our
setting, these coefficients can be interpreted as the percent change in wages and employment
of subgroup i in response to a one percentage point change in local immigrant employment
between 1988 and 1993. They incorporate complementarities between skill and age groups
as well as between capital and labor, and they accommodate the possibility of heterogeneous
labor supply elasticities (or wage rigidities) for different demographic groups. Note that
our immigration shock refers to a region as a whole — that is, we investigate how different
native groups within a regional labor market are affected by an overall inflow of immigrants,
irrespective of the specific composition of that inflow and the implied relative immigration
shock for different native groups. We believe that this is a more policy relevant analysis,
24The coefficients θir and ψir can be interpreted as the average annual wage and employment growth for
subgroup i in region r between 1986 and 1988. We arrive at equivalent parameter estimates when subtracting the
corresponding average from our outcome variable and running regressions on the years 1989-1993. Standard
errors in this case are somewhat smaller.
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primarily because the demographic structure of immigrant inflows is often hard to measure
(especially at the regional level), and devising appropriate regulations based on the particular
composition of immigrants, while potentially superior in terms of effectiveness, seems
difficult to achieve in practice.25
Following DSS, we measure the immigrant supply shock using the change in the number
of employed immigrants as a fraction of total (native + immigrant) employment in the base
period. This approach bears two issues relevant to the interpretation of our estimates. First, by
relating the inflow to a fixed measure of employment in the base year, we avoid confounding
changes in immigrant inflows with potentially correlated changes in native employment.
As shown formally in Card and Peri (2016), the alternative specification based on changes
in the share of employed immigrants might generate a downward bias in wage estimates,
and is mechanically negatively correlated with changes in native employment as dependent
variable.26 Second, by focusing on employment inflows divided by total employment in the
base period, a coefficient of -1 implies that for each additional immigrant employed, one
worker who is already in the country leaves or no longer enters employment in a region.
This worker is native (foreign) with probability equal to the share of natives (foreigners) in
total employment — we summarize these probabilities in the top panel of Table 2.1. By
focusing on the subgroup of immigrants who find a job, however, we might miss indirect
effects on natives from immigrants who also arrived but did not find a job.27 To see how the
definition of the immigrant shock affects our results, we also used labor force and population
measures to gauge the immigrant inflow. However, these alternative measures led to very
similar conclusions, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
2.4.2. Implementation Issues
Controlling for Worker Selection: Since our data are longitudinal in nature, we can account
for selection into employment in wage regressions even though our unit of analysis is the
region. In particular, before performing the covariate-adjustment at the individual level (see
above), we focus on only those workers who are employed full-time in the same region
in two consecutive years.28 In so doing, we eliminate the change in wages between two
25One reason is downgrading of immigrants, which refers to a systematic difference between the position of
an immigrant in the labor market (e.g. measured by the position in the wage distribution) and the position of a
native with the same observed education/experience level. Based on a simple imputation procedure described in
Dustmann et al. (2016), we find substantial downgrading in our analysis period: the effective share of unskilled
immigrants (who entered the German labor market within the last five years) is on average 25% higher than the
share of observed unskilled immigrants.
26The key issue here is that changes in shares are downward biased if natives move into similar regions as do
immigrants, e.g., due to positive demand shocks attracting both natives and immigrants, and implying higher
wage and employment growth. Studies using this measure often draw a more negative picture of immigration
shocks on native labor markets (Borjas 2003; Bonin 2005; Steinhardt 2011; Borjas 2014) than papers using a
specification that avoids this bias (Card 2001, 2007, 2009; Peri and Sparber 2009).
27One possibility is that employers, faced with a larger labor supply, are able to use this as a threat to enforce
lower wages for the extant workforce. One could also think of the reverse effect, where native employees increase
their effort in the wake of immigrants waiting to ’take their jobs’.
28This procedure is similar to first-difference regressions estimated at the worker-level, with differences taken
within worker-region spells.
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periods that is generated by compositional adjustments in local employment (which might
be caused by immigrants in the first place). If low wage workers are more strongly affected
by immigrants than high wage workers — e.g., because immigrants are overrepresented
in the low wage service sector —, and if their labor supply elasticity is relatively large —
e.g., because they are more often employed under temporary contracts — not controlling for
worker selection would lead to upward biased wage effects.
However, although restricting attention to stayers eliminates a composition bias in terms of
wage levels, this approach may come at the cost of selection on wage changes. For example,
if stayers are not only high wage but also high wage growth workers, our estimate of the
impact of immigrants would be underestimated. We believe that this is less of an issue for
two main reasons: first, comparisons of the variance of wage levels and wage changes show
that the former is much larger than the latter. So, by eliminating the potential bias in wage
levels, we likely account for the quantitatively more important bias. Second, we selected all
(geographic) movers and stayers during the treatment years (1988-1993), and plotted their
wage growth eight years earlier. Although the sample of movers is much smaller than the
sample of stayers, we find remarkably similar wage growth distributions across all years.
Cumulative Coefficients: In our empirical implementation of equations (2.1) and (2.2),
we decompose the overall impact of the 1988-1993 immigrant shock on natives, βi and
γi, into a series of annual effects, βit and γit . We then calculate the cumulative effect over
a particular (flexible) time period, say, 1988-1993, by adding up the parameters from the
annual regressions, i.e., βi = ∑1993t=1989βit . The βit’s and γit’s are interesting, as they help us to
understand how local economies adjust to immigration shocks: technological adjustments
(Lewis 2011; Peri 2012; DG), mobility of labor (Card and DiNardo 2000) and capital,
occupational specialization (Peri and Sparber 2009), and also land and housing prices (Saiz
2003, 2007) are just a few of many potential margins of response. What they all have in
common, though, is that their adjustment takes years to fully unfold, and our analysis of
the dynamic adjustments over about a decade might provide evidence in favor of these
mechanisms.
Two-Step Implementation of IV-Approach: Unlike conventional two-stage least squares
(2SLS), we implement the first stage of our IV-models separately from the second stage as
this enables us to adopt a different weighting scheme in each step of the estimation. In our
first stage models, we want to weight by total native employment in 1988, first, because our
immigrant shock refers to the region as a whole and is scaled to 1988, and second, because it
accommodates the analysis of heterogeneous effects in response to the same shock. In our
second stage models, however, the dependent variable refers to the subgroup-region-year,
and hence, the appropriate weight should also refer to this cell. To account for the omitted
first stage uncertainty in our “plug-in OLS” approach, we compute bootstrapped standard
errors using a pairs bootstrap and 1,000 replications.29
29Another way of accounting for the first stage uncertainty would be to interpret the first stage as pre-estimation
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2.5. Instrumental Variables
Immigrants are more likely to settle in regions that experience positive demand shocks over
time, generating an upward bias in OLS estimates of both βˆi and γˆi. Since we estimate
models of equation (2.1) and (2.2) in first differences, we eliminate time constant region-
and subgroup-specific heterogeneity in wage and employment levels that might be correlated
with immigrant inflows. While region-fixed effects take out many structural differences that
are correlated with wage/employment levels (such as industry and occupation structure),
subgroup-specific effects eliminate heterogeneity between age and skill groups. In addition,
subgroup-region specific time trends control for differences in wage and employment growth
prior to the immigrant shock. Still, there is space for omitted variable bias if shocks within
regions and subgroups simultaneously affect immigrant inflows and native outcomes. To
account for this possibility, we devise an instrumental variable strategy based on the (airline)
distance between a local labor market and the southern (1) and eastern (2) German border.30
This choice is guided by the specific composition of inflows indicated in section 2.2. We
explain the details and summarize our results in the following.
Distance to Southern Border: The predictive power of distance to the southern German
border dates back to the guest worker period during the 1950s/60s. Shortly after World
War II, the German economy faced a shortage of labor caused by the preceding war period
and draining inflows from East Germany. To fuel industrial production at home, politi-
cians negotiated multiple recruitment agreements (Anwerbeabkommen) with several South
European states, who themselves were facing high structural unemployment rates at the
time. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants moved to Germany in the following years,
crossing the southern border, and starting to settle in southern Germany (primarily Bavaria
and Baden-Wuerttemberg) before starting to move north (North Rhine-Westphalia). These
allocation choices, which were primarily demand-driven due to industrial melting pots in
these areas, ultimately generated a south-north gradient in immigrant shares. While their
settlement was meant to be transitory, many immigrants stayed after the last recruitment
halt in 1973, beginning to reunify their families and thereby consolidating the temporary
immigrant enclaves.31 Since new immigrants tend to settle where earlier immigrants had
moved to before, our distance-to-south instrument predicts the allocation of the large fraction
of immigrants coming from former guest worker countries between 1988 and 1993.
Distance to Eastern Border: To target the settlement of another large group of immigrants
between 1988 and 1993, those coming from former Eastern Bloc states (excluding ethnic
step in which we generate the instrument, and then implement a regular two-stage least squares regression using
the generated immigrant inflow as instrument (Wooldridge 2010, ch. 6.1.2). We show in Table A.2 that both the
“Generated IV” and the “plug-in OLS” approach yield similar results. In a slight abuse of terminology, we use
the term 2SLS to refer to our “plug-in OLS” approach in what follows.
30Distance instruments have been widely used in the immigration literature, most often in the US context; see,
e.g., Peri and Sparber (2009); Peri (2012); Smith (2012); Llull (2017).
31Already in 1965 the author Max Frisch epitomized the situation, saying: “We called for workers and people
came”.
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Figure 2.4.: Spatial Distribution of Immigrant Inflows in West Germany Between 1988 and
1993
A. Distance to South German Border B. Distance to East German Border
Notes: Figure plots immigrant employment growth rates for all 204 commuting zones between 1988 and 1993
against distance to border. Panel A shows distance to the southern border and panel B to the eastern border. The
area of each circle is proportional to a region’s employment share in 1988. Data source: SIAB 7510.
and East Germans), we use distance from eastern border as a second instrument. Prior to the
fall of the inner German border, immigrants coming from the former Eastern Bloc accounted
for only 0.3% of the total German population and about 3-4% of all immigrants. Following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, immigrants from these regions came in large
numbers (see section 2.2), and they began to trickle into the Federal Republic from east to
west. Their settlement decision was not affected by prior compatriot settlements (as those
were negligible), but instead reflected a trade-off between employment prospects on the
one hand (inciting them to move to West Germany) and proximity to their home country
on the other hand (inciting them not to move too far west). Travel costs were important for
a large fraction of immigrants who worked during the week and returned to their families
at weekends or migrated temporarily for several weeks or months (Moritz 2011). Based
on these considerations, distance from today’s eastern border is another useful predictor of
immigrant settlements between 1988 and 1993.
First Stage Results: Figure 2.4 illustrates the association between changes in local immi-
grant employment shares in 1988-1993 and the airline distance (in 100 km) from the southern
(panel A) and eastern (panel B) border. Each circle represents a local labor market, with its
area being proportional to native employment in 1988. In line with our previous considera-
tions, we find that regions closer to the border experienced higher immigrant inflows than
regions further away. For example, the airline distance between Stuttgart and Hamburg, about
530 km, suggests that the change in immigrant employment between 1988 and 1993 was
about 1.7 percentage points lower in Hamburg than in Stuttgart. A more detailed summary
of our first stage relationships is provided in columns 1 to 4 of Table 2.3.32 Our preferred
specification, reported in column 1, includes distance to south and east separately. It explains
32Similar results emerge when we exclude the quadratic term or use a spline with 10 knots.
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Table 2.3.: Summary of First Stage Regressions
Ethnic East
Foreign Immigrants Germans Germans
Distance Shift Distance Distance Distance
to South Share IV to South to East to East
and East Distance Distance Average Using ’75 and East Border Border
Border to South to East Distance Density Border
[SIAB] [MC]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance to South −0.050 −0.058 0.032
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Distance to South sq. 0.004 0.005 −0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Distance to East −0.103 −0.128 0.074 0.011 −0.004
(0.036) (0.032) (0.029) (0.008) (0.001)
Distance to East sq. 0.020 0.020 −0.014 −0.004 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000)
Average Distance −0.073
0.016
Average Distance sq. 0.005
0.002
1988-1993
Predicted %-growth 0.045
(0.025)
R-squared (adjusted) 0.250 0.201 0.155 0.224 0.027 0.096 0.070 0.319
F-statistic (excl. Instr.) 16.43 13.27 19.38 30.47 3.34 2.90 12.26 13.82
Local labor markets 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 70
Notes: Table summarizes the first stage results. Columns 1 to 4 report the coefficients from models of the
1988-1993 change in immigrant employment on distance to border (divided by 1,000 km). Column 5 shows an
alternative instrument using the 1975 distribution of immigrants by country of origin across local labor markets,
interacted with the aggregate cumulative inflow from the same region of origin between 1988 and 1993. Column
6 uses the change in ethnic German employment instead of the change in foreign immigrant employment as
dependent variable, and in columns 7 and 8, we use the change in East German employment. In column 7, we
use data from the SIAB-sample, and in column 8, we use data from the German Microcensus as dependent
variable. We use published data from Burchardi and Hassan (2013) to implement these regressions, and refer to
their paper and Online Appendix for details. Data sources: SIAB 7510; German Microcensus 1991, 1993, 1995.
about 25% of the cross-regional variation in immigrant growth rates (adjusted R2), and the
coefficients are jointly significant (F-statistic=16.4). In the next two columns, we examine
each distance instrument separately. As suggested by Figure 2.4, the negative relationship
is rather strong in both cases, generating F-statistics of 13.3 and 19.4. In column 4, we
combine the two distance measures into a single average distance from border. Compared to
our preferred model, this yields a higher F-statistic (30.47), but a smaller adjusted R2 due to
the relative loss of information.33
Our distance-to-south instrument exploits a similar source of variation as the standard
shift share instrument (though dating back to the 1950s/60s, and thus earlier than available
data for regional immigrant densities), and it is natural to wonder how such a shift share
instrument performs relative to our distance measure. We investigate this in column 5,
finding only a weak association between predicted and actual immigrant employment growth
33We define the average distance as d =
(
d(south)2 + d(east)2
)1/2, which yields the smallest values for
regions in south-east Germany and is increasing in northern and western direction.
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(F-statistic=3.43), which disqualifies this instrument for our analysis.34
Confounding Effects of East and Ethnic Germans: Between 1988 and 1993, two other
large waves of immigrants entered the West German labor market: East Germans and
ethnic Germans. Although we exclude these migrants from the outcome variables (focusing
solely on resident native workers), we might still be concerned with a potential omitted
variable bias (see section 2.3). On the one hand, if East Germans located in the same
regions as refugee migrants, and if East Germans also put downward pressure on native
outcomes, then our coefficient estimates would be more negative. On the other hand, if East
Germans avoided regions with high foreign inflows, perhaps because they expected better
employment opportunities in unaffected regions, our estimates would be biased towards zero.
To probe into this issue, we formed a new set of first stage models using proxies for the
regional inflows of ethnic Germans (as identified above) and East German immigrants as
the dependent variables. To measure the inflow of East Germans, we use two approaches.
First, we approximate the inflow of East Germans based on the SIAB sample, with the
obvious shortcomings of being available only from 1992 onwards, and relying on a rather
crude identification based on the location of the first spell (see above). Second, we draw on
information from the German Microcensus, an annual survey of a 1% random sample of the
German population. This survey asked individuals in 1991, 1993, and 1995, whether they
had migrated from East Germany, and we thus use the change in the share of East German
immigrants in West German regions as dependent variable.35 We suspect that this measure
is somewhat more reliable, though it suffers from the limitations of a smaller sample and
potential measurement error. The relationship between these “German” inflows and our
distance instrument is reported in columns 6 to 8 of Table 2.3. For ethnic Germans, we only
find a relatively low correlation between inflows and distance to border, with an F-Statistic
of less than 3. For East Germans, in contrast, we find a relatively strong correlation arising in
both the SIAB and the Microcensus.36 As this finding might cast doubt on our main results,
we show in section 2.6.4 that our key conclusions hold up when we additionally exclude
regions with unusually high inflows of natives in the critical years (potentially East or ethnic
Germans that are not correctly identified), or regions within an 80km strip from the former
inner German border (section 2.6.4).
34In Appendix A.5, we provide a detailed description of the construction of our shift share instrument.
Moreover, we compare our approach with Dustmann and Glitz (2015) who provide a similar application of the
instrument for West Germany during the same time frame but obtain a highly significant relation between the
predicted and the actual change in local labor supply.
35Specifically, we draw on data prepared by Burchardi and Hassan (2013), and refer to their study for further
details of the sample construction. They use a coarser definition of regional units and compute the difference
in the share of East Germans in West Germany, rather than the change of East Germans in the West German
population. Moreover, they refer to the total population rather than the number of employed individuals.
36Moreover, informal experimentation with German pension data suggests that this correlation breaks down if
we focus on employment inflows rather than population inflows.
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2.6. Results
2.6.1. Baseline Effects
Table 2.4 summarizes our baseline results of the impact of immigrants on local native wages
and employment based on equations (2.1) and (2.2). Looking across the first row, reporting
simple OLS effects, we first note that the growth in immigrant employment is uncorrelated
with changes in native wages and employment. These simple correlations might be upward
biased by positive demand shocks jointly attracting immigrants and generating higher wage
and employment growth for natives. Instrumenting the change in immigrant employment
with distance to border, we find considerably more negative effects. In particular, our
coefficient estimates suggest that a one percentage point rise in local immigrant employment
— about half of the average increase between 1988 and 1993 — reduced native wages and
employment by 0.68 and 1.13%, respectively, though the employment effect is somewhat
imprecisely estimated. To put the wage effect into perspective, note that over the same time
period native real wages rose by about 1.3% per year (8.5% over 5 years; see Table 2.1),
suggesting that the negative impact of immigrants did not result in real wage losses for
natives, but rather counteracted what would otherwise have been an even larger wage growth.
To understand how these cumulative effects evolved over time, Figure 2.5 plots the sum
of the 2SLS effects in each year relative to 1988, which we normalize to zero.37 Two main
conclusions emerge: first, our estimates for both wages and employment are close to zero
and statistically insignificant before 1988 when immigrant inflows were low, suggesting
that distance to border is uncorrelated with native wage and employment growth prior to
the inflow of immigrants. This finding alleviates concerns that our instrumental variable
strategy merely picks up persistent labor demand differentials between regions, e.g., due to
different industry compositions, and thus serves as an indirect confirmation of the validity of
our identification strategy (DSS). Second, coinciding with the rapid surge of immigration
from then on, we observe a steady downward trend in wages until 1993, followed by a
relatively flat development thereafter. Reassuringly, this pattern is just the reciprocal of the
rise in immigrant employment shares over the same years (Figure 2.2). While the overall
patterns are similar for employment, the effect starts somewhat delayed, is significant only in
1992, and tends to be compensated in the medium run (after 1993) by positive annual effects.
Taken at face value, the point estimate for 1992 suggests a sizable displacement effect of
about 1.02 employed natives per additional immigrant finding a job (−1.111×0.92).38
How can these estimates be reconciled with the positive or null effects often found in the
literature? We argue that a key difference is time. In the short run, firms might be reluctant or
unable to adjust their capital and production technology, workers might not have found a job
37This means that the difference between t and t+1 is equal to the coefficient estimate for t+1. For simplicity,
we show confidence bands based on non-bootstrapped standard errors which are slightly smaller than bootstrapped
standard errors.
38See Appendix A.3 for a derivation of the native displacement effect. DSS, who also focus on the short run,
report estimates in a similar ballpark (0.9 natives per additional Czech immigrant employed).
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Table 2.4.: Baseline Effects of Immigration on Native Wage and Employment Growth
Wages Employment
’88-’93 ’93-’98 ’88-’98 ’88-’93 ’93-’98 ’88-’98
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled sample
OLS −0.108 0.120 0.010 0.186 0.739 0.920
(0.112) (0.127) (0.199) (0.351) (0.278) (0.554)
2SLS −0.677 0.527 −0.153 −1.125 1.504 0.377
(0.281) (0.187) (0.393) (0.718) (0.474) (1.096)
Panel B: Unskilled
OLS −0.089 −0.120 −0.212 −0.152 0.977 0.821
(0.213) (0.218) (0.363) (0.646) (0.542) (1.039)
2SLS −0.695 −0.101 −0.725 −2.610 1.113 −1.513
(0.459) (0.321) (0.607) (1.166) (0.789) (1.575)
Panel C: Skilled
OLS −0.068 0.244 0.175 0.240 0.766 1.003
(0.122) (0.133) (0.216) (0.376) (0.314) (0.615)
2SLS −0.581 0.843 0.245 −0.917 1.711 0.799
(0.294) (0.208) (0.428) (0.779) (0.558) (1.295)
Local labor markets 204 204 204 204 204 204
Notes: Table shows cumulative wage (columns 1 to 3) and employment (columns 4 to 6) effects from a series
of models relating native annual wage and employment changes to the aggregate inflow of immigrants between
1988 and 1993. Two-stage least squares estimations are implemented in two steps as described in the main
text. The first stage is weighted by initial native employment in 1988, and the second stage is weighted by
native employment in the base year. Estimates are trend-adjusted using a region-specific linear trend based on
years 1986 to 1988. Standard errors are calculated using a pairs bootstrap with 1,000 replications. Data source:
SIAB 7510.
in another region or upgraded to higher skilled occupations yet, and future entrants might
still be investing into more education (see above). All these adjustment processes bear the
potential to turn a negative short run effect of immigration into a null or positive effect in the
medium or long run (Ruist et al. 2017). To shed more light on this, we investigate in columns
2 to 3 and 5 to 6 how wages and employment evolve over the 5-year period following the
immigration shock (1993-1998), and over the entire 10-year time frame (1988-1998). Indeed,
the overall picture is now considerably more optimistic, with significantly positive effects
for both outcomes in 1993-1998 compensating for the negative effects in the short run,
and implying a null effect in the long run. However, while these patterns are consistent
with standard economic theory (Borjas 2009) and empirical results in Monras (2015) and
Edo (2017), they should be regarded suggestive since, as we expand the analysis period,
potentially confounding shocks might debilitate a causal interpretation.39
As indicated, these dynamic adjustments are consistent with various potential explanations.
However, we believe that the magnitude of the short run effects calls for further explanations,
and we investigate several possibilities below. We show that employment losses in one region
39A related concern of long run estimates in settings that use cross regional variation is a potential violation
of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). As we show below, we find substantial spillover effects
induced by native regional mobility, meaning that as time passes, our counterfactual regions also experience an
(indirect) impact of immigrants through native mobility. It is thus difficult to interpret the long run estimates as
an overall causal effect.
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Figure 2.5.: Cumulative Wage and Employment Effects of 1988-1993 Immigrant Inflow
A. Cumulative Wage Effects B. Cumulative Employment Effects
Notes: Figure shows cumulative wage and employment effects for years 1986-1996. In each year, we plot the
sum of coefficient estimates relative to 1988, that is, we sum backward and forward. 95% confidence bands are
indicated in red. The vertical line represents the start of the immigration shock. Data source: SIAB 7510.
are to a large extent associated with employment gains in other regions, and demonstrate
that employment declines are concentrated in particular subgroups, among them the elderly
for whom an outflow from employment might be associated with early retirement, rather
than job search. We also show that the net reduction in regional employment results from
both a slowdown in inflows and an acceleration of outflows, meaning that unlike the typical
notion of native displacement, part of the local employment loss is attributable to immigrants
preventing native workers from finding a job in a region when they otherwise would have.
2.6.2. Skilled and Unskilled
The discussion in section 2.3 (Table 2.1) showed that immigrants were disproportionately un-
skilled, hence it is natural to wonder how different skill groups responded to the immigration
shock. Indeed, panels B and C indicate some striking differences: for unskilled workers, we
find no wage effects, but substantial employment effects of about -2.61%, which, on a per
worker basis means that about 0.37 unskilled natives leave or no longer enter employment for
each additional immigrant employed between 1988 and 1993.40 This suggests that unskilled
workers bear the burden of immigration predominantly through the employment margin:
although they only account for about 15% of local native employment, they account for
35% (0.37/1.04) of its decline. In contrast, our estimates for skilled workers suggest that
they respond primarily through wage losses.41 Taken together, these findings point to a
40Using figures from Tables I (col. 1: native share = 0.975), II (col. 1: 0.276) and IV (col. 2: -1.371)
from DSS, we also obtain a displacement of 0.37 unskilled per additional Czech immigrant employed. This
comparison holds only approximately, because DSS report summary statistics including the unemployed (leading
to a higher unskilled share), whereas our summary statistics refer to employed workers only, which should be
used to calculate the native displacement effect.
41This corresponds to a native displacement of about 0.71 skilled workers. In principle, the sum of unskilled
and skilled displaced workers should sum up to 1.04 (−1.125×0.92), the total effect in 1993. They do not add
up exactly due to the different weighting used in our second stage analysis.
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relatively larger short run labor supply elasticity (or stronger wage rigidities) for unskilled
than skilled workers, meaning that part of what would otherwise have been a wage loss is
compensated by a reduction in employment. These results underpin that a thorough evalua-
tion of immigration effects must consider both wages and employment jointly. Specifically,
if we had only examined wages (assuming inelastic labor supply), we would have found only
skilled workers to be affected negatively by immigration, and our estimates suggest that this
conclusion would have been severely misguided.42
As before, we also examined how the effects evolve over time (col. 2-3 and 5-6). With one
exception (wages for unskilled), the post-migration period is marked by positive wage and
employment effects that are highly significant among skilled workers, and tend to mitigate
the short run contemporary impact of immigration.
2.6.3. Age Groups, Occupations, and Industries
We next narrow our attention to workers in different age groups (young, middle, and old),
and in different types of occupations (simple and advanced) and industries (tradable and
non-tradable), seeking to provide a coherent picture of the impact on the native labor market,
and to better understand the proximate sources of these effects. We will focus on the short run
effects, not only because the existing immigration literature has paid much less attention to
this time horizon, but also because the short run dynamics constitute an essential ingredient
for understanding how local labor markets adjust to immigration shocks.
Young, Middle, and Old Workers: Panel A of Table 2.5 shows 2SLS estimates of the
impact of immigrants on young (under 30), middle (between 30 and 49), and old (above 50)
workers. Since younger workers are both more mobile and on a steeper gradient of their age-
earnings profile (making it easier for employers to enforce reduced wage growth), we might
suspect that they react more strongly to immigrants than older workers with families settled
and wage profiles plateauing. The entries in Table 2.5 generally confirm these considerations.
Although we find no effects for workers below 30, looking at ages 30 to 49, we find that
a one percentage point increase in local immigrant employment reduced native wage and
employment growth by about 0.98% and 2.11%.43 Old workers, in contrast, respond to the
same inflow only on the employment margin (-1.93%), though as we illustrate below, much
of this reduction arises through increased outflows into unemployment, which, at the time,
was an attractive path to early retirement.44
Simple and Advanced Occupations: Since the immigrants that we consider were less edu-
cated on average than natives, and spoke the German language at lower levels of proficiency,
42Somewhat ironically, it is precisely this large employment decline in affected regions which may have
shielded unskilled workers staying employed from incurring similar wage cuts as skilled.
43Note that the joint occurrence of negative wage and employment effects for the large group of middle-aged
workers is consistent with the local supply of capital not being fully elastic (DSS).
44DSS report the largest employment effects for old, followed by young and middle aged workers. Our results
show the largest response among middle aged workers.
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Table 2.5.: Effects of Immigration on Native Wage and Employment Growth by Subgroups
Wages Employment
(1) (2)
Pooled Sample −0.677 −1.125
(0.281) (0.718)
Panel A: Age Groups
Below 30 −0.650 0.892
(0.471) (0.947)
Between 30 and 49 −0.983 −2.109
(0.305) (0.777)
50 and above −0.247 −1.927
(0.352) (0.957)
Panel B: Occupational Complexity
Simple −0.952 −1.169
(0.316) (0.810)
Advanced −0.192 −0.919
(0.303) (0.887)
Panel C: Sectors
Tradable −0.506 −2.054
(0.284) (0.708)
Nontradable −1.041 0.701
(0.369) (0.898)
Panel D: Gender
Men −0.651 −1.179
(0.302) (0.940)
Women −0.713 −0.984
(0.334) (0.606)
Local labor markets 204 204
Notes: Table shows cumulative wage and employment effects from a
series of models relating native annual wage and employment changes
to the aggregate inflow of immigrants between 1988 and 1993, instru-
mented using distance to border. Two-stage least squares estimations
are implemented in two steps, where the first stage is weighted by
initial native employment in 1988, and the second stage is weighted
by native employment in the base year. Estimates are trend-adjusted
using a region-specific linear trend based on the 1986-1988 period.
Standard errors are calculated using a pairs bootstrap with 1,000
replications. Data source: SIAB 7510.
we might expect the effect on natives to be stronger in low skill jobs (e.g., cleaning) than
high skill jobs (e.g., planning, managing, or designing). To test this hypothesis, we slice
the sample into simple and advanced occupations based on the task composition associated
with each job. Using the 1985 wave of the BIBB/IAB Qualification and Career Survey (see
Appendix A.1), we classify the following tasks as “advanced”: designing, making plans,
restoring, servicing and equipping machines (Prantl and Spitz-Oener 2014). We then define
“job complexity” as the average share of advanced tasks in an occupation, and consider an
occupation as advanced (simple) if the associated share is above the employment weighted
median of the job complexity index. By design, simple occupations thus contain relatively
high routine and manual task shares that can be easily performed by lesser skilled immigrants.
As panel B of Table 2.5 shows, we find no effects in advanced jobs, but a large and significant
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wage depression of 0.95% in simple occupations — corroborating our expectation that the
impact on natives is larger in jobs more likely to be performed by immigrants.
Tradable and Non-Tradable Industries: In a recent study for Germany, DG show that an
inflow of immigrants has significant distributional effects on resident employment. Specifi-
cally, using variation between regions and skill groups, they find that an inflow of immigrants
reduces the relative wage of workers in the non-tradable sector, but has no effect in the
tradable sector.45 In contrast to their empirical approach, we only exploit regional variation
in immigration shocks, hence we can examine what type of native response in each sector
generates the distributional effects. We investigate this in panel C of Table 2.5. A striking
observation is that the wage impact in non-tradable industries is about twice as large as in
tradable industries, whereas employment effects are entirely concentrated in the tradable
sector. This means that the relative wage effect reported in DG is associated with an overall
decline in average wages in the non-tradable sector of affected areas relative to unaffected
ones, consistent with firms in the tradable sector responding to changes in labor supply
primarily by means of technological adjustments (instead of wages). It is natural to wonder
what provokes these markedly different response margins in the two sectors. One explanation
might be that wages in the tradable sector are set at the industry level, implying that the local
relative wage elasticity in response to immigration is low.46 While beyond the scope of this
paper, we believe that inquiring deeper into this heterogeneity, perhaps by incorporating
the dimension of product and labor market regulation (Prantl and Spitz-Oener 2014), is a
promising avenue for future research in this area.47
2.6.4. Robustness
In this section, we show that our main results are robust to a variety of robustness checks
regarding the possibility of correlated shocks, the unit of observation, the selection of regions,
the inclusion of further covariates, and alternative measures of the immigration shock and
native outcomes. We moreover illustrate that worker selection into nonemployment generates
an upward bias in standard cross-sectional wage estimates often applied in the immigration
literature. Having established that our results hold up under these alternatives, we then turn to
investigate in more detail the different response margins generating the overall employment
response of natives.
Correlated Shocks: The causal interpretation of our IV estimates hinges on the identifying
45Using the terminology of Dustmann et al. (2016), DG’s design is based on the mixture approach, which
uses variation in immigration across regions and skills cells, thus identifying these distributional effects of
immigration. We instead use the pure spatial approach, exploiting only variation in the immigration shock across
regions.
46DG investigate this by looking at union coverage rates, concluding that industry level wage setting is
probably not the main source.
47As shown in panel D, we also looked for heterogeneous effects across genders. Although a large literature
shows that female labor supply is on average more elastic than male labor supply (see Evers et al. 2008, for a
review), we do not find a larger employment effect for women than men.
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assumption that distance to border is uncorrelated with other shocks affecting local native
outcomes. The combination of region-specific linear trends and cleaned outcomes accounts
for pre-existing structural differences in wage and employment growth as well as contem-
porary differences in the demographic structure possibly correlated with immigration and
native outcomes. We also showed in Figure 2.5 that distance to border has no effect on
native outcomes prior to 1988. However, it is conceivable that our instrument is correlated
with shocks associated with German reunification, which only happened after 1988. For
example, increased market access (Redding and Sturm 2008), the phasing out of subsidies
to the former border region (Zonenrandförderung), or industrial relocation (Redding et al.
2011) might be functions of distance and correlate with native outcomes.48 We address these
concerns in two ways reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.6. First, we exclude regions
receiving border zone subsidies prior to 1994.49 Second, we augment our baseline model
with a Bartik instrument to control for coincident demand shocks (Bartik 1991). Specifically,
we predict the 1988-1993 native wage (employment) growth in a region based on its industry
structure in the base year and the industry-specific wage (employment) growth in all other
regions. Reassuringly, these exercises yield very similar wage and employment effects as
our baseline estimates, suggesting that our results are not driven by correlated shocks in the
aftermath of reunification.
As noted above, we might still be concerned with confounding effects of East and ethnic
German inflows. One approach would be to examine whether the results are robust to the
exclusion of regions near the inner German border. Indeed, excluding all areas whose outer
contour reaches into an 80 km strip from the former inner German border does not affect our
estimates (column 4). Another approach would be to exclude regions with unusually high
native inflows, assuming that these must be driven by East and ethnic Germans. We do so in
column 5, again finding very similar effects as in the baseline model.
A final concern regards the possibility of understating the actual immigrant employment
shock (and thus overestimating the immigration effect) since we only observe workers
showing up in the social security system. Indeed, the period under consideration has seen
a massive rise in labor migrants through the implementation of bilateral labor treaties
(section 2.2), and these workers were generally not subject to social security contributions
in the host country.50 While it is difficult to fully account for this effect, we try to at least
partially address this concern by excluding the building sector from the analysis, which has
been the key employer of labor migrants. As shown in column 6, we find no evidence of an
undercounting bias.
48It is a prioi unclear whether these shocks would lead to an upward or downward bias in our estimates. On
the one hand, increased market access for border regions after reunification would imply an upward bias. On
the other hand, the parallel phasing out of substantial subsidies for border regions until 1994 would suggest a
downward bias.
49These are detailed in the Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) 77, pp. 1217-1240 (1971). Estimations
are based on the district-level.
50The number of labor migrants rose by 80,000 workers between 1988 and 1993, whereas the total number of
social security employed immigrants rose by 450,000 workers. This suggests that we might overstate the impact
of immigration by about one-fifth.
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Table 2.6.: Wage and Employment Effects of Immigration Under Alternative Model Specifications
Unit of Selection of
Correlated Shocks Observation Regions Additional Covariates
Exclude Baseline Distance High Exclude Large Col. 11 Col. 12 Long
Base- subsidized + Bartik to border native building District Individ. Highly labor Unad- + demogr. + Bartik differ-
line districts demand IV > 80 km inflows sector level level exposed markets justed controls demand IV ences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel A: Wages
All −0.677 −0.680 −0.761 −0.681 −0.627 −0.639 −0.643 −0.757 −0.287 −0.839 −1.260 −0.956 −0.660 −0.638
(0.281) (0.325) (0.259) (0.278) (0.256) (0.297) (0.247) (0.241) (0.456) (0.337) (0.375) (0.595) (0.476) (0.275)
Unskilled −0.695 −0.512 −0.301 −0.595 −0.655 −0.691 −0.723 −0.748 −1.011 −1.718 −1.092 −2.172 −0.989 1.177
(0.459) (0.539) (0.411) (0.506) (0.511) (0.450) (0.412) (0.473) (0.831) (1.550) (0.461) (1.224) (0.932) (0.622)
Skilled −0.581 −0.610 −0.800 −0.605 −0.529 −0.517 −0.536 −0.687 −0.088 −0.781 −1.331 −0.793 −0.776 −0.914
(0.294) (0.335) (0.267) (0.302) (0.253) (0.316) (0.249) (0.244) (0.423) (0.353) (0.372) (0.587) (0.497) (0.296)
Local labor markets 204 272 204 144 204 204 325 204 100 94 204 204 204 204
Individuals 448,604
Panel B: Employment
All −1.125 −1.459 −0.953 −1.793 −1.048 −1.224 −0.950 −0.398 −1.509 −2.302 −2.497 −0.919 −0.650 −1.617
(0.718) (1.032) (0.538) (0.691) (0.716) (0.740) (0.794) (0.301) (0.896) (0.548) (0.762) (1.462) (0.904) (0.626)
Unskilled −2.610 −2.427 −2.742 −2.319 −2.466 −2.420 −2.366 −1.849 −1.723 −3.914 −3.554 −2.263 −1.998 −3.153
(1.166) (1.308) (1.117) (1.149) (1.140) (1.211) (1.185) (0.600) (1.676) (3.865) (1.403) (2.636) (1.949) (1.149)
Skilled −0.917 −1.332 −0.631 −1.786 −0.850 −1.049 −0.739 −0.107 −1.485 −2.170 −2.530 −1.045 −0.273 −1.511
(0.779) (1.050) (0.643) (0.816) (0.819) (0.784) (0.884) (0.309) (0.991) (0.611) (0.811) (1.546) (1.123) (0.686)
Local labor markets 204 272 204 144 204 204 325 204 100 94 204 204 204 204
Individuals 530,282
Notes: Table reports estimates of the wage and employment effect of immigration between 1988 and 1993 for different types of regions and under alternative model specifications. Column
1 reports the baseline results for reference. Columns 2 to 6 analyze sources of correlated shocks by imposing different restrictions on the sample. Columns 7 and 8 change the level of
observation from commuting zones to the district level and to the individual level. In columns 9 and 10, we estimate the models for different types of regions. In columns 11 to 13, we use
unadjusted native wages and employment (see main text for the adjustment procedure), and successively include additional control variables. Column 14 reports coefficients from models
based on the long difference, i.e., without conditioning the wage analysis on workers being present in two consecutive periods. All models include a linear region-specific trend for years
1986-1988. Except for column 8, standard errors are bootstrapped using a pairs bootstrap with 1,000 replications. In column 8, standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. Data
source: SIAB 7510.31
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Unit of Observation: Our main analysis is based on 204 commuting zones, representing
aggregates of 325 districts. To test whether our results depend on the particular regional
unit, we re-estimated our baseline wage and employment models at the district level rather
than the commuting zone. The associated coefficients are reported in column 7, and they
are very similar to our baseline estimates. Another specification check is to investigate the
impact of immigrants directly on the worker level. To this end, we calculate first differences
in wages and employment for each worker (and within regions in the case of wages) and
regress the trend-adjusted change in each outcome on the instrumented immigrant inflow.
We control for gender interacted with full sets of age and education dummies, and cluster
standard errors at the regional level. As shown in column 8, point estimates and significance
levels line up well with our baseline results.
Selection of Regions: One might be concerned that our results are driven by particular
types of regions, e.g., the largest or smallest regions, or regions with particularly high
immigrant exposure. To investigate this, columns 9 and 10 of Table 2.6 repeat our analysis
for three different types of regions. First, we consider only regions with very high immigrant
exposure, defined as an above median percent increase in immigrant employment between
1988 and 1993. Despite some variation in magnitude and significance in both outcomes, we
find consistently negative signs and cannot detect systematic deviations from our baseline
estimates. Second, we restrict the sample to large regions with an average labor force
exceeding 50,000 individuals. As shown in column 10, both wage and employment effects
are more pronounced in this subsample. One reason might be that large regions typically
feature higher average wage and employment growth, which generates additional leeway for
reductions in the associated growth rates due to immigration.
Additional Covariates: As explained above, we residualize native wages and employment
in each year before calculating region level aggregates. However, since some native char-
acteristics might themselves be endogenous — for example, facing an immigrant shock,
native labor market entrants might decide to study one more year rather than compete with
unskilled immigrants for jobs (Hunt 2017) — it may be preferable to condition on pre-shock
characteristics instead. We analyze this in columns 11 to 13 of Table 2.6, starting from a
specification with raw instead of cleaned outcomes and no controls except for a linear trend,
and then augmenting these models with region level covariates averaged over the 1986-1988
period. The results in column 11 suggest somewhat larger wage and employment effects than
our baseline results, indicating an overall average decline of 1.26 and 2.5%, respectively. In
column 12, we add an array of region level covariates: the shares of middle and old workers,
the fraction of females, the share of advanced occupations, the share of tradable industries,
the overall employment level, and the unemployment rate. Overall, the results are now
much closer to our baseline estimates both in terms of wages and employment, with the only
notable deviation remaining for the small group of unskilled workers. Finally, in column 13,
we also add a Bartik instrument (see above). This has two effects: on the one hand, it brings
32
2.6. RESULTS
our wage estimates even closer to our baseline results (also for unskilled); on the other hand,
the employment response shrinks to about 50% of our baseline coefficient, mainly driven by
skilled workers. Overall, however, the patterns look very similar to our baseline estimates.
Worker Selection: Most studies of the effects of immigration rely on repeated cross-sections
to estimate the response in native wages to an immigration shock (Card 2001; Glitz 2012).
Only a few recent studies such as Bratsberg and Raaum (2012), Foged and Peri (2016), and
DSS exploit longitudinal worker spell data to account for differential worker selection into
nonemployment. If low wage workers are more likely to select into nonemployment, simple
cross-sectional comparisons produce upward biased wage effects. To investigate this, we
report in column 14 of Table 2.6 estimates based on regional wage changes calculated as the
difference in mean wages between all workers in 1993 and all workers in 1988.51 We find
considerably larger coefficients for unskilled workers, with point estimates rising from an
insignificant -0.695 to a significant 1.177, confirming the DSS findings and underpinning the
importance of controlling for selection effects.52
Alternative Measures of Immigration Shocks: Our definition of the native employment
response (dependent variable) and our measure of the immigration shock (independent
variable) differ from specifications typically used in the immigration literature. Specifically,
we standardize the change in local native employment by native employment in the base
year, rather than dividing by the labor force or population (Altonji and Card 1991; Pischke
and Velling 1997; Dustmann et al. 2005). In addition, our immigration shock is measured
in terms of employment as opposed to, e.g., labor force or population inflows. To explore
the sensitivity of our results against these alternatives, we collected data on native and
immigrant populations at the district-level, enabling us to scale the employment change (∆E)
not only by employment (E, our baseline) but also by labor force (LF) and population (P). We
also built two additional versions of our immigration shock variable, measuring the inflow
either in terms of the labor force or in terms of the population.53 We then regressed each
native employment proxy (∆E/E, ∆E/LF, ∆E/P) and the wage change on each of the three
immigrant shock variables, instrumented using distance to border.
Table 2.7 reports the results, showing different employment measures from left to right,
and different immigrant shock measures from top to bottom. Reading across columns thus
tells us how a different scaling of the native employment response changes the estimated
coefficients (conditional on how we measure the immigration shock), whereas reading across
rows tells us how different ways of gauging the immigration shock affect our conclusions
(conditional on how we measure the native employment response). For each combination of
dependent and independent variable, we display cumulative coefficients (1988-93), standard
51In these models, we use a manual trend-adjustment, i.e., we subtract the average value of the outcome
variable for each region over the years 1986-1988 from the dependent variable; see section 2.4.
52For employment, in contrast, net changes are relatively similar, with differences arising mainly through
approximation errors and different weighting factors.
53To build the population series, we digitized Statistical Yearbooks (years 1985-1990) as well as multiple
versions of the BBSR Laufende Raumbeobachtung (years 1986, 1989/90, 1992/93).
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Table 2.7.: Comparison of Different Measures of Immigrant Inflows and Native Outcomes
Employment Wages
%-change native
Type of employment o/ %-change native %-change native %-change native
Standard employment employment o/ employment o/ wages
Error (baseline) labor force population (baseline)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Instrument: South and East Distance to Border
employment share
%-change in immigrant −1.125 −1.319 −0.368 −0.677
Pairs (0.718) (0.621) (0.208) (0.281)
2SLS (0.700) (0.575) (0.202) (0.247)
First stage F-statistic 16.43 16.51 16.71 16.43
labor force share
%-change in immigrant −1.319 −1.247 −0.417 −0.879
Pairs (0.621) (0.556) (0.186) (0.234)
2SLS (0.575) (0.549) (0.173) (0.215)
First stage F-statistic 28.33 28.61 28.57 28.33
population share
%-change in immigrant −1.696 −1.623 −0.514 −1.424
Pairs (0.530) (0.515) (0.162) (0.378)
2SLS (0.555) (0.530) (0.167) (0.296)
First stage F-statistic 18.25 18.47 21.73 18.25
Local labor markets 204 204 204 204
Panel B: Instrument: Population Shift Share (Base Density 1961)
population share
%-change in immigrant −2.708 −2.529 −0.816 −1.313
Pairs (0.542) (0.506) (0.158) (0.289)
2SLS (0.768) (0.754) (0.261) (0.456)
First stage F-statistic 32.56 31.22 30.24 32.56
Local labor markets 112 112 112 112
Weight (as of 1988) native native native native
employment labor force population employment
Notes: Table shows cumulative native wage and employment outcomes for alternative measures of native
employment (columns 1 to 3) and immigrant shocks (across rows) between 1988 and 1993. Columns 1 and 4
are based on the baseline definition of native employment and wage changes. Column 2 scales employment
changes by the native labor force, and column 3 by native population. All models refer to the pooled
regressions, combining skill and age groups. We weight the first stage by total native employment (columns 1
and 4), labor force (column 2), and population (column 3) in 1988, and the second stage by the corresponding
values in the previous year. All models include a linear region-specific trend for years 1986-1988. The first
row measures the immigrant shock by the percentage change in the immigrant employment share; the second
row, by the percentage change in the immigrant labor force; and the third row by the percentage change in
the immigrant population. Standard errors are bootstrapped using a pairs bootstrap with 1,000 replications.
F-Statistics for instrument excludability are reported below standard errors. Data source: SIAB 7510.
errors, and F-Statistics for the first stage. Moving down column 1, we see that our baseline
results (row 1; compare Table 2.4) hardly change if we measure the immigration shock in
terms of labor force (row 2) or population (row 3) instead of employment. Moving across
row 1, we observe a relatively stable effect for the labor force measure but a sizable drop by
about two-thirds when measuring the employment change by the employment-to-population
ratio (similar patterns emerge in rows 2 and 3). Hence, while the definition of our dependent
variable might explain why we report larger employment effects than typically found in
the literature, our particular definition of the immigrant inflow appears rather innocuous
— if anything, our approach delivers conservative estimates. In the last column, we report
the associated wage effects for each immigration proxy, again suggesting that our baseline
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estimates represent a lower bound.
As a final check, we collected population data for the earliest year available, 1961,
to construct a standard shift share instrument based on historical immigrant population
densities.54 When we use this instrument instead of distance to border, we obtain the highest
F-statistics, and also larger and more precisely estimated wage and employment coefficients,
reinforcing our conclusion that the short run effects of immigration reported above tend to
be conservative (see also Appendix A.5).
2.6.5. Margins of Adjustment: Inflows vs. Outflows and
Geographic vs. Nonemployment Flows
Our results reveal substantial employment adjustments due to immigration for unskilled
workers, middle and older age groups, and, more broadly, in the tradable sector. These
findings raise three questions which we set out to answer in this section. First, are these
effects generated by increased employment outflows, reduced inflows, or both? Second, are
these flows emerging between regions (within employment), or rather between employment
and nonemployment? Third, do the insignificant employment effects found for certain
subgroups potentially conceal a rise in overall worker flows, with growing inflows and
outflows compensating each other? To answer these questions, we decompose the net
employment effects into outflows from and inflows into employment, distinguishing between
two types of transitions: geographic transitions that lower employment in one region and
increase employment in another; and nonemployment transitions that lower employment
in one region without a corresponding gain in another region. We further decompose
the nonemployment transitions into transitions from and to unemployment (if a person
is observed as unemployed prior/post an employment spell) and transitions from and to
nonemployment (if a person is not observed prior/post an employment spell).
The results for several subsamples are presented in Table 2.8. Columns 1 to 4 refer
to inflows, columns 5 to 8 to outflows, and the last four columns to net flows, i.e., the
difference between inflows and outflows. In each set of columns, we show, from left to right,
geographic, nonemployment, and unemployment transitions, followed by the total effect
in the last column — column 12 corresponds to the total employment effect reported in
Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
Inflows and Outflows: The entries in columns 4 and 8 Table 2.8 show the total contributions
of inflows and outflows, respectively. Overall, we find that the negative employment effects
of natives are generated by a combination of reduced inflows into employment and higher
outflows from employment. For example, using the average coefficients for the three groups
54The Stata file is available online at GESIS data archive, file name ZA2472. It provides, among others,
census data for years 1961 and 1987. Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia are not included, which explains the
reduced number of observations. We combine this file with population data from the German Federal Statistical
Office for years 1985-2001.
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Table 2.8.: Impact of Immigrants on Native Inflows/Outflows and Geographic/Nonemployment Flows
Inflows Outflows Net Flows (= Inflows – Outflows)
Geo- Nonem- Unem- Sum of Geo- Nonem- Unem- Sum of Geo- Nonem- Unem- Net Em-
graphic ployment ployment Inflows graphic ployment ployment Outflows graphic ployment ployment ployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Total employment flow −0.67 −0.28 0.36 −0.59 0.05 −0.36 0.85 0.54 −0.72 0.09 −0.49 −1.13
(0.43) (0.41) (0.25) (0.64) (0.41) (0.32) (0.40) (0.53) (0.39) (0.53) (0.37) (0.71)
Panel A: Skill Groups
Unskilled −0.09 −1.04 −1.04 −2.17 0.11 −0.72 0.72 0.44 −0.20 −0.32 −1.77 −2.61
(0.33) (0.92) (0.41) (0.94) (0.45) (0.75) (0.50) (0.90) (0.40) (0.94) (0.70) (1.15)
Skilled −0.79 −0.04 0.65 −0.23 0.09 −0.24 0.84 0.69 −0.88 0.20 −0.19 −0.92
(0.47) (0.46) (0.27) (0.82) (0.38) (0.33) (0.42) (0.52) (0.44) (0.61) (0.35) (0.80)
Panel B: Age Groups
below 30 −2.30 1.16 1.70 0.56 −0.73 −0.93 1.67 −0.33 −1.57 2.09 0.03 0.89
0.66 (0.75) (0.54) (1.16) (0.55) (0.54) (0.59) (0.88) (0.65) (0.74) (0.44) (0.95)
between 30 and 49 0.07 −1.25 −0.28 −1.43 0.54 0.26 −0.14 0.68 −0.46 −1.51 −0.14 −2.11
(0.47) (0.41) (0.25) (0.59) (0.39) (0.44) (0.30) (0.60) (0.46) (0.59) (0.37) (0.75)
50 and above 0.09 −0.45 −0.43 −0.76 0.16 −0.50 1.75 1.17 −0.07 0.05 −2.19 −1.93
(0.38) (0.35) (0.31) (0.52) (0.32) (0.66) (0.67) (0.85) (0.30) (0.73) (0.72) (0.96)
Panel C: Gender
Men −0.63 −0.38 0.68 −0.33 0.27 −0.63 1.21 0.85 −0.90 0.26 −0.53 −1.18
0.54 (0.46) (0.25) (0.74) (0.40) (0.36) (0.32) (0.57) (0.60) (0.60) (0.36) (0.94)
Women −0.75 −0.06 −0.10 −0.91 −0.29 0.02 0.34 0.07 −0.46 −0.08 −0.44 −0.98
(0.36) (0.51) (0.23) (0.74) (0.37) (0.50) (0.49) (0.69) (0.28) (0.64) (0.43) (0.67)
Local labor markets 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204
Notes: Table shows estimates of the effect of changes in immigrant employment between 1988 and 1993 on native inflows and outflows. Columns 1 to 4 show inflow rates,
columns 5-8 outflow rates, and columns 9 to 12 show net flows. Columns 1, 5, and 9 refer to geographic mobility which is identified from individual worker spells if a person
is employed in two different regions in two consecutive years. Columns 2, 6, and 10 refer to nonemployment flows, defined as changes from unobserved into employment or
from employment into unobserved. Columns 3, 7, and 11 refer to unemployment flows, defined as changes from observed unemployment into employment, and vice versa.
Columns 4, 8, and 12 report the sum of all flow components. All models include a linear region-specific trend for years 1986-1988. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported
in parentheses and calculated using a pairs bootstrap with 1,000 replications. Data source: SIAB 7510.
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with significant employment declines (unskilled, ages 30-49, and 50+), we find that inflows
account for about two-thirds (1.45%) and outflows for about one-third (0.76%) of the overall
average employment decline of about 2.21% in these groups — the importance of inflows
for the employment response is in line with DSS, but contrasts with evidence in Wozniak
and Murray (2012) who find the main response margin of natives to be outflows. In sum,
our findings suggest that employment losses from immigration are, at least in the short run,
induced by employers adjusting their hiring rate or poaching behavior; that is, incumbent
workers are protected from immigration effects at the expense of outsiders, possibly, because
the latter feature a more elastic labor supply.
Geographic and Nonemployment Flows: In columns 9 to 11 of Table 2.8, we next par-
tition the employment decline (column 12) into three terms gauging the contributions of
geographic transitions (job-to-job), movements between employment and nonemployment,
and movements between employment and unemployment. A striking conclusion from this
exercise is the important role of geographic mobility in the pooled sample, suggesting that on
average 64% (0.72/1.13) of the 1988-1993 employment decline in one region is compensated
by employment gains in other regions. This means that, at the macro-level, the effect of
immigration on native employment is considerably less negative than suggested by our
region-level estimates. While the prominence of geographic mobility for the local native
employment response is qualitatively in line with DSS, our estimate is about twice as large
as theirs. One explanation might be that our immigrant shock was less clustered, meaning
that natives had to move a shorter distance to avoid it. Moreover, our sample consists of
many urban areas which, on average, feature higher labor mobility rates than the rural areas
considered in DSS. A visual impression of the underlying adjustment processes is provided
in Figure 2.6. While we find an immediate and sustained decline in geographic net flows
(panel A), the contribution of nonemployment flows (panel B) is zero until 1993, and tends
to increase thereafter. Unemployment flows (panel C), on the other hand, show an initial
decline until 1992, and a return to zero in subsequent years. Overall, these results suggest that
geographic mobility is a primary means of equilibrating local labor markets (Blanchard and
Katz 1992; Cadena and Kovak 2016), with a sustained reduction in affected areas creating
new job opportunities for nonemployed and unemployed workers in the longer run.
In panels A and B of Table 2.8, we break out the overall effect into different skill and
age groups. For both skilled and young workers, geographic mobility exhibits sizable
declines — among skilled, it virtually accounts for the entire reduction in local employment
growth. In contrast, among unskilled workers and workers in older age groups, a reduction
in nonemployment and unemployment flows dominates the overall employment effect.
To investigate the sources of these effects, we further decompose the contribution of each
channel into inflows and outflows (columns 1 to 3 and 5 to 7). Considering first geographic
flows, the overall picture is one of a decline in inflows rather than an increase in outflows,
that is, instead of workers in affected regions seeking employment elsewhere, it is workers
elsewhere no longer moving into affected regions. Not surprisingly, this is especially true for
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Figure 2.6.: Decomposition of Cumulative Net Employment Effects Into Geographic and
Nonemployment Flows
A. Cumulative Geographic Net Flows
B. Cumulative Nonemployment Net Flows
C. Cumulative Unemployment Net Flows
Notes: Figure shows a decomposition of the cumulative net employment flows for years 1986-1996 from
Figure 2.5B into geographic, nonemployment, and unemployment flows. In each year, we plot the sum of
coefficient estimates relative to 1988, that is, we sum backward and forward. 95% confidence bands are indicated
in red. The vertical line represents the start of the immigration shock. Data source: SIAB 7510.
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skilled and younger workers for whom geographic flows are of particular importance. This
result contrasts with evidence for the US (Wozniak and Murray 2012), where immigrants
increase outflows of high skilled natives, however, it is consistent with evidence for Germany
(DSS), suggesting that geographic flows are primarily driven by the inflow margin. For
nonemployment and unemployment transitions, we also find reduced inflows, especially
among unskilled and middle-aged workers, but here outflows likewise play a role, most
importantly in the youngest and oldest age groups. Looking at young workers in more
detail, we note that the growing outflow into unemployment is somewhat compensated by
a corresponding rise in inflows, implying an increase in gross native worker flows. One
interpretation of this result is that immigration leads to a reshuffling of extant employment
matches which would be consistent with a process of occupational specialization as suggested
by Peri and Sparber (2009), and might constitute another means of alleviating wage losses.
Finally, turning to older workers, we find that the growing outflow into unemployment
is the main source of employment adjustments. We suspect that this outflow effect is
amplified by one particular feature of the social security system at the time, which rendered
unemployment for male workers approaching retirement a very attractive and often used
choice. Specifically, conditional on at least 52 weeks of registered unemployment, male
workers were allowed to retire up to 5 years early. Though suggesting at most, the annual
growth rate of men in West Germany exploiting this option rose from 0.5 percentage points
per year in 1970-1990 to 2 percentage points in 1990-1995. In 1995-2000, i.e., after the
immigration shock, this rate returned to 0.7 percentage points (German Pension Fund, 2017).
2.7. Conclusions
Research on the effects of immigration on native workers is abundant, yet a central concern,
namely, whether immigrants reduce or raise native wages and employment remains a contro-
versial topic: empirical evidence covers the whole range from negative effects, to zero and
positive effects, even when analyses are based on the same time period, country, and data.
Using detailed longitudinal administrative data, we provide the first comprehensive analysis
of the short-run effects of a large and unexpected immigration shock between 1988 and 1993
on native wages and employment in the West German labor market.
Our analysis of local labor markets shows that immigrants tend to reduce native wages
and employment by about 0.68% and 1.13% in the first five years after arrival, but tend to
have no or even positive effects in the longer perspective. We find important heterogeneity
across various groups of the labor market, which might be explained by different labor supply
elasticities or wage rigidities. We also show that, while wage reductions are indeed borne by
incumbent workers, i.e., those who are and stay employed in a given labor market, about
two-thirds of the local employment losses are compensated by employment gains in other
regions, meaning that those workers who move out of an affected region or those who no
longer enter it often find employment in other regions. We show that the latter component is
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a key driver of the impact of cross-regional flows.
What do our findings imply for the current refugee debate? Latest since 2015, the topic
of immigration has resumed center-stage in the political debate in virtually all receiving
countries in Europe, with populist parties rapidly gaining voter approvals (Dustmann et al.
2016). At first glance, our results seem to spur those populist calls for more isolation,
increased border control, and vetting of immigrants. But this is only half the story for two
main reasons. First, the composition of source countries in the 1980/1990 refugee wave
differed considerably from today’s refugee inflow. Crucially, the inflow that we consider,
comprising of many East Europeans and Yugoslavs (with guest worker background), was
probably more educated and in a sense “culturally closer” than the composition of refugees
arriving today. Consequently, the labor market impact of the current inflow would be
expected to be less pronounced. Second, the specific conditions on the German labor market
during our analysis period differed dramatically from today’s situation. In the early 1990s,
Germany was characterized by high and increasing stocks of unemployment, struggling with
reunification, rigid labor market institutions, and a lack of international competitiveness.
All these features prevented the German labor market from a speedy adjustment to the
additional supply of labor and likely contributed to the temporary decline in native wages
and employment. However, our results suggest that even in this difficult situation, the long
term effects of immigration were, if anything, positive. Looking at Germany today, the
picture has completely reversed: due to trade unions’ continued accommodation of moderate
wage growth and rising wage flexibility, and due to substantial reforms of the social security
system, the German economy has risen its productivity (measured in unit labor costs) and by
now belongs to one of the most productive economies in the world (Dustmann et al. 2014),
with unemployment rates chasing one record low after the other. Against this backdrop,
the German economy seems ready to leverage the opportunities associated with the inflow
of immigrants in order to keep fueling the booming economy. To accomplish this, a fast
processing of asylum applications and parallel integration into the labor market is imperative.
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3. Effects of Relaxed Employment
Protection on Labor Market Outcomes:
Evidence from a 2004 German Reform
3.1. Introduction
Employment protection legislation constitutes a key feature of labor markets. Its major aim
is to protect employees from arbitrary dismissals and increase job security. At the same time,
it may impose rigidities on the ability of firms to adapt to changing economic conditions.
Too stringent dismissal protection may hinder job creation and worker reallocation unless
dismissal costs are passed on to workers through wages (Leonardi and Pica 2013; OECD
2013). Moreover, a growing regulatory gap between open-ended and temporary contracts
may increase labor market segmentation by encouraging the excessive use of less-protected
temporary employment (OECD 2014). Overall, the debate on the design of dismissal
protection remains controversial both from a research and a policy perspective. Empirical
evidence from the 2004 reform of the German employment protection legislation may provide
valuable insights for theoretical work as well as for policymaking.
As the largest economy in the European Union and the fourth largest in the world (by
GDP), Germany is a worthwhile example to study the interrelation between dismissal
protection legislation and employment. Moreover, the latest reform of the German Protection
Against Dismissal Act (PADA — Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG)) in 2004 constitutes
a suitable case for an empirical analysis of its causal effects on different labor market
outcomes. Notably, the German government decided to change the minimum establishment
size threshold determining coverage by the PADA from five to 10 employees as of January 1,
2004. The reform affected about 15 to 16% of all establishments (with at least one employee
liable for social security payments) representing 7 to 8% of all employees liable for social
security payments in Germany.1
In this paper, I exploit the temporal and cross-sectional variation in the PADA resulting
from this 2004 reform as a quasi-experiment. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD)
approach, I identify the causal effect of reduced dismissal protection on various labor
market outcomes. To this end, I compare average outcomes of establishments subject to
the policy change (treatment group) with establishments that exhibit similar establishment
1Own calculations based on data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the LIAB QM2 9310 following the
approach of Rudolph (1996).
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characteristics, yet, are not exposed to the change (control group) before and after the reform.
By drawing on detailed administrative employer-employee panel data linked to establishment
survey data (LIAB QM2 9310), I provide estimates on the impact of the change in the
PADA in 2004 on establishment level worker flow, job flow and churning rates. Worker
flows comprise yearly hires and separations whereas the job flow is defined as the yearly
difference between the two. Churning, on the other hand, refers to worker flows in excess of
job flows. In addition, I assess potential heterogeneous treatment effects by looking at effects
on gender- and age-specific turnover rates as well as differential effects by unionization
status and East-West divide of firms.2 Finally, I examine other margins of adjustment that
may mitigate potential effects on the above mentioned outcomes. Namely, I study effects on
firm mean wages and the use of temporary employment relations. I take into consideration a
three and a half year period after the reform until 2007, which allows me to capture potential
short- and medium-term adjustments.
The present paper contributes to the strand of literature on the labor market effects of
employment protection legislation. Since the seminal work of Lazear (1990), the impact of
dismissal costs on labor market flows and employment is analyzed in a number of theoretical
studies. Drawing on Lazear’s result from 1990 that severance payments between the employer
and the employee can be offset by an efficient labor contract, early literature uses partial
equilibrium models with third party transfers to show that more stringent employment
protection reduces layoffs in downturns, but also deters employers from hiring in upturns
as firms take potential future dismissal costs into account. Thus, increased dismissal costs
reduce worker flows while its impact on the level of overall employment remains ambiguous.
These findings also hold in a number of studies using general equilibrium models (e.g.,
Mortensen and Pissarides 1999; Ljungqvist 2002). As for the PADA reform studied in this
paper, economic theory thus predicts increased worker flows given an easing of dismissal
protection, but does not provide a clear-cut prediction in terms of net employment effects.
In addition, although the above mentioned studies do not explicitly discuss the effect on
churning (defined as worker flows in excess of net employment), a decline in dismissal costs
should tend to raise excess worker turnover.
A number of empirical studies exploit the quasi-experimental setting of changes in dis-
missal protection to examine the effect on worker turnover. Kugler and Pica (2008) analyze
the impact of a labor market reform in Italy in 1990. They use an employer-employee panel
and exploit the differential increase in dismissal protection for firms with fewer than 15
employees relative to firms with more than 15 employees. They find that the increase in
dismissal costs reduces the individual probability of employment by 13 to 14% and for loss
of employment by 14 to 15%. At the same time, year-to-year employment declines by 5
to 6% in smaller firms relative to larger firms. Martins (2009) studies the effects of a law
introduced in Portugal in 1989 under which dismissal constraints were softened for all firms.
However, firms with 20 or fewer employees were partially exempted from the new law such
2I use the term worker turnover in this paper to refer to hires, separations, job flows, and churning.
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that they experienced an even greater reduction in dismissal costs relative to larger firms.
Using longitudinal data from an annual employment survey covering firms and workers
based in Portugal, he finds evidence for a small relative increase in the small firms’ job flow
rate driven by a moderate increase in their hiring rate that corresponds to 5% of their average
hiring rate. Moreover, estimates on the churning rate are statistically insignificant. von Below
and Thoursie (2010) investigate a reform of a size-contingent relaxation of seniority rules
in Sweden in 2001 where firms with ten or fewer employees were allowed to exempt two
workers from the prevalent ’last-in-first-out’ principle. Using an employer-employee panel,
they find that both the probabilities of hires and separations increase by 1.7 percentage points
for small relative to large firms after the reform. Centeno and Novo (2012) explore a reform
in Portugal in 2004 that increased the dismissal protection of open-ended contracts for firms
with 11 to 20 workers. Among other outcomes, they estimate the impact of the reform on
churning among workers with open-end and fixed-term contracts and find evidence for an
increase among the latter. That is to say, churning of workers on fixed-term contracts in the
treated firms increased by 1.3 percentage points, while no statistically significant effect is
observed among workers with open-ended contracts.
Bauer et al. (2007) are the first to conduct a similar analysis for Germany by investigating
previous changes in the minimum threshold of the PADA in 1996 and 1999. They use admin-
istrative data based on the Employment Statistic Register of West German establishments
and study short-term changes in employment dynamics in a six months period after the
1996 reform and a three months period after the 1999 reform. Their results do not suggest a
significant effect of changes in the stringency of dismissal protection on worker and job flows.
Closest to this paper, Bauernschuster (2013) analyzes the effect of the latest adjustment of
the threshold of the PADA in 2004 on the hiring behavior of firms. He uses survey data on
establishments (IAB Establishment Panel) and estimates the impact of the change in the
dismissal protection in the first one and a half years after the reform. He finds that the relaxed
dismissal protection increases the hiring rate for small establishments relative to larger ones
by 1.3 to 2.0 percentage points in 2004 and 2.0 to 2.1 percentage points in 2005.
My analysis differs from previous studies for Germany (e.g., Bauer et al. 2007; Bauern-
schuster 2013) on a number of key dimensions. First, I exploit the absence of any relevant
changes to the PADA after 2004 and examine an extended period of three and a half years
as opposed to the short-term view of at most one and a half years. Second, I provide a
more comprehensive analysis by assessing the heterogeneity in treatment effects for different
groups of workers and firms. Third, I consider a potential impact of the reform along other
margins of adjustment, in particular, wages and the use of temporary employment. Lastly, I
put particular emphasis on the sample selection criteria and discuss different methods in the
light of the literature on firm size-contingent labor market reforms.
My estimates from the difference-in-differences approach do not provide robust evidence
for a causal impact of the 2004 PADA reform on overall hiring, separation, job flow and
churning rates of treated establishments. This is line with the Bauer et al. (2007) analysis on
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previous threshold changes but to some extent inconsistent with the positive effect on the
hiring rate found by Bauernschuster (2013). In a further analysis, I show that differences
to the later study can be explained by different assignment methods to the treatment and
control groups. In addition, I find some evidence of increases in the hiring and job flow
rates of women in response to the relaxed dismissal protection, but no effect on age group-
specific turnover rates. Finally, I do not find any support for an adjustment along the wage
margin and changes in the use of temporary employment relations. While there are as yet
no comparable analyses for Germany, Leonardi and Pica (2013) find a negative relationship
between dismissal costs and wages in Italy exploiting the Italian 1990 reform mentioned
above. As for temporary work, Boockmann and Hagen (2001) and Fritsch and Schank (2005)
conduct very similar analyses on the effect of the previous PADA reform in 1996 on the
use of fixed-term employment in Germany, but do not provide a consistent conclusion since
only the former find a significant negative effect of a reduction in dismissal protection on
the demand for fixed-term employment. In contrast, there is strong evidence that stricter
dismissal protection in the United States boosted the use of temporary services employment
between the beginning of the 1970s and mid 1990s (Autor 2003).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section, I provide
background information on the institutional setting of the PADA reform. In section 3.3, I
explain the identification strategy. I then describe the data, the sample selection rules, and
the summary statistics and assess the validity of the stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA) in section 4.2.1. Next, I present and discuss the estimation results in section 3.5.
Finally, I conclude in section 3.6.
3.2. Institutional Background
Since 1951, the German employment protection legislation is regulated by the Civil Code
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB))) and the Protection Against Dismissal Act (PADA —
Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG)). Its aim is to protect employees from arbitrary dismissals
by their employer. In principle, the PADA applies to all employees of an establishment
unless a person is employed on a fixed-term contract.3 Given an employer is not exempted
from the PADA and the duration of employment exceeds the probationary period of six
months, a dismissal with notice is only effective if it is socially justified on either personal
grounds, grounds of conduct, or operational grounds (KSchG §1 (2)). Prior to any dismissal,
the employer has to give notice to its works council (if in place) under the terms of the
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) §102). In case of a dismissal
due to operational requirements, the employer has to carry out a social selection among his
employees taking into consideration job tenure, age, maintenance obligation, and severe
disability (KSchG §1 (3)). In addition, any dismissed employee may appeal to the labor
3Although the Law on Part-Time Work and Temporary Employment Contracts (Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz
(TzBfG)) does allow for individual or collective agreements which grant the right of regular termination to
employees on fixed-term contracts (TzBfG §15 (3)), this is in practice the exception rather than the rule.
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court and contest the termination of her contract (KSchG §4). If the court decides in favor of
the employee, the employer commonly has to pay a severance payment as a reinstatement of
the employee is not feasible in most cases. Ultimately, studies show that dismissals under the
PADA often produce legal effects and are considered to be costly (e.g., Jahn and Schnabel
2003; Pfarr et al. 2004; Jahn 2005).
Some employers are exempted from the PADA by legislation. In particular, the PADA
comprises an exception provision for small establishments such that dismissals in estab-
lishments with less than a minimum number of employees do not have to comply with the
PADA but only need to fulfill some general statutory dismissal rules. As part of the Agenda
2010 reform package, the minimum threshold for the applicability of the PADA was raised
from five to 10 full-time equivalent weighted (FTE) employees as of January 1, 2004 for
any employee hired after December 31, 2003, while incumbent workers stayed protected as
long as their initial number did not fall below the former threshold of five FTE employees.
Prior to this reform, the threshold had been adjusted twice; first, it was raised from five to 10
employees in 1996, and then reduced from 10 to five employees in 1999. Since the latest
reform in 2004, no further adjustments to the PADA have taken place.4
The reform of the PADA is a result of negotiations in the conciliation committee as of
December 16, 2003 and was approved on December 19, 2003, less than two weeks before it
became effective. Prior to that, the German government proposed in the government policy
statement on March 14, 2003 and lastly reiterated in an information brochure published on
November 14, 2003 to facilitate the hiring of fixed-term contract employees in establishments
with less than five workers. Eventually, the short-dated announcement and introduction of
the threshold reform are advantageous for my setting in that the analysis of the 2004 PADA
reform is unlikely to be distorted by anticipation effects.
However, it is worth mentioning that besides the PADA reform, the Agenda 2010 entailed
further modifications of labor market policies that were gradually implemented between
2003 and 2005, known as the four Hartz reforms. The active labor market policies of Hartz I
deregulated temporary employment (i.e., fixed-term contract (FTC) and temporary agency
(TA) employment) in 2003.5 Hartz II comprised changes in the regulation of freelance work
and marginal employment. Hartz III regulated the restructuring of the Federal Employment
Office. Hartz IV included revisions of the social and unemployment assistance. In addition,
4The PADA reform in 2004 comprised some further minor modifications that are not contingent on estab-
lishment size: The social selection process was simplified, the period for filing a suit was standardized to three
weeks, and severance payment on the waiver taking legal action was introduced.
5With respect to FTC employment, Hartz I implied a lowering of the age threshold for unlimited use of
fixed-term contracts without valid reason from 58 to 52. For employees below this age, the maximum duration
of fixed-term contracts without valid reason remained at two years. In terms of TA employment, the maximum
period of assignment was raised from 12 to 24 months in 2002 and eventually completely abolished in 2003.
Moreover, the rehiring and synchronization ban was suspended such that TA workers could be repeatedly hired
by a particular agency and labor contracts could be synchronized with the duration of a specific assignment.
Lastly, with an interim arrangement until 2004, the principal of ’equal pay’ and ’equal treatment’ was introduced.
Except for the introduction of an upper limit of five years for fixed-term contracts without valid reason for
workers above the age of 52 as of May 1, 2007, there have been no further changes to the regulation of FTC and
TA employment in the observation periods of this study (i.e., until June 30, 2007).
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the German Trade and Crafts Code was reformed as of January 1, 2004 by abolishing the
master craftsman requirement for 53 out of 94 regulated crafts occupations (Rostam-Afschar
2014). However, it is important to note, that contrary to the PADA reform, none of these
additional reforms were specific to the establishment size.
3.3. Identification Strategy
The aim of my paper is to identify the impact of the change in the PADA on different labor
market outcomes. To this end, I exploit the 2004 PADA reform as a quasi-experiment and
apply a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach by comparing outcomes of establishments
subject to a change in the PADA (treatment group) with establishments not exposed to this
change (control group) before and after the policy reform (Meyer 1995). More formally, this
double difference can be expressed by the equation:
ρ = {E[Yit |Di = 1]−E[Yit |Di = 0]}−{E[Yit ′ |Di = 1]−E[Yit ′ |Di = 0]},
where Yit and Yit ′ denote the observable outcome of observation i in period t and t ′, t is a
time period after and t ′ a time period before the policy reform. Di is a dummy variable
indicating whether observation i belongs to the treatment group (Di = 1) or the control group
(Di = 0). In the present analysis an observation i refers to an establishment (or firm).6 The
key identifying assumption is a common time trend, meaning that in the absence of treatment
the average outcomes of both treatment and control firms would have evolved in the same
way. Formally, this can be expressed as:
E[Y 0it −Y 0it ′ |Di = 1] = E[Y 0it −Y 0it ′ |Di = 0],
where Y 0it and Y
0
it ′ denote the potential outcomes of firm i in period t and t
′ in the absence of
the treatment. In other words, the common trend assumption justifies the replacement of
the counterfactual (unobserved) non-treatment difference in average outcomes of the treated
by the observed non-treatment difference of the (observed) non-treated. Assuming that the
common time trend assumption holds, ρ identifies the average causal effect of the treatment
on the treated firms. This assumption, however, is inherently not testable and must thus
be defended by economic reasoning. Moreover, note that up until now, I have used a time
constant definition of the treatment identifier (Di). In what follows, I will add the bracketed
subscript (t) to the identifier which indicates that the treatment assignment may also vary
over time, depending on the underlying assignment method to the treatment and control
group (Di(t)).7
6Although multiple establishments may belong to the same firm (or company), I use the terms establishment
and firm interchangeably throughout this paper.
7I note that a time-varying treatment assignment necessitates that the above expressions hold accordingly for
Dit . I elaborate on different assignment methods to the treatment and control group at the end of this section and
in section 3.4.2.
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Under the assumption of an additive causal effect ρ , the approach can be generalized to
the linear regression equation:
Yit = αi+λDi(t)+ρ(Di(t)×Postt)+ δt + εit , (3.1)
where αi accounts for firm fixed effects and thus allows for time constant confounding
observables and unobservables, Di(t) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for treated
firms and 0 for control firms and, as described above, may or may vary over time. Postt is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the years after 2003 and 0 otherwise, δt captures
yearly effects that are assumed to be common to all firms, and εit is an idiosyncratic error
term. The parameter of interest is ρ and reflects the differential effect on the outcome variable
Yit due to the policy reform.
I opt to estimate equation (3.1) with the fixed effects (FE) estimator for the sample periods
2001 to 2007.8 To define 2003 as the baseline period and at the same time provide descriptive
evidence for the common time trend assumption, I estimate a version of equation (3.1) that
includes µ(Di(t)×Pret) where Pret is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the years
before 2003 and 0 otherwise. Eventually, µ captures a pooled pre-treatment difference
between the treatment and control group for the years 2001 and 2002. Put differently, a
statistically insignificant estimate for µ suggests that the treatment and control group do not
follow a different time trend in the pre-treatment periods, which I consider as support for the
common time trend assumption.
To capture time trends of the treatment effect, I additionally estimate a modified version
of equation (3.1) whereby the interaction terms Di(t)×Pret and Di(t)×Postt are replaced by
a series of annual leads and lags of the reform:
Yit = αi+λDi(t)+
2007
∑
τ=2001
(τ 6=2003)
ρτ(Di(t)×δ τt )+ δt + εit , (3.2)
where τ denotes years, each δ τt represents a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in year
t = τ and 0 otherwise, and all other variables are defined as above. The parameters ρτ
capture the time trend of the treatment by providing estimates of the annual treatment effect.
Thereby, I regard statistically insignificant estimates of the leads (ρτ for τ < 2003) as support
for the common time trend assumption.
In contrast to other studies on firm size-contingent reforms of dismissal protection (e.g.,
Bauer et al. 2007; Centeno and Novo 2012), I omit Xit in equations (3.1) and (3.2). That is, I
do not control for observable time-varying firm-level characteristics in my main specification.
Recall that the firm fixed effects already take into account time constant differences between
firms. If I want to include further variables, I have to assume that these variables are not
influenced by the treatment. Given that I can only consider variables that change over time
8Note that FE estimates given by equation (3.1) and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates given by an
analogous equation that includes α instead of αi are identical if the sample is a balanced panel and the treatment
status is time constant.
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and that are also measured after the treatment, there is a good chance that these variables are
bad controls and violate the assumption of exogeneity (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Lechner
2010). On the other hand, one could make the counterargument that the exclusion of time-
varying variables that are not influenced by the reform but still correlated with both the
treatment status and the outcome variable might lead to an omitted variable bias and/or
decrease the precision of the estimates. Reassuringly, I obtain very similar results that lead
to the same conclusions when I include a set of time-varying controls (see the sensitivity
check in section 3.5.5).9
Due to the panel data structure, serial correlation in the error term of an establishment
may be an issue when conducting statistical inference. Though, by using a FE estimator, I
implicitly take into account any serial correlation that is captured by the unobserved time-
invariant firm effect. Moreover, I cluster standard errors at the establishment level to further
allow for unrestricted correlation between observations of each establishment.
A consistent estimation of the causal effect ρ (and ρτ , respectively) based on equation (3.1)
and (3.2) relies on a series of identifying assumptions. In addition to the common time trend
assumption mentioned above (for which I provide evidence along with the discussion of
the main results in section 3.5), I have to assume that the threshold change has no effect
on control firms (i.e., stable unit treatment value assumption, SUTVA). Most notably, firms
that are just above the new threshold may alter their hiring and separation decisions in
response to the reform. Accordingly, I show support for the absence of threshold effects in
section 3.4.5. Next, while there is hardly any scope for anticipation effects due to the short-
dated introduction of the reform (see discussion in section 3.2), the analyses may suffer from
a bias due to selection into (or out of) treatment after the reform. To circumvent this problem,
some studies define a time-invariant treatment status based on firm size in the pre-reform
periods only (e.g., Martins 2009; Bauernschuster 2013), while others allow for a time-varying
treatment status but argue that a FE estimator should, for the most part, obviate issues of
endogeneity as it allows for selection into treatment based on time-invariant unobservable
characteristics that also influence the outcome variable.(e.g., Centeno and Novo 2012).10
Eventually, I apply both approaches by using different methods to assign establishments to
the treatment and control group (see section 3.4.2 for an in-depth discussion of the various
assignment methods). Finally, I have to assume that the other reforms discussed in section 3.2
did not affect the treatment and control firms in systematically different ways.
9The set of explanatory variables consists of worker characteristics averaged at the firm level. See Table 3.3
for a list.
10Technically, the absence of self-selection into (or out of) treatment requires that E[Ditεit |αi] = 0, ∀t.
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3.4. Data
3.4.1. Data Source
The analysis uses the Cross-sectional Model 2 of the Linked-Employer-Employee Data 1993-
2010 (LIAB QM2 9310) from the German Institute of Employment Research (IAB).11 The
data set is a representative sample of German establishments and contains both survey data
on establishments and administrative data on individuals. For the years under consideration,
the annual sample size amounts to roughly 16,000 establishments representing approximately
1% of the universe of German establishments. The data on individuals cover employees that
are liable for social security payments and work for one of the establishments.12 Given the
administrative nature of the individual-level information, the data set is considered to be
highly reliable. The data are particularly suitable for the analysis, as the individual-level data
can be aggregated at the establishment-level using a unique identifier and allow for tracing
employees over time to determine establishment-level worker flows. Moreover, the data
provide sufficient information to calculate the establishment size in line with the legislation
and thus to determine coverage by the PADA for each establishment.
3.4.2. Treatment Assignment
The threshold of the PADA applies to establishments (not companies with several establish-
ments in several municipalities), which is also the unit of measurement in the data. Panel A
in Table 3.1 summarizes the procedure to determine the full-time equivalent weighted (FTE)
firm size defined by the PADA in column 1 and the availability of the associated information
in the data in column 2. Panel B lists the relevance of workers by their employment status.
In principle, all regular employees including marginal employees, employees with fixed-
term contracts and employees hired within the last six months should be counted.13 Part-time
employees should be weighted depending on contractual weekly working hours. According
to the legislation (KSchG §23), employees working up to 20 hours per week should be
weighted by 0.5, employees working more than 20 and up to 30 hours per week should be
weighted by 0.75, and employees working more than 30 hours should be weighted with
1.0. Although the data set provides information on part-time employees, it only records
whether a person works up to 18 hours per week (small part-time) or more than 18 hours
per week (large part-time). I weight the former by 0.5 and the latter by 0.75. Accordingly,
part-time employees working more than 18 and up to 20 hours per week as well as workers
identified as part-time employees but working more than 30 hours per week are not weighted
exactly according to the PADA. Owners and executive staff not subject to directives, family
11See Heining et al. (2013) for a detailed description of the data.
12Employees liable for social security payments are all white-collar and blue-collar workers including
apprentices and, since 1999, also marginal employees and unpaid family workers. Civil servants, self-employed
and regular students are not recorded.
13Against a common misconception, the PADA applies to marginal employees without any restrictions.
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Table 3.1.: Determination of FTE Establishment Size
PADA LIAB QM2
(1) (2)
Panel A: Full-time equivalent weight
0.5 (small part-time) [0, 20] [0, 18]
0.75 (large part-time) (20, 30] (18, full-time)
1.0 (full-time) (30, ∞) full-time
Panel B: Employment status
Regular employees liable for social security payments Included Included
Marginal employees Included Included
Fixed-term contract workers Included Included
Workers employed for less than 6 months Included Included
Owners and executive staff (not subject to directives) Excluded Excluded
(if identified)
Family members without working contract Excluded Excluded
Vocational trainees (incl. apprentices) Excluded Excluded
Employees with an inactive work relationship Excluded Excluded
(if replaced) (always)
Temporary agency worker (in user establishment) Excluded Excluded
Notes: Panel A lists the full-time equivalent weights for different intervals of workings hours
per week. Column 1 indicates the intervals defined by the PADA. Column 2 shows the intervals
observed and used in the data. Panel B lists different types of employment status and their
respective consideration in the PADA and the data.
members without a labor contract and vocational trainees should not be counted and are
consequently excluded. Employees with an inactive work relationships (e.g., maternity leave)
should be excluded in case of replacement. As the data do not record inactive employees
and replacements cannot be identified, I assume that inactive employees are replaced in all
cases.14
I restrict the sample by excluding establishments in the shipping and aircraft transport
industry since other legislation applies to these sectors (KSchG §24). In addition, I remove
establishments in the highly subsidized agricultural and mining sectors as well as non-profit
firms and private households. Moreover, I abstract from establishment entries and exits and
only keep firms that are always present during the sample periods 2000 to 2007.15,16
For the analysis, I compare average outcomes of establishments subject to the policy
change (treatment group) with establishments that exhibit similar establishment character-
istics, yet, are not exposed to the change (control group) before and after the reform. The
binary treatment variable Di(t) identifies each group and depending on the assignment method
may or may not vary over time. The assignment of firms to the treatment and control group
is determined by the FTE firm size range and the selection of assignment periods.
14Only recently, German Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG)) has decided that TA workers
should also be counted if they regularly work for the user establishment (BAG, judgment of January 24, 2013, 2
AZR 140/12). However, in the periods under consideration, the common perception was that TA employees
should not be added to the number of employees of the user establishment. In line with this argument, I do not
consider TA employment in the determination of the establishment size.
15In order to conduct the analysis for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, firms already need to be present in the
data in 2000 since worker turnover rates in period t are based on information in periods t−1 and t.
16For further details on the sample processing, see Appendix B.1.1.
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The FTE size range of the treatment group is defined by the size interval (5,10]. This
is in line with the reform, which should only affect firms in this size category. In addition,
the size interval (10,20] constitutes the FTE size range for the control group. The firm size
restriction for the control group follows Bauernschuster (2013) and seems appropriate as it
selects firms that should be very similar to the treated firms except for their difference in size
and, at the same time, samples a number of firms that is comparable to the number of firms
in the treatment group. I test the sensitivity of the results to different choices for the size
limits of the control group in section 3.5.5.
The selection of the assignment periods relies on the debate on regression fallacy. Since
the study by Davis et al. (1996), it has been a recurring question in the literature on small firm
job creation as to how to avoid regression fallacy.17 However, more recently, there seems to
be a consensus that an assignment of firms to size categories based on the average size or
base-year size method should be preferred (Neumark et al. 2011; Haltiwanger et al. 2013;
de Wit and de Kok 2014).18 Further taking into account discussions in previous studies on
the effects of size-contingent dismissal reforms, I consider an assignment procedure to the
treatment and control group based on the FTE establishment size in a two-year window in
the ’before’ periods.19 Similar to the average size method, this method assigns firms to a
size category based on the firm size in the periods t−1 and t. Yet, it differs in that it restricts
the sample to establishments that remain in the same size category for two years rather
than relying on averages. Eventually, this should mitigate the potential bias from regression
fallacy and, in addition, avoid the problem of an ambiguous allocation of worker turnover
to firms that enter or exit the treatment or control group during the two-year assignment
window.20 As I consider this assignment method as the most natural approach, I focus on the
sample based on this method in the discussion of the summary statistics.
To make my results comparable to previous studies, I apply three further assignment
methods that rely on methods used in previous studies (see Table 3.2 for an overview). In
contrast to the first method, the second method uses a four-year window in the ’before’
periods to mitigate a regression-to-the-mean bias if transitory employment fluctuations last
17Following the argument of Davis et al. (1996) and Neumark et al. (2011), the regression fallacy may occur
if firms are assigned to a firm size category based on employment in a given year rather than on the firm’s
long run size. For the case of two size categories (i.e., small and large firms), Neumark et al. (2011) argue that
firms assigned to the small size category based on a single year are more likely to have experienced a transitory
decrease in employment. Correspondingly, these firms are more likely to return to their long run size revealing
a positive job flow rate falsely attributed to the small size category. Eventually, small firms may appear to
outperform large firms in terms of job flow rates only because of regression to the mean. The bias in the job
flow rate may result from an upward bias in the hiring or a downward bias in the separation rate or both. The
reverse argument can be made for large firms. Neumark et al. (2011) further argue that under the assumption that
transitory employment changes are not highly correlated, assignment to firm size categories based on multiple
years should mitigate a potential bias from the regression fallacy. Note, however, that contrary to the case of two
size categories, the direction of the bias for the treatment and control group in the present study is undetermined
since the phenomena described above may occur at the upper and lower limit of the size ranges.
18The average size method assigns firms to a size category based on the simple average of the firm size in
t−1 and t. The base-year size method assigns firms to a size category based on the firm size in t−1.
19See Appendix Table B.1 for an overview of the literature and the different methods used for the treatment
assignment in other studies.
20Since the base-year size method suffers from the latter issue, I disregard this method.
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Table 3.2.: Assignment Methods to Treatment Group and Control Group
2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assignment periods 2002 and 2003 2000 to 2003 2000 to 2007 t−1 and t
Treatment units - FTE firm size ∈ (5,10] -
Control units - FTE firm size ∈ (10,20] -
Time-varying treatment status - No - Yes
Balanced panel - Yes - No
Notes: Table summarizes the four assignment methods to the treatment and control group used in the
present study. For further explanations on each assignment methods see section 3.4.2.
up to four years. Eventually, both methods fix the treatment status prior to the reform which
is supposed to prevent biases from selection into (out of) treatment. However, they allow
firms to exceed the defined firm size limits of the treatment and control group in the periods
beyond the assignment window which may distort the actual treatment effect.21 Therefore,
the third method denoted as ’always the same’ further restricts the sample to establishments
that remain in their size category over the sample periods 2000 to 2007. Finally, the fourth
method denoted as ’adjacent period’ assigns establishments to the treatment and control
group on a rolling basis based on the firm size in the base year (t−1) and the current year
(t), thus, excluding year-to-year movers. Consequently, this method allows the treatment
status to vary over time and identification therefore relies on the assumption that there are no
unobserved variables that vary over time and influence both the treatment status Dit and the
outcome variable. In what follows, I denote the four assignment methods by (1) to (4).
3.4.3. Outcome Variables
To examine changes in hires, separations, job flows, and churning, I define worker turnover
variables as point-in-time comparisons. FTE_Hiresit denotes the number of employees
working at establishment i in period t but not t−1 weighted in full-time equivalent units
according to the PADA. Likewise, FTE_Separationsit denotes the FTE number of employees
working at establishment i in period t−1 but not t. Since t refers to June 30 in each year,
short-term working relationships that begin and end within 12 months (or vice versa) and
do not cover June 30 are not taken into account. Due to data limitations, the focus is on
all separations irrespective of whether the contract is terminated by the employer or the
employee. I use conventional flow rates by dividing the year-to-year flows of establishment
i in period t by the average total number of FTE employees between t and t−1, denoted
FT Eit and FT Eit−1 (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger 1999; Martins 2009; Centeno and Novo
2012).22 Consequently, I define the hiring and separation rate as:
21Appendix Figure B.1 shows that by 2007 up to 35% of firms are exceeding the size limits if the treatment
and control group.
22My results are robust to an alternative rate measure that only uses FT Eit−1 as the denominator.
52
3.4. DATA
HRit =
FTE_Hiresit
(FT Eit +FT Eit−1)/2
and
SRit =
FTE_Separationsit
(FT Eit +FT Eit−1)/2
.
In addition, I obtain job flows (or net employment changes) as the difference between hires
and separations and define the job flow rate as JFRit =HRit−SRit . Lastly, following Burgess
et al. (2000), I define churning which measures the turnover in excess of the net employment
change as CRit = HRit + SRit −|JFRit |.
Since the legislation became effective on January 1, 2004, the worker turnover rates for
period t = 2004 (covering hires and separations between June 30, 2003 and June 30, 2004)
are only subject to the policy change for the last six months. To examine this period in
more detail, I conduct a supplementary analysis that distinguishes between hires in the first
half (from July to December in period t−1) and the second half (from January to June in
period t) of the 12-months observation period (see section 3.5.2). Due to data limitations,
this additional analysis cannot be performed for separations, job flows, and churning. To
test for potential heterogeneity of the treatment effects, I further define within-firm gender-
and age-specific worker turnover rates as described in section 3.5.3. Finally, I define firm-
level mean wages and shares of temporary workers in order to examine other margins of
adjustment as described in section 3.5.4.
3.4.4. Summary Statistics
Table 3.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the treatment and control group for the
sample based on the assignment method (1) in the baseline period 2003. The sample consists
of 587 establishments, of which 289 belong to the treatment group. Columns 1 to 4 depict the
means and standard deviations of selected firm-level characteristics. Column 5 presents the
differences in the means between the two groups whereby asterisks indicate the significance
level of t-tests for mean equality. Hiring and separation rates fluctuate around 11 to 12%.
This is in line with Bellmann et al. (2017) who find similar rates ranging from 10 to 13%
using the same data for the years 1993 to 2014. More importantly, firms in the treatment and
control group are very similar in terms of their worker turnover rates. The differences in the
rates are uniformly less than 1% and statistically not different from each other.
With regard to the other observable firm-level characteristics, the treatment and control
group are also very alike. Although treated firms are slightly overrepresented in wholesale
and retail trade and underrepresented in manufacturing and real estate, differences in the
industry distribution are not statistically significant at a reasonable level. The same holds
with respect to the geographic distribution where there is a minor overrepresentation of
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Table 3.3.: Summary Statistics of Establishment Characteristics in 2003 for Sample Based
on Assignment Method 2-Years in ’Before’ Periods
Treatment Group Control Group
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment identifier
FTE establishment size 7.444 (1.321) 14.848 (2.648) −7.404∗∗∗
Outcome variables
Hiring rate 0.111 (0.123) 0.116 (0.104) −0.004
Separation rate 0.125 (0.129) 0.122 (0.104) 0.003
Job flow rate −0.014 (0.133) −0.006 (0.111) −0.007
Churning rate 0.145 (0.194) 0.154 (0.157) −0.009
Industry distribution
Manufacturing 0.298 (0.458) 0.319 (0.467) −0.021
Construction 0.187 (0.390) 0.181 (0.386) 0.006
Wholesale and retail trade 0.235 (0.425) 0.205 (0.404) 0.031
Real estate 0.104 (0.306) 0.117 (0.322) −0.014
Others 0.176 (0.382) 0.178 (0.383) −0.001
Geographic distribution
North 0.087 (0.282) 0.111 (0.314) −0.024
East 0.367 (0.483) 0.396 (0.490) −0.029
Berlin region 0.163 (0.370) 0.148 (0.355) 0.015
South 0.208 (0.406) 0.161 (0.368) 0.047
West 0.176 (0.382) 0.185 (0.389) −0.008
Average worker characteristics
Avg. share of women 0.457 (0.313) 0.412 (0.301) 0.045∗
Avg. share of blue-collar worker 0.101 (0.184) 0.130 (0.199) −0.028∗
Avg. share of part-time worker 0.199 (0.215) 0.187 (0.208) 0.012
Avg. share of apprentices 0.066 (0.099) 0.065 (0.091) 0.001
Mean age 42.971 (5.327) 42.973 (4.492) −0.002
Mean age squared 1876.129 (466.369) 1867.639 (387.340) 8.490
Firms 289 298
Notes: Table shows the summary statistics of the establishment sample that is based on assignment
method 2-Years in ’Before’ Periods for the baseline year 2003. Treatment group: More than 5 and
up to 10 full-time equivalent weighted employees in 2002 to 2003. Control group: More than 10
and up to 20 full-time equivalent weighted employees in 2002 to 2003. Others includes the industries
electricity, gas and water supply, hotels and restaurants, transport, storage and communication, financial
intermediation, education, health and social work, and other community, social and personal service
activities. North includes the federal states Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein.
East includes Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. Berlin region
includes Berlin and Brandenburg. South includes Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, and Hesse and West
includes North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate, and Saarland. Due to reasons of data protection,
a further industrial and geographic breakdown is not feasible. Asterisks denote significance of t-test for
mean equality between treatment and control group. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%.
Data source: LIAB QM2.
treated firms in the Berlin region and an underrepresentation in the North and East, but
differences are again statistically insignificant. Next, there are some noteworthy differences
in the firm’s average worker characteristics. Namely, the average share of women is 4.5
percentage points higher in the treated firms and the average share of blue-collar workers is
2.8 percentage points lower, yet, both differences are significant only at a 10% level. Lastly,
Appendix Table B.2 summarizes the differences in means and respective tests for mean
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Figure 3.1.: Firm Size Distribution Before and After Reform
A. Years 2001 to 2003 B. Years 2004 to 2007
Notes: Figure shows histograms of full-time equivalent weighted (FTE) establishment size, i.e., FTE workers
per establishment, in the before (panel A) and after (panel B) periods of the 2004 PADA reform. Vertical lines
indicate the minimum threshold determining coverage by the PADA before (panel A) and after (panel B) 2004.
To the right dismissal protection is less strict. The sample consists of establishments that are always present in
the data between 2000 and 2007. Data source: LIAB QM2.
equality for all four assignment methods used in this study. The first column recapitulates
column 5 in Table 3.3. Columns 2 to 4 correspond to the other three assignment methods
described in section 3.4.2. Reassuringly, firms in the treatment and control group are very
similar in terms of their observable firm-level characteristics in all four cases.
3.4.5. Threshold Effects
One threat to the validity of the analysis lies in the violation of SUTVA due to the presence
of spillover effects. In the present setting, the threshold change might indirectly influence the
behavior of firms in the control group, that is firms above the new threshold. For instance,
these firms may strategically reduce their size below the new threshold such that remaining
workers lose their protection from the PADA and costs for further adjustments diminish. To
provide some descriptive evidence for the absence of threshold effects, I will look at the firm
size distribution before and after the reform and, in addition, apply a more formal test for
threshold effects following an approach by Bauer et al. (2007) and Schivardi and Torrini
(2008).
The histograms in Figure 3.1 show the distribution of firms by FTE firm size before (panel
A) and after (panel B) the PADA reform for firms with sizes ranging between 1 to 25 FTE
employees. The sample is based on firms that are always present during the sample periods
2000 to 2007. Before the reform, the threshold was at five FTE employees (left panel) and
after the reform, it is at ten FTE employees (right panel). As expected, small firms constitute
the vast majority in the sample and the density decreases with size. More importantly, in both
cases, there are no noticeable discontinuities in the distribution of firms near the thresholds.
Thus, the figure suggests that firms do not behave strategically by clustering around the
thresholds. As a more formal test for threshold effects, I follow Bauer et al. (2007) and
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Table 3.4.: Estimation Results for Probability of Downsizing After 2004 PADA Reform
OLS Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3)
1 [FT Eit−1 ∈ (10,11]] −0.011 −0.011 −0.011
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
1 [FT Eit−1 ∈ (11,12]] 0.034 0.033 0.033
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
1 [FT Eit−1 ∈ (12,13]] 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Firms 763 763 763
Observations 3,073 3,073 3,073
Notes: Results from OLS, Probit, and Logit estimates of empirical model (3.3) for
the sample periods 2004 to 2007, with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if an
establishment downsizes between periods t−1 and t and 0 otherwise as the outcome
and establishment-year as the unit of observation. 1[...] refers to estimates of the
threshold effect (λk for k = 1,2,3) for the respective indicator function. For Probit
and Logit, table reports average partial effects. The sample consists of firms in the size
range of five to 20 full-time equivalent weighted employees that are always present
in the data between 2000 and 2007. Year dummies included. Standard errors are
clustered at the establishment level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%.
Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
Schivardi and Torrini (2008) and estimate a model of the form:
Y downit = α+
4
∑
j=1
β jFT E jit−1+
K
∑
k=1
λk1 [FT Eit−1 ∈ (9+ k,10+ k]]+ δt + εit , (3.3)
where Y downit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm downsizes between
periods t−1 and t, i.e., ∆FT Eit−1,t < 0, and 0 otherwise. FT E jit−1 is the jth polynomial of
the FTE firm size in period t−1, 1 [FT Eit−1 ∈ (9+ k,10+ k]] is a set of K dummy variables
defined by indicator functions that take the value 1 if the FTE firm size in period t−1 lies
in the interval (9+ k,10+ k] for integers k = 1, . . . ,K, and 0 otherwise. δt captures yearly
effects that are assumed to be common to all firms and εit is an idiosyncratic error term. The
model’s underlying assumption is that there is a smooth relation between the probability
of downsizing and the fourth degree polynomial in FTE firm size. Moreover, the model
requires firms just above the new threshold to behave exactly like firms further away from the
threshold in absence of threshold constraints (Bauer et al. 2007). Given these assumptions
hold, the parameter of interest λk for k = 1, ...K should capture potential threshold effects.
That is to say, if firms just above the new threshold indeed strategically reduce their firm size,
λk should be statistically significantly larger than zero, in particular for small k.
I estimate equation (3.3) by OLS, Probit, and Logit for the sample periods after the reform
(2004 to 2007). Following Schivardi and Torrini (2008), I use K = 3, that is I test for
threshold effects up to the FTE firm size of 13. The sample consists of firms that are always
present during the sample periods 2000 to 2007 and employ more than five and up to 20 FTE
employees. Since the outcome variable is binary and the model is not saturated, the use of
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OLS may introduce problems. In particular, predicted probabilities of this linear probability
model (LPM) are unbounded (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Reassuringly, I obtain very similar
results when looking at the average partial effects from Probit and Logit models. Table 3.4
reports the results. Column 1 corresponds to OLS, column 2 to Probit, and column 3 to Logit
estimates. For all three methods, none of the estimates is statistically significant. I consider
this as evidence in favor of the view that there are no threshold effects for firms just above
the new threshold that may threaten my identification strategy.23
3.5. Results
To study the causal effect of the PADA reform on different labor market outcomes, I start by
looking at estimates for the overall hiring, separation, job flow, and churning rate. Thereby, I
discuss my results against the backdrop of findings in previous studies and attempt to shed
light on potential contractions. Next, I explore potential heterogeneity in treatment effects by
analyzing the effect of the reform on gender- and age-specific worker turnover rates as well
as on rates by union status and East-West divide of firms. Finally, I examine other margins of
adjustment by looking at effects on firm mean wages and the use of temporary employment.
3.5.1. Worker Turnover
Figure 3.2 shows yearly DiD estimates of the hiring rate from model (3.2) two periods before
and four periods after the PADA reform.24 The vertical bands correspond to 95% confidence
intervals. Each of the four panels coincides with one of the assignment methods described in
section 3.4.2. Estimates in the pre-treatment periods are statistically insignificant in all cases
which I regard as support for the common time trend assumption underlying the identification
strategy. Moreover, point estimates for the after periods tend to be positive. At first glance,
this is in line with the theoretical predictions that hires should increase in response to softened
dismissal protection. However, except for the 2004 coefficient from assignment method
23To test for the robustness of the results, I restrict the sample to firms with up to 15 FTE employees and extend
the sample to firms with up to 25 FTE employees, include more or less indicator functions (i.e., K ∈ 2,4,5),
estimate the model separately for each unit interval by including in each run only one indicator function for
k = 1, ...5, and include additional controls (i.e., industry and federal state dummies and/or average share of
blue-collar workers, average share of part-time workers, average share of apprentices, average share of women,
average age of employees and its square). Furthermore, I exploit the time variation in the threshold and allow
the coefficients of the indicator functions to differ before and after the reform by augmenting model (3.3)
with interaction terms between the indicator functions and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the
periods after the reform and 0 otherwise. Formally, I add ∑Kk=1 γk{1 [FT Eit−1 ∈ (9+ k,10+ k]]×Postt} to
equation (3.3). I re-estimate the augmented model for the sample periods 2001 to 2007. In the model, λk close
to zero and γk statistically significantly larger than zero for some k would suggest a threshold effect after the
reform. However, none of the tests provides evidence for a robust significant threshold effect. Finally, I conduct
an analogous analysis for the growth probability of firms just below the new threshold using the following model:
Y growthit = α+∑
4
j=1 β jFT E
j
it−1 +∑
K
k=1 λk1 [FT Eit−1 ∈ (10− k,11− k]]+ δt + εit , where Y growthit is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if a FTE firm size increases between periods t−1 and t, i.e., ∆FT Eit−1,t > 0, and
0 otherwise. Once more, I am not able to identify any robust significant threshold effects for firms just below the
new threshold. All results are available upon request.
24The yearly DiD estimates correspond to the interaction terms in model (3.2).
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Figure 3.2.: Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Results: Hiring Rate
A. 2-Years in ’Before’ Periods B. 4-Years in ’Before’ Periods
C. Always the same D. Adjacent Periods
Notes: Figure shows coefficients and their 95% confidence interval of yearly difference-in-differences estimates
(ρτ for τ = 2001, ...,2007, τ 6= 2003) as given by empirical model (3.2) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007,
with the hiring rate as the outcome and establishment-year as the unit of observation. The year 2003 is the
baseline period. The vertical line represents the timing of the PADA reform. Each panel presents separate
estimates for one of the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
(2) (see panel B), none of the coefficients is statistically significant at the 5% level. Panel
A in Table 3.5 on page 61 summarizes the results of the DiD estimates by displaying the
total (DiD 2004-07) and pre-treatment (DiD 2001-02) effect.25 The statistically insignificant
pre-treatment DiD estimates can again be regarded as support for the common time trend.
Furthermore, as the evolution of the yearly effects already suggested, I do not find convincing
evidence for a positive effect of the PADA reform on firm hiring rates. Only the total effect
for assignment method (2) of 2.0 percentage points is statistically significant at a 10% level.
The results are in conformity with Bauer et al. (2007) who also do not find robust evidence
for a causal relation between similar threshold reforms in 1996 and 1999 and hiring rates.
Yet, my results are inconsistent with findings of Bauernschuster (2013) who concludes that
the 2004 PADA reform had a positive effect on firms’ hiring in the years 2004 and 2005. I
explore this contradiction in more detail in section 3.5.2.
Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 display dynamic patterns of the treatment effect on the separation,
job flow, and churning rates. Panel B, C, and D in Table 3.5 further summarize the total
25The DiD estimates for total effect corresponds to the interaction term in model (3.1) and is technically an
average of the annual effects of the post-treatment periods. Respectively, the DiD estimate for the pre-treatment
period is technically an average of the yearly estimates for 2001 and 2002.
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Figure 3.3.: Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Results: Separation Rate
A. 2-Years in ’Before’ Periods B. 4-Years in ’Before’ Periods
C. Always the same D. Adjacent Periods
Notes: See notes to Figure 3.2. The outcome is the separation rate. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
Figure 3.4.: Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Results: Job Flow Rate
A. 2-Years in ’Before’ Periods B. 4-Years in ’Before’ Periods
C. Always the same D. Adjacent Periods
Notes: See notes to Figure 3.2. The outcome is the job flow rate. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
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Figure 3.5.: Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Results: Churning Rate
A. 2-Years in ’Before’ Periods B. 4-Years in ’Before’ Periods
C. Always the same D. Adjacent Periods
Notes: See notes to Figure 3.2. The outcome is the churning rate. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
and pre-treatment effect for these outcome variables. Reassuringly, for none of assignment
methods and outcome variables do I obtain statistically significant estimates in periods before
the reform which reinforces the common time trend assumption for these outcome variables.
Based on economic theory, I would expect the separation rate to increase in response to
reduced dismissal costs at some point. However, turning to the post-reform periods, the
effect on the separation rate is uniformly statistically insignificant. In the short run, this is to
some extent not surprising since the relaxed dismissal protection only applies to new hires in
the treated firms. Consequently, dismissal costs are not instantaneously reduced and I would
only expect longer run effects. However, also in the long term only the 2007 coefficient for
the assignment method (3) is statistically significant (see panel C in Figure 3.3) which I do
not consider as robust evidence for an increase in the separation rate in later periods. In
summary, estimates for the total effect on the separation rate are mostly negative, in absolute
terms not larger than 1.0 percentage point, and in all cases statistically insignificant (see
Table 3.5). Again, the results are consistent with Bauer et al. (2007) who also do not observe
any significant short-run effects on separation rates in 1996 and 1999.
As the hiring rate exceeds the separation rate in almost all post-treatment periods, the
predominantly positive estimates for the job flow rate do not come at a surprise. Yet, the
coefficients remain statistically insignificant and thus cannot be interpreted as support for
a positive net employment effect of the reform (see Figure 3.4 and panel C in Table 3.5).
Similarly, Bauer et al. (2007) do not find any evidence for a significant relationship between
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Table 3.5.: Difference-in-Differences Results: Overall Turnover Rates
2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 0.005 0.020∗ 0.015 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
DiD 2001-02 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 −0.006 −0.002 0.011 −0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
DiD 2001-02 −0.002 −0.007 −0.010 −0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 0.011 0.022 0.004 0.009
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013)
DiD 2001-02 0.014 0.016 0.011 0.005
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 −0.001 0.017 0.020 0.004
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
DiD 2001-02 −0.009 0.005 0.003 0.001
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Firms 587 422 247 957
Observations 4109 2954 1729 4304
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empirical
model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the indicated variable as the outcome and
establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under
consideration. The year 2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one of
the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment
level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
relaxed dismissal protection and job flows for previous threshold reforms. Moreover, the
absence of an effect is not contradictory to economic theory which is also inconclusive in
terms of the relationship between changes in dismissal costs and net employment.
Finally, while theory suggests an increase in churning in response to a reduction in
dismissal costs, the DiD estimates for the churning rate do not underpin this prediction.
Although estimates for the total effect are mostly positive and go in absolute terms up to 2.0
percentage points, the coefficients are statistically not significant at a reasonable level (see
Figure 3.5 and panel D in Table 3.5).
Summing up, I do not find evidence that the reform of the PADA in 2004 had a causal
effect on overall worker turnover rates of treated firms.
3.5.2. Consolidation with Previous Findings
To consolidate my statistically insignificant estimates on the hiring rate with the positive
effect on this outcome detected by Bauernschuster (2013), I apply the four assignment
methods described in section 3.4.2 to the IAB Establishment Panel (IAB EP) after I pre-
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processed the data following Bauernschuster (2013).26 Thereby, I extend Bauernschuster
(2013)’s analysis for the years 2004 and 2005 by the sample periods 2006 and 2007. Since
the IAB EP refers to hires within the first six months of each year, I conduct a comparable
analysis based on the LIAB QM2 that distinguishes between hires in the first (June to
December in year t−1) and the second (January to June in year t) half of the twelve month
observation period. More precisely, following the definition of flow rates in section 3.4.3,
I compute half-year hiring rates for each period by replacing annual hires with six months
hires in the numerator. This is possible since I know the exact entry date of each worker
in a firm. Eventually, I estimate the effect on the half-year hiring rates (January to June)
based on models (3.1) and (3.2) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007 for both the IAB EP
and LIAB QM2. To obtain separate estimates for a short- and medium-term effect that can
be compared to results in Bauernschuster (2013), I re-estimate equation (3.1) once more
whereby I substitute ρS(Di(t)×Shortt)+ρM(Di(t)×Mediumt) for ρ1(Di(t)×Postt). Shortt
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the years 2004 and 2005 and 0 otherwise.
Likewise, Mediumt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the years 2006 and 2007
and 0 otherwise.
The left side of Table 3.6 shows the extension of Bauernschuster (2013)’s estimates based
on the IAB EP. Column 2 corresponds to the assignment method used in his main analysis
(Table 1, p. 301). The results are comforting in that I obtain a statistically significant short-
term effect (DiD 2004-05) of 1.5 percentage points, while his original estimates for the years
2004 and 2005 range between 1.3 and 2.1 percentage points.27 In contrast, estimates from
assignment methods (1), (3), and (4) for the short-term effect are smaller in absolute terms
and statistically insignificant. The picture is similar for the total effect (DiD 2004-07) where
only assignment method (2) leads to a statistically significant DiD coefficient. Taken together,
the results based on the IAB EP already cast some doubt on Bauernschuster (2013)’s finding
of a causal short-term effect on the hiring rate.
The right side of Table 3.6 depicts the analogous estimates based on the LIAB QM2.
Interestingly, looking at column 6 which represents assignment method (2), the coefficient
of the total effect from the LIAB QM2 of 1.5 percentage points (significant at the 10% level)
is very close to the respective estimate from the IAB EP of 1.6 percentage points (significant
at the 5% level), despite the fact that the former is only driven by a significant short-term
effect while the latter is driven by both a statistically significant short- and medium term
effect.28 Even more important, results for the total effect from the other assignment methods
26I thank Stefan Bauernschuster for making available the statistical programs for the data processing of the
IAB EP.
27The slightly lower significance in my estimates could potentially be explained by the smaller sample as the
extension of the sample periods require firms from the initial sample to also be present in the periods 2006 and
2007.
28There are a number of reasons that may explain differences in the estimates from the two data sources. To
name a few, the LIAB QM2 constitutes administrative data whereas the IAB EP is obtained from surveys, the
hires in the LIAB QM2 are determined as point-in-time comparisons whereas hires in the IAB EP refer to all
hires, and the LIAB QM2 allows for a more precise full-time equivalent weighting scheme as opposed to global
part-time weights used for the IAB EP.
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Table 3.6.: Difference-in-Differences Results: IAB EP vs. LIAB QM2
IAB EP LIAB QM2
2-Years 4-Years 2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Six month DiD 2004-05 0.013 0.015∗ 0.008 −0.007 0.014∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.017 0.016∗∗
hiring rate (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
(Jan. DiD 2006-07 0.002 0.017∗∗ 0.005 −0.005 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.005
to June) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
DiD 2004-07 0.007 0.016∗∗ 0.006 −0.006 0.008 0.015∗ 0.001 0.011
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
DiD 2001-02 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.004
(0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Firms 558 383 349 1184 587 422 247 957
Observations 3906 2681 2443 4304 4109 2954 1729 4304
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empirical model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001
to 2007, with the indicated variable as the outcome and establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled
periods under consideration. The year 2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one of the four assignment
methods described in section 3.4.2. Columns 1 to 4 refer to estimates for the six month hiring rate as the outcome based on the IAB EP and
columns 5 to 8 to estimates for the analogous outcome based on the LIAB QM2. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. See text for additional details. Data sources: LIAB QM2 9310 and IAB Establishment Panel.
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in columns 5, 7, and 8 are again statistically insignificant, although the short-term effect
remains statistically significant in method (1) and (4).29
To sum up, this supplementary analysis highlights the dependence of previous findings
from Bauernschuster (2013) on the assignment methods to the treatment and control group.
As discussed in section 3.4.2, there is no obvious justification for prioritizing one assignment
method over the other and therefore the findings based on both data sources do not allow one
to draw a clear-cut conclusion on the causal effect of the relaxed dismissal protection on firm
hiring rates. If anything, the findings suggest a short-term effect on the six months hiring
rate which does not persist in the medium-term.
3.5.3. Heterogeneity
Although I do not find an effect on the firm overall worker turnover rates, the PADA reform
might have differential impacts on subgroups of workers or firms. To this end, I first exploit
worker-level information on gender and age and construct an array of subgroup-specific
turnover rates for which I re-estimate model (3.1). In analogy to the overall rates, the men’s
(women’s) hiring rate is determined by dividing the FTE hires of men (women) in period t
by the average of the FTE firm size in periods t−1 and t. Age-specific rates are constructed
in the same way based on two age groups, i.e., young workers (aged < 35 years) and older
workers (aged ≥ 35 years).30 As in Centeno and Novo (2014), I use the cut-off age at
35 so that the group of young workers predominantly comprises employees that are still
establishing themselves in the labor market and have a reasonable likelihood to pursue further
education. In addition, I assess differential effects by union status and the East-West divide
between firms. To this end, I split the establishment samples by the respective observable
firm-level characteristic and re-estimate model (3.1) for each subsample.
From a theoretical point of view, differential effects of the PADA reform on worker
subgroups could be explained by differences in labor supply elasticities (Bertola et al. 2007;
Centeno and Novo 2014). The labor supply of women and young workers is generally more
elastic relative to prime-aged men given that women are more likely to decide between
home production and market work and young workers between market work and education
(Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; Bertola et al. 2007; Evers et al. 2008).31 Therefore, a less
29In unreported estimations, I also look at the dynamic pattern of the effects. Since the reform became effective
in the beginning of 2004 and the outcome flow variables of the LIAB QM2 are point-in-time comparisons of
the June 30 of consecutive years, the first treatment period 2004 is only subject to the reform in the last six
month (January to June 2004). Hence, I would expect an effect on the hiring rate only in the second half of this
observation period. Reassuringly, estimates reveal that positive and statistically significant effects on the hiring
rate in 2004 for the different assignment methods are indeed driven by the second half of the observation period.
Coefficients range between 2.0 and 2.7 percentage points and are significance at least at 10% levels. In contrast,
estimates for the first six months (July to December 2003) vary between -0.1 and 0.5 percentage points and are
uniformly statistically insignificant.
30By construction, the sums of subgroup-specific hiring, separation, and job flow rates for men/women and
young/older workers are equal to the respective overall flow rate. Consequently, the sums of the subgroup-specific
total DiD coefficients are equal to the respective total DiD coefficients from section 3.5.1.
31For example, Prifti and Vuri (2013) find that a strengthening of the dismissal protection in Italy in 1990 had
a positive and sizable causal effect on women’s fertility decisions.
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stringent dismissal protection should have more pronounced employment effects on women
and younger workers as employment rather than wage is the more important margin of
adjustment (relative to men) (Bertola et al. 2007). Consequently, worker turnover rates of
women and younger workers are more likely to be affected by the reform than rates of men
and older workers.
Gender: Table 3.7 summarizes the results for the gender-specific turnover rates. The
left side shows the results for the men’s rates, the right side the analogous estimates for
the women’s rates. DiD estimates for the hiring, separation, and job flow rates in the
pre-treatment periods are statistically insignificant which supports the common time trend
assumption for these subgroup-specific outcome variables. In contrast, the women’s churning
rate exhibits differential trends in the pre-reform periods for two of the four assignment
methods. Consequently, I focus on the gender-specific hiring, separation, and job flow rates
and disregard the results for the churning rate. Looking at the post-reform periods, I find
evidence for a positive effect of the PADA reform on the women’s hiring rate (see panel A in
Table 3.7). Depending on the assignment method, the rate increased by 1.3 to 2.1 percentage
points with estimates being statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels. In comparison,
estimates for the men’s hiring rate are in absolute terms not larger than 0.8 percentage points
and uniformly statistically insignificant. The significant increase of the women’s hiring rate
of 1.3 to 2.1 percentage points is sizeable. Relative to the women’s mean rate of 4.3% in the
baseline year 2003, it is a 30 to 48% increase. Taking into account that the estimates for the
gender-specific separation rates are very small, and for both men and women statistically
insignificant (see panel B in Table 3.7), the DiD coefficients for the women’s job flow rates
are, as expected, positive (see panel C in Table 3.7). Moreover, given all assignment methods
yield positive estimates that range between 1.5 and 2.3 percentage points of which three out
of four are statistically significant at the 5% level, the results further suggest a positive causal
effect of the PADA reform on the women’s job flow rate.
Age groups: Contrary to the gender-specific findings which are consistent with the initial
hypothesis on labor supply elasticities, the results do not support the prediction of a differen-
tial effect for younger workers. As panel A to D in Table 3.8 show, the age-specific estimates
are almost exclusively statistically insignificant.
Union status: To test for heterogeneity across the union status of firms, I divide the sample
into two groups, one with firms that are covered by either a firm-level or an industry-wide
union agreement and one with firms without any union coverage. As union membership is
generally associated with more rigid wages, I expect worker turnover rates of firms in the
group within unionized firms to be more susceptible to a reduction in dismissal protection
as these firms are more likely to adjust along the employment margin. Panel A in Table 3.9
depicts the results on the hiring rate by firm unionization status. The total effect ranges
from 1.7 to 3.1 percentage points, but is only statistically significant in two cases. I do not
regard this as convincing evidence for a positive effect on the hiring rate of unionized firms.
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Table 3.7.: Difference-in-Differences Results: Turnover Rates by Gender
Men Women
2-Years 4-Years 2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 −0.008 0.002 −0.006 −0.006 0.013∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
DiD 2001-02 0.007 0.003 −0.008 −0.004 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.000 −0.006 −0.005 0.005 −0.002
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
DiD 2001-02 0.000 −0.007 −0.014 −0.004 −0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 −0.008 −0.001 −0.012 −0.007 0.019∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.016 0.015∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
DiD 2001-02 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 −0.001 0.006 0.009 0.003 0.011 0.022∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
DiD 2001-02 −0.006 −0.008 −0.013 −0.009 0.006 0.019∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Firms 587 422 247 957 587 422 247 957
Observations 4109 2954 1729 4304 4109 2954 1729 4304
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empirical model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the
indicated variable as the outcome and establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under consideration. The year
2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one of the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. Columns 1 to 4 refer to
estimates for the gender-specific worker turnover rates of men and columns 5 to 8 to estimates for the gender-specific worker turnover rates of women. Standard errors
are clustered at the establishment level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
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Table 3.8.: Difference-in-Differences Results: Turnover Rates by Age Groups
Young (workers aged < 35) Older (workers aged ≥ 35)
2-Years 4-Years 2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 0.004 0.009 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
DiD 2001-02 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.005 −0.005 −0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 −0.001 0.007 0.013 0.003 −0.005 −0.010 −0.002 −0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
DiD 2001-02 −0.003 −0.001 −0.005 −0.002 0.001 −0.005 −0.005 −0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.020∗ 0.005 0.009
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010)
DiD 2001-02 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 −0.001 0.009 0.018∗∗ 0.001 −0.007 0.000 0.003 −0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
DiD 2001-02 −0.012 −0.006 −0.001 −0.006 −0.002 0.000 −0.007 −0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Firms 587 422 247 957 587 422 247 957
Observations 4109 2954 1729 4304 4109 2954 1729 4304
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empirical model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the
indicated variable as the outcome and establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under consideration. The year
2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one of the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. Columns 1 to 4 refer to
estimates for the age-specific worker turnover rates of young workers (aged < 35) and columns 5 to 8 to estimates for the age-specific worker turnover rates of older
workers (aged ≥ 35). Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
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Table 3.9.: Difference-in-Differences Results: Turnover Rates by Union Status of Establishments
Union agreement No union agreement
2-Years 4-Years 2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 0.025∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.027 0.017 −0.012 0.010 0.005 −0.002
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014)
DiD 2001-02 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.015 0.005 0.005 −0.017 −0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 0.002 0.008 0.014 0.005 −0.014 −0.012 0.007 −0.008
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014)
DiD 2001-02 0.001 −0.002 −0.011 −0.007 −0.005 −0.011 −0.010 0.000
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 0.023 0.022 0.013 0.013 0.001 0.022 −0.002 0.006
(0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.018)
DiD 2001-02 0.019 0.017 0.034 0.023 0.009 0.016 −0.007 −0.010
(0.020) (0.022) (0.029) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.019)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 0.009 0.033 0.043∗ 0.012 −0.010 0.003 0.000 −0.002
(0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020)
DiD 2001-02 −0.004 0.007 0.016 −0.005 −0.012 0.004 −0.008 0.006
(0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021)
Firms 263 199 118 429 324 223 129 528
Observations 1841 1393 826 1944 2268 1561 903 2360
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empirical model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the
indicated variable as the outcome and establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under consideration. The year
2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one of the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. Columns 1 to 4 refer to
estimates for unionized establishments and columns 5 to 8 to estimates for non-unionized establishments. An establishment is considered as unionized if it is covered
by either a firm-level or an industry-wide union agreement. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%.
Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
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Table 3.10.: Difference-in-Differences Results: Turnover Rates by East-West Divide of Establishments
West Germany East Germany
2-Years 4-Years 2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 −0.002 0.030∗∗ 0.022 0.007 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
DiD 2001-02 0.012 0.006 −0.012 −0.014 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.018
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 −0.005 0.001 0.027∗ 0.007 −0.007 −0.002 −0.003 −0.011
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015)
DiD 2001-02 −0.002 −0.017 −0.024 −0.015 −0.002 0.004 0.002 0.008
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 0.003 0.029 −0.006 0.000 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.019
(0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.018)
DiD 2001-02 0.014 0.023 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.020)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 −0.002 0.021 0.026 0.015 0.000 0.014 0.014 −0.008
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021)
DiD 2001-02 −0.024 −0.013 −0.032 −0.017 0.008 0.023 0.031 0.020
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021)
Firms 315 215 115 538 272 207 132 419
Observations 2205 1505 805 2342 1904 1449 924 1961
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empirical model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the
indicated variable as the outcome and establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under consideration. The year
2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one of the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. Columns 1 to 4 refer to
estimates for West German establishments and columns 5 to 8 to estimates for East German establishments. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
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Unreported sensitivity checks (in analogy to the sensitivity tests conducted in section 3.5.5)
further support this conclusion in that the positive effect on the hiring rate of unionized firms
becomes in most of the tests statistically insignificant. Panel B, C, and D of Table 3.9 further
show that estimates for both subgroups on the separation, job flow, and churning rate are
predominantly statistically insignificant and thus do not provide evidence for a differential
effect by firm unionization status.
East-West divide: Finally, I analyze differences in the effects on firms located in former West
Germany versus firms located in former East Germany.32 Although the PADA reform was
introduced country-wide, persistent structural differences in the economies of the two former
halves of Germany may still yield differential reform effects. However, as Table 3.10 shows,
the DiD coefficients for both groups are again almost exclusively statistically insignificant
and thus there is no evidence that firms in either part of Germany responded differently to
the PADA reform.
3.5.4. Other Margins of Adjustment
Firms might possibly have adjusted to the reduced dismissal costs along other margins. If
firms take into account firing costs in the hiring decisions, a reduction in dismissal costs
might be passed on to the workers which would lead to a raise in wages (Lazear 1990;
Leonardi and Pica 2013). In contrast, placing reliance upon the insider-outsider theory, a fall
in dismissal protection might just as well reduce wages due to a loss in the bargaining power
of incumbent workers (Lindbeck and Snower 2001; Martins 2009).
To shed light on potential wage effects, I examine the impact on firm mean wages. Since
I do not have information on hours worked, I limit my attention to full-time workers. I
determine log mean daily wages by Log_wageit = log
(
1
FTit ∑
FTit
e=1 wageeit
)
where wageeit is
the wage of the full-time employee e in firm i in period t and FTit is the number of full-time
workers in the respective firm and period.33 Panel A in Table 3.11 reports the DiD results
from an re-estimation of model (3.1) using Log_wageit as the outcome variable. Although
statistically insignificant coefficients for the pre-treatment periods sustain the common time
trend assumption for this outcome, the results for the post-reform periods do not corroborate
an adjustment along the wage dimension. Estimates are in absolute terms not larger than 1.0
percentage point and uniformly statistically insignificant.34
Alternatively, firms might employ workers on a temporary basis to evade costly firing
restrictions. That is, theory predicts that a larger protection gap between open-ended and
temporary contracts entails an increased substitution of temporary for permanent workers
32West Germany comprises the federal states Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein. Former East Germany
includes the federal states Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and
Thuringia.
33I impute right-censored wages following Dustmann et al. (2009). For details on the imputation method see
Appendix B.1.1.
34The results do qualitatively not change when I use non-imputed wages. Results are available upon request.
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Table 3.11.: Difference-in-Differences Results: Other Margins of Adjustment
2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log mean wages DiD 2004-07 −0.004 −0.005 −0.009 −0.010
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
DiD 2001-02 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.008
(0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
Firms 575 412 243 956
Observations 4025 2884 1701 4287
Panel B: Share of FTC DiD 2004-07 −0.003 −0.006 −0.014∗ −0.003
workers (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
DiD 2001-02 −0.005 −0.010 −0.016∗∗ −0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Firms 381 269 167 536
Observations 2667 1883 1169 2605
Panel C: Share of TA DiD 2004-07 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 −0.001
workers (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
DiD 2002 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Firms 380 268 168 523
Observations 2280 1608 1008 2233
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empirical model
(3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007 (panel A and B) and 2002 to 2007 (panel C), with the indicated
variable as the outcome and establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the
pooled periods under consideration. The year 2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate
estimates for one of the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. Outcome variables for estimates
in panel B and C are based on the additional information from the IAB EP. Standard errors are clustered at the
establishment level. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data sources: LIAB QM2 9310 and IAB
Establishment Panel.
(Boeri 2011; Cahuc et al. 2016).35 In terms of the PADA reform under study, the less stringent
dismissal protection for some firms reduces the respective protection gap and should cut the
use of temporary employment relations in treated firms.
To test for this hypothesis, I examine the extent of the use of workers on fixed-term
contracts (FTC) or workers from temporary agencies (TA). Both types of employment
allow firms to bypass coverage by the general rules of the PADA. I determine the share of
FTC workers by Share_FTCit =
(Number of FTC workers)it
Eit
where the numerator is the number of
(unweighted) FTC workers in firm i in period t and Eit is the total number of (unweighted)
workers in the respective firm and period. The share of TA workers is constructed the
35For example, Autor (2003) finds that 20% of the growth of temporary services employment in the Unites
States between 1973 and 1995 results from a stricter dismissal protection. As for Germany, empirical evidence on
the effects of changes in dismissal protection on the use of temporary employment exploiting previous threshold
changes is limited and contradictory. Boockmann and Hagen (2001) find some indication that the raise of the
PADA threshold in 1996 lowered the probability of using fixed-term contracts and had no effect on temporary
agency work in establishments subject to less stringent dismissal protection. However, using the same survey
data (IAB EP), Fritsch and Schank (2005) do not confirm the result on fixed-term employment. Neither in
1996 nor in 1999 do they find a significant effect of threshold changes in the PADA on the use and the share of
fixed-term contracts.
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same way using the number of TA instead of FTC workers in the numerator. Once more, I
re-estimate model (3.1) separately for the two outcome variables.36
Panel B in Table 3.11 shows the results for the share of FTC workers. The total effects are
negative but close to zero, and statistically insignificant in three out of four cases. Only for
assignment method (3) do I find a statistically significant negative effect of 1.4 percentage
points. However, it is also for this assignment method where the pre-reform period is also
statistically significant which casts doubt on the common time trend assumption for this
outcome. Overall, there is no clear evidence that the relaxed dismissal protection reduced
the use of FTC workers in treated firms. Panel C of Table 3.11 reports the estimates for the
share of TA workers. Initially, the pre-reform coefficient passes the test for common time
trend for this outcome variable.37 However, although the total effect is negative in all cases,
it is never statistically significant and thus, there is no support for a significant reduction in
the use of TA workers. To sum up, the results do not support the theoretical prediction that a
tightening of the protection gap reduces the use of temporary employment.
3.5.5. Sensitivity Analyses
So far, the results presented do not reveal statistically significant effects of the PADA reform
on the overall worker turnover rates within firms. However, the analysis of the heterogeneity
of treatment effects suggests that the reform had an effect on subgroups of workers. Namely,
I find evidence for a positive effect on the women’s hiring and job flow rates. In this final
section of the paper, I assess the robustness of these findings in more detail.
Controlling for Firm Characteristics: As discussed in section (3.3), the main results are
based on regressions unconditional on time-varying confounding factors. As a first sensitivity
check, I re-estimate model (3.1) whereby I control for observable time-varying firm-level
characteristics. As controls, I include the average share of blue-collar workers, part-time
workers, apprentices, and women as well as the average age of employees and its square. If
these variables are not influenced by the reform but still correlated with both the treatment
status and the outcome variable, their inclusion might mitigate an omitted variable bias
(and/or increase the precision of the estimation). However, the results in Table 3.12 do not
suggest that my results suffer from this bias. Conditioning on additional variables only has a
negligible impact on the DiD estimates both in terms of the size of the estimates as well as
the significance levels of the coefficients.
Varying Upper Firm Size Limits: The upper limit of the control group is supposed to
enhance the credibility of the common time trend assumption. A tighter limit may increase
36As the individual-level data of the LIAB QM2 do not provide information on the contract type, I use survey
information on the number of FTC and TA workers from the IAB EP. For details on the matching of the two data
sources see Appendix B.1.1. In particular, I note that in order to maintain consistency of the data I follow the
procedure described in Alda (2005) which reduces sample sizes substantially.
37The pre-treatment analysis for the share of TA workers is only based on the period 2002, since the survey
did not asked firms for the number of TA workers in 2001.
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Table 3.12.: Sensitivity Check: Controlling for Firm Characteristics
2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 0.004 0.020∗ 0.015 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
DiD 2001-02 0.012 0.009 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 −0.007 −0.002 0.012 −0.002
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
DiD 2001-02 −0.003 −0.009 −0.010 −0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 0.011 0.022 0.005 0.009
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013)
DiD 2001-02 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.005
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 −0.002 0.017 0.020 0.003
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
DiD 2001-02 −0.009 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Panel E: Hiring rate, DiD 2004-07 0.013∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
women (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
DiD 2001-02 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Panel F: Job flow rate, DiD 2004-07 0.019∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.016 0.016∗∗
women (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
DiD 2001-02 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009)
Firms 587 422 247 957
Observations 4109 2954 1729 4303
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empiri-
cal model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the indicated variable as the outcome and
establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under
consideration. The year 2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one of
the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. In difference to the main analysis in section 3.5,
difference-in-differences estimates in this table are based on an empirical model that additionally includes
time-varying establishment-level characteristics (Xit ). Xit contains average share of blue-collar workers,
average share of part-time workers, average share of apprentices, average share of women, average age
of employees and its square. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. Significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
the plausibility of this assumption. At the same time, it confines the sample size of the
control group. For the main analysis, I defined the upper limit of the control group’s size
range at 20 FTE employees. To test whether my results are sensitive towards the choice of
the upper limit, I replicate the analysis using a more restrictive limit of 15 FTE employees
and a more relaxed limit of 25 FTE employees. Panel A to D in Table 3.13 show the extended
results for the overall worker turnover rates. For each assignment method, the center column
resembles the main results presented in section 3.5.1 and the left (right) column report results
for the lower (higher) upper limit. The results emphasize that the insignificance of the overall
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Table 3.13.: Sensitivity Check: Varying Upper Firm Size Limits
2-Years in ’Before’ Periods 4-Years in ’Before’ Periods Always the same Adjacent Periods
Max. size for C: 15 20 25 15 20 25 15 20 25 15 20 25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 0.016 0.005 0.009 0.035∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.010 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.010
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
DiD2001-02 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.022 0.010 0.015 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.002 0.005
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 −0.001 −0.006 0.003 0.005 −0.002 0.007 0.023 0.011 0.019 0.000 −0.001 0.006
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
DiD2001-02 −0.012 −0.002 0.004 0.000 −0.007 0.000 0.021 −0.010 0.001 0.004 −0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 0.017 0.011 0.006 0.030 0.022 0.020 −0.013 0.004 −0.002 0.017 0.009 0.004
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
DiD2001-02 0.028∗ 0.014 0.011 0.022 0.016 0.015 −0.011 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.005 0.002
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 0.015 −0.001 0.004 0.037∗ 0.017 0.028∗∗ 0.023 0.020 0.029∗ 0.011 0.004 0.010
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
DiD2001-02 −0.011 −0.009 −0.008 0.000 0.005 0.013 0.019 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.001 0.007
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.028) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014)
Panel E: Hiring rate, DiD 2004-07 0.015∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
women (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
DiD2001-02 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.022∗ 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.008
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Panel F: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 0.021∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.005 0.016 0.012 0.019∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.013∗
women (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
DiD2001-02 0.014 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Firms 419 587 724 268 422 554 153 247 363 769 957 1082
Observations 2933 4109 5068 1876 2954 3878 1071 1729 2541 3180 4304 5233
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empirical model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the indicated variable as the
outcome and establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under consideration. The year 2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents
separate estimates for one of the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. Columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 resemble the main estimates from section 3.5 for a sample based on an upper
size limit for the control group of 20 full-time equivalent weighted employees. Respectively, columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 show difference-in-differences estimates for a sample based on an upper
size limit of 15 and columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 for a sample based on an upper size limit of 25. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
74
3.5. RESULTS
effects is for the most part not sensitive to the choice of the control group’s upper limit.
Only the churning rate becomes significantly positive in three cases. However, given that
majority of estimates for this outcome is still statistically insignificant, I do not consider
this as evidence for a positive causal effect. As for the women’s hiring rate, Panel E in
Table 3.13 demonstrates that the effect is robust to different size limits. Notably, all estimates
on the women’s hiring rate are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. Moreover, the
size of the coefficients is fairly stable ranging from 1.3 to 2.4 percentage points. Panel F in
Table 3.13 further shows that the estimates on the women’s job flow rate are also insensitive
to different upper limits. The coefficients of the assignment methods (1), (2), and (4) remain
statistically significant at least at the 10% level while estimates for assignment method (3)
are still statistically insignificant.
Tightening Firm Size Intervals: While the LIAB QM2 allows for a relatively accurate
computation of the FTE firm size that determines coverage by the PADA, I cannot preclude
measurement errors. For example, the part-time weighting scheme defined by the PADA
is not perfectly replicated by the data and I have to assume that workers in inactive work
relationships are always replaced by new (temporary) hires (see discussion in section 3.4.2).
As this may pose a problem in particular for establishments near the old and new thresholds,
I exclude firms close to two thresholds during the assignment periods by tightening the size
interval of the treatment group to [6,9] and size interval of the control group to [11,20] FTE
employees. Table 3.14 shows that the main results from sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.3 are robust to
this alternative sample selection criteria, and therefore the previous conclusions remain valid.
Excluding Firms Clustered at Thresholds: In section 3.4.5, I already assessed potential
threshold effects and did not find evidence that firms just above (or below) the new threshold
adjusted their firm size strategically. To provide further evidence that my findings are not
distorted by threshold effects, I remove firms from the sample that are clustered around
the size thresholds. To do so, I exclude firms from the treatment group with a FTE firm
size below six in at least one of the before periods (given the old threshold at five FTE
employees) and I further drop firms from the treatment and control group with a FTE firm
size larger than nine and smaller than 11 in at least one of the after periods (given the new
threshold at 10 FTE employees). Panels A to D in Table 3.15 summarize the results for the
overall worker turnover rates and confirm the absence of a robust effect. Panel E and D
further depict the estimates for the hiring and job flow rate of women. While the increased
effect on the hiring rate of women is strongly confirmed, the size of the effect on women’s
job flow rates for the assignment method (4) further decreases and becomes statistically
insignificant. Nevertheless, taking into account the array of sensitivity checks, I maintain my
main conclusion and interpret the estimates on both the hiring and job flow rates of women
as positive causal effects.
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Table 3.14.: Sensitivity Check: Tightening Firm Size Intervals
2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 0.012 0.018 0.019 0.015
(0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011)
DiD 2001-02 0.012 −0.003 0.002 −0.002
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 0.000 0.013 0.022 0.009
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011)
DiD 2001-02 0.000 −0.003 −0.006 −0.005
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 0.011 0.004 −0.003 0.006
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013)
DiD 2001-02 0.012 0.000 0.008 0.003
(0.015) (0.017) (0.023) (0.015)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 −0.004 0.025 0.027 0.019
(0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017)
DiD 2001-02 −0.013 0.000 0.004 −0.001
(0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017)
Panel E: Hiring rate, DiD 2004-07 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
women (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
DiD 2001-02 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007)
Panel F: Job flow rate, DiD 2004-07 0.021∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.017 0.020∗∗
women (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008)
DiD 2001-02 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.007
(0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
Firms 461 307 158 875
Observations 3227 2149 1106 3361
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empiri-
cal model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the indicated variable as the outcome and
establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under
consideration. The year 2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one
of the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. In difference to the main analysis in sec-
tion 3.5), difference-in-differences estimates in this table are based on a sample with the size interval
of the treatment group tightened to [6,9] full-time equivalent weighted employees and the size interval
of the control group tightened to [11,20] full-time equivalent weighted employees. Significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
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Table 3.15.: Sensitivity Check: Excluding Firms Clustered at Thresholds
2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Hiring rate DiD 2004-07 −0.010 0.004 0.015 0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010)
DiD 2001-02 0.000 −0.008 −0.002 −0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010)
Panel B: Separation rate DiD 2004-07 0.010 0.012 0.017 0.013
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010)
DiD 2001-02 −0.003 −0.005 −0.003 0.002
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011)
Panel C: Job flow rate DiD 2004-07 −0.019 −0.008 −0.002 −0.012
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013)
DiD 2001-02 0.003 −0.003 0.001 −0.009
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.014)
Panel D: Churning rate DiD 2004-07 −0.010 0.007 0.018 0.009
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.015)
DiD 2001-02 −0.027 −0.003 0.002 −0.001
(0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.015)
Panel E: Hiring rate, DiD 2004-07 0.015∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
women (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006)
DiD 2001-02 0.009 0.005 0.007 0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006)
Panel F: Job flow rate, DiD 2004-07 0.019∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.017 0.011
women (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008)
DiD 2001-02 0.014 0.006 0.003 0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009)
Firms 407 283 178 923
Observations 2849 1981 1246 3843
Notes: Table shows coefficients of difference-in-differences (DiD) estimates (ρ) as given by empiri-
cal model (3.1) for the sample periods 2001 to 2007, with the indicated variable as the outcome and
establishment-year as the unit of observation. The years after DiD indicate the pooled periods under
consideration. The year 2003 is the baseline period. Each column presents separate estimates for one of
the four assignment methods described in section 3.4.2. In difference to the main analysis in section 3.5),
difference-in-differences estimates in this table are based on a sample that excludes establishments with a
full-time equivalent weighted firm size below six in at least one of the pre-reform periods or establishments
with a full-time equivalent weighted firm size larger than nine and smaller than 11 in at least one of the
after-reform periods. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2 9310.
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3.6. Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze the impact of a change in the German PADA in 2004 on different labor
market outcomes in small establishments. I use detailed administrative employer-employee
panel data linked to establishment survey data (LIAB QM2 9310) to estimate the causal
effect of the change in the PADA on hiring, separation, job flow and churning rates, as well
as on wages and the use of temporary employment relations. The identification strategy
is based on a difference-in-differences approach exploiting a temporal and cross-sectional
variation in the PADA.
I find no robust evidence for a causal impact of the 2004 PADA reform on the overall
worker turnover rates of firms. Thereby, I show that a positive effect on the hiring rate, that
has previously been detected by Bauernschuster (2013), is highly sensitive to the assignment
method to the treatment and control group. Moreover, my findings are in line with Bauer
et al. (2007). They study the impact of similar PADA reforms in 1996 and 1999 on worker
turnover and also do not find statistically significant effects. From a policy point of view, the
absence of causal evidence for a positive effect on the overall job flow rate is of particular
interest because advocates for a raise of the minimum threshold determining coverage by the
PADA often justify their policy recommendation by positive employment effects.
I further assess potential heterogeneous treatment effects and find some evidence of
increases in the hiring and job flow rates of women in response to the relaxed dismissal
protection which could be explained by higher labor supply elasticities of women. This
introduces an important gender aspect to the evaluation of reforms of the dismissal protection
that has not been addressed in the literature so far.
Lastly, I examine other margins of adjustment that may offset the effects on worker
turnover. Contrary to findings in other countries (e.g., Centeno and Novo 2012; Leonardi
and Pica 2013), I neither find evidence that the reduced dismissal costs impacted wages nor
do I find evidence that firms reduced the use of temporary employment.
There are a number of potential reasons for the lack of a sizable effect of the PADA reform.
To name a few, the reduction in dismissal costs may not have been of a magnitude such
that it had a significant and persistent effect on worker turnover. For example, incumbent
workers remained protected by the PADA and thus only the dismissal costs of new hires
were directly affected. Besides, some establishments may not have been aware of the change
in the threshold or generally misjudged coverage by the PADA. Survey evidence shows that
a considerable share of establishments falsely assumed coverage by the PADA prior to the
reform (Pfarr et al. 2003). Finally, firms may have adjusted along the extensive margin by
firm entries and exits (Kugler and Pica 2008), a phenomenon that could be addressed with
data that allow for identifying events of firm entry and exit.
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4. The Role of STEM Occupations in the
German Labor Market
4.1. Introduction
Wage inequality in West Germany has increased dramatically from the mid-1990s onwards.
This development followed a moderate growth in wage dispersion during the preceding two
decades. While much of the rise in wage inequality has been driven by declines in wages at
the bottom of the wage distribution, wage gains in the upper part of the wage distribution
also contributed substantially to this development (Dustmann et al. 2009, 2014).1 During
the same period, non-routine cognitive skills, in particular in combination with technical
expertise and scientific capabilities, have increasingly been in demand (Spitz-Oener 2006;
Autor 2014). One occupational group that is confined to the top of the wage distribution and,
in addition, is considered to be particularly in demand due to its provision of technical skills,
is the group of workers in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) occupations.
This suggests that STEM workers might have been an important factor accounting for part of
the rise in wage inequality. To date, however, there is no systematic evidence on the role of
STEM occupations for changes in the German wage structure.
One strand of literature on wage inequality in West Germany has focused on supply
and demand factors including the supply of skilled workers and technological changes
(e.g., Antonczyk et al. 2009; Dustmann et al. 2009; Glitz and Wissmann 2017).2 These
studies investigate different drivers underlying changes in the German wage structure, with
a particular emphasis on skill-specific differences. Notably, while Antonczyk et al. (2009)
perform a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition into separate effects of worker characteristics and
task assignments, Dustmann et al. (2009) and Glitz and Wissmann (2017) study the rise
in skill premiums within a CES production function framework under the assumption of
a competitive labor market.3 Another, more recent strand of literature uses models with
additive worker and establishment fixed effects to highlight the contribution of establishment-
specific wage differentials to the growth in wage inequality in West Germany. Card et al.
1Similar increases in wage inequality have been observed in many other industrialized countries, attracting
continuing attention from both researchers and policy makers (Acemoglu and Autor 2011; OECD 2015).
2Other prominent explanations are changes in institutions such as the decline in unionization, globalization
and changes in the social skills (Dustmann et al. 2009; Dauth et al. 2016; Deming 2017).
3The CES framework was initially introduced by Katz and Murphy (1992) using data for the U.S. labor
market. For further studies focusing on the U.S., see, e.g., Bound and Johnson (1992); Juhn et al. (1993); Card
and Lemieux (2001); Goldin and Katz (2007); Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
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(2013) estimate a model for four subintervals of similar length separately for men and women
using West German data between 1985 and 2009. They find that wage inequality for both
genders increased due to a combination of a rising dispersion in worker and establishment
effects as well as increasing assortativeness in the assignment of workers to establishments.
Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017) provide an application of the model to assess wage
changes of a selected occupational group. To this end, they estimate the same model (again
separately for men and women) based the same data for the entire period 1975 to 2009 and
show that the outsourcing of food, cleaning, security and logistics workers accounts for about
7 to 9% of the wage dispersion between 1985 and 2008 with equal parts due to increased
dispersion of the establishment effect and increased assortativeness of low wage workers to
low wage establishments.4
In this paper, I use detailed administrative data on West German employees to study trends
in STEM employment and wages and explore potential drivers underlying an increase in wage
differentials between STEM and non-STEM workers — which I call the STEM premium.
My main contribution is a deeper analysis of the evolution of the STEM premium using two
empirical approaches. First, I analyze wage differentials between STEM and non-STEM
workers within the scope of a competitive labor market using a CES framework. Second, I
investigate the STEM premium using estimates from a model with additive worker and firm
fixed effects.5 Notably, the model is a departure from the competitive labor market approach
and allows for firm-specific wage rents which turn out to be an important component of wages
in other studies (e.g., Card et al. 2013).6 STEM workers are particularly interesting because,
as I will show, they are located in the upper part of the wage distribution where a substantial
part of the wage inequality occurs. Moreover, by virtue of the German dual apprenticeship
system, about half of these highly paid STEM workers have received vocational training
without a college or university degree and are therefore only considered medium-skilled in
the German context (see section 4.3). Consequently, an analysis along broad skill categories
may mask extensive heterogeneity that is of importance to explain trends in wages.7
To document the role of STEM occupations, I begin with a broad overview of labor market
trends of STEM workers between 1980 and 2010. Despite a decrease in the share of STEM
workers among the highly-skilled, the overall share of STEM workers in total employment
4For a review of the literature on firm effects that includes studies for other countries see Card et al. (2017).
5In what follows, I use the term firm to refer to an establishment. Strictly speaking, a firm may consist of
multiple establishments and the data refer to the latter.
6The empirical model used in Card et al. (2013) was initially introduced without a theoretical economic
underpinning. However, Card et al. (2017) have developed a microeconomic foundation and show that the
empirical findings can readily be matched with a frictional labor market model.
7While there is a growing number of studies that focus on STEM occupations, they primarily target other
aspects. Hanson and Slaughter (2013), Kerr and Kerr (2013), Peri et al. (2014), Kerr et al. (2015), Hanson and
Slaughter (2016) and Jaimovich and Sin (2017) assess the impact of the immigration of STEM workers in the
U.S. labor market. Grave and Goerlitz (2012) and Black et al. (2015) look at the relationship between wages and
education in STEM subjects. Card and Payne (2017) and Kahn and Ginther (2017) analyze a gender gap in STEM
jobs. Moreover, numerous policy papers discuss a potential shortage of skilled workers (Fachkräftemangel/-
engpass) in Germany (e.g., Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2011; Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2016;
Anger et al. 2017) and the U.S. (e.g., Rothwell 2013; Holzer 2015).
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increased from 11% to 16% for men and from 3% to 7% for women within three decades.8
Moreover, I find that both STEM and non-STEM wages increased between 1980 and 2010,
however, wage growth was greater in STEM than in non-STEM jobs, leading to a significant
increase in the wage differential between the two occupational groups for both genders during
this period. Notably, even when I take into account compositional differences by controlling
for skill-age profiles of individuals, I find a sizable increase in the wage differential between
STEM and non-STEM workers by 10 percentage points (from 20% to 30%) for men and
a moderate increase of 3 percentage points (from 24% to 27%) for women. With respect
to the time pattern, I show that the STEM premium for men grew in the early 1980s by 4
percentage points, plateaued between 1985 and 1995, and from then on continuously grew
by another 6 percentage points until 2010. In contrast, the women’s premium decreased
between 1980 and 1995 by 3 percentage points and from then on steadily increased over the
next 15 years by 7 percentage points. Importantly, the timing of these trends coincides with
the rise in overall wage inequality, suggesting that the rise of STEM occupations contributed
to the accelerated increase in the German wage inequality since the mid-1990s.
To further assess the supply and demand factors that underlie the evolution of the STEM
premium, I introduce a CES production function framework which allows for imperfect
substitutability between STEM and non-STEM workers. The framework closely follows
previous work by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Goldin and Katz (2007) who use the same
approach to analyze wage differentials between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. My
model estimates for a combined sample of men and women for the entire period 1980 to 2010
indicate a negative relationship between the STEM premiums and relative STEM/non-STEM
supplies by year, each purged of a linear time trend. This suggests that STEM and non-STEM
workers are gross substitutes. Moreover, it identifies — within the boundaries of the model
— the deceleration of detrended supplies of STEM workers as a potential driver for the
growth in the annual STEM premium since the mid-1990s. Overall, the evolution of the
STEM premiums can be characterized by an elasticity of substitution between the STEM
and non-STEM labor inputs of 1.70. Interestingly, this estimate is of a similar magnitude as
estimates by Glitz and Wissmann (2017) of the elasticity of substitution between college and
non-college labor in West Germany between 1980 and 2008.
While the CES framework provides a coherent model to relate the rise in wage premiums
to supply and demand factors in a competitive labor market, the more recent literature uses
models with additive fixed effects that allow for firm-specific wage differentials to study
changes in the wage structure. Accordingly, I use estimates of unobserved worker and firm
fixed effects from Card et al. (2013) to assess factors that underlie changes in the composition
of the STEM premium over time. The distributions of the worker and firm effects demonstrate
that male and female STEM workers are positively selected in terms of their estimated worker
effects and, in addition, distinctly allocated at the upper part of the distribution of firm effects.
However, while the selectivity in terms of the worker effects as well as the firm effects of
8For the definition of STEM jobs used in the present study see section 4.2.1.
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women remains fairly stable, there is a pronounced right shift of the distribution of firm effects
for male STEM workers over time. An application of Gelbach’s decomposition method to
the unconditional STEM premium in different subintervals confirms this observation. To this
end, I estimate the contribution of unobserved worker and firm effects as well as observable
time-varying worker characteristics to the STEM premium in two subintervals (1985 to 1991
and 2002 to 2009) and compare the change in the contribution over time. Taking my results
at face value, I find that the men’s fraction of the premium that is explained by firm effects
increases from 12% to 22%, while the respective fraction for women increases only from
21% to 24%. This shows that firm-specific wage components have become more important
in explaining the STEM wage gap over time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the data
set used in the analyses. In section 4.3, I document labor market trends in STEM employment
and wages and their relation to wage inequality. I then analyze the evolution of the STEM
premium on the basis of a CES production function with imperfect substitutability between
STEM and non-STEM labor inputs in a competitive environment in section 4.4. Next, I
assess the importance of worker and firm effects for the wage structure of STEM jobs on
the basis of externally provided estimates from a wage model with additive fixed effects in
section 4.5. Finally, section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. Data
4.2.1. Data Source
I use the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies Regional File 1975-2010 (SIAB-R
7510), which is a 2% random sample drawn from the Integrated Employment Biographies
(IEB) of the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB).9 The IEB contain admin-
istrative data on the universe of employees subject to social security (including marginal
employees from 1999 onwards), benefit recipients, and job seekers.10 The data source for
workers in employment is the Employee History (BeH) which results from the integrated
notification procedure for health, pension and unemployment insurance and is therefore
highly accurate.
The individual data for workers in employment are recorded in job spells. Each job spell
contains information on the beginning and end date, daily wage (subject to right censoring
at the upper earnings limit for statutory pension insurance), full-time or part-time status,
employment type (e.g., regular employee, apprentice, marginal employee), gender, birth date,
education, occupation as well as industry code and geographic location of the employing
firm.11 In addition, I use supplementary data on estimated worker and firm fixed effects by
9See vom Berge et al. (2013a) for a detailed description of the data.
10Self-employed and civil servants are not included.
11The occupation variable contains 120 occupational categories, which are aggregates of 330 occupations from
the German KldB 1988 classification. The industry variable contains 14 industry sectors, which are aggregates of
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Card et al. (2013).12 Notably, the IAB provides estimates of the so-called CHK effects for
the 2% sample of the SIAB-R in a separate data file. Due to data protection regulations, only
the 5%-percentile positions of (weighted) firm fixed effects in the overall distribution of firm
effects are available.
I focus on full-time workers from West Germany (including Berlin) between the age
of 20 and 60 who are not marginally employed or in inactive work relationships (e.g.,
maternity leave). I correct the education variable following the imputation procedure 1 (IP1)
by Fitzenberger et al. (2006) and aggregate educational attainment into three skill groups:
Low-skilled are workers without vocational training or a university degree. Medium-skilled
are workers with vocational training. High-skilled are workers who completed a degree from
a college of applied sciences (Fachhochschule), university or more (e.g., Ph.D.).13
To obtain the main job spell by worker and year, I first collapse all spells at the same
employer in a given year into a single worker-firm-year record. Next, I select the worker-year
record with the highest total earnings during a calendar year. I calculate the average daily
wage for the selected job spell by dividing the total earnings by the duration of the spell.
For a worker who is observed in multiple job spells with the same employer in the same
year, I follow Card et al. (2013) and assign the highest education, occupation, region and
industry category to that worker-firm-year observation. From the remaining observations, I
exclude individuals who earn on average less than 10 Euro per day (in 1995 Euros) or who
are undergoing training. Moreover, since my analysis predominantly rests upon information
on occupation and education, I remove workers with missing information for these variables.
The imputed education variable is missing for 1.1% of the job spells and the occupation
variable for around 0.5%. Finally, I exclude employees working in firms in agriculture
and mining (1.8%). Between 1996 and 1998, the occupation code 102 (for doctors and
pharmacists) is very rare compared to the neighboring years. The reasons for this are
unknown (for details, see vom Berge et al. (2013a), p.31). To account for this problem, I
impute the number of workers and wages for this occupation at varying cell levels (e.g.,
gender or gender-skill cells) using a simple linear interpolation method in some figures and
tables.14
I deflate all wages in Euros using the Consumer Price Index of the German Central Bank,
with 1995 as the base year. The wage measure only records bonus payments from 1984
onwards. I correct for this structural break following the approach of Fitzenberger (1999)
the 3-digit code of the German WZ93 classification.
12Selecting the full-time workers’ main job spells in each year from the full sample of the IEB, Card et al.
(2013) estimate wage models with additive worker and firm fixed effects for four subintervals (1985-1991,
1990-1996, 1996-2002, 2002-2009), so called CHK effects, following the framework developed in Abowd et al.
(1999). For a further description of the estimation method and data, see section 4.5.
13The classification of educational attainment into skill groups follows, e.g., Antonczyk et al. (2009). The
classification deviates from, e.g., Dustmann et al. (2009) and Glitz and Wissmann (2017) who consider individuals
with missing values as low-skilled and workers with a high school degree (Abitur) as medium-skilled. However, I
consider my classification to be more suitable for the present study, because employment in STEM jobs regularly
requires either apprenticeship training or a tertiary education.
14Whenever a figure or table is based on data using this imputation method, it is indicated in the notes.
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and Dustmann et al. (2009).15 I impute wages above the right censoring limit according
to Gartner (2005). Specifically, I run separate Tobit regressions for each year and gender
of right censored log wages on indicators of three skill groups, eight age groups, and all
possible interactions. This imputation approach is by now common practice for this data
and has been extensively evaluated (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2009; Card et al. 2013; Glitz and
Wissmann 2017). I test the sensitivity of the imputation method in Appendix C.1.1. Finally,
I exclude the years 1975 to 1979 due to an unusually high share of right censored wages
among high-skilled workers (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2009; Glitz and Wissmann 2017).16
My definition of STEM occupations is guided by the classification used in U.S. literature
(e.g., Langdon et al. 2011; Black et al. 2015; Hanson and Slaughter 2016; Card and Payne
2017). Most importantly, I define the occupational group of STEM workers by including both
STEM jobs and STEM-related jobs (i.e., medical workers). The Appendix Table C.1 lists the
16 out of 120 SIAB-R occupations classified as STEM, grouped into five broad categories
(i.e., engineers, computer scientists, technicians, math/ physics/ chemistry/ economics, and
medical workers).17 For the most part of this study, the assignment to the group of STEM
and non-STEM workers is based on a worker’s current job title, and may therefore change
over time. However, due to empirical limitations, a time constant assignment to the two
occupational groups based on the mode of a worker’s job titles is used in section 4.5 (see
discussion in section 4.5.2).
4.2.2. Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 displays the summary statistics of the pooled sample for non-STEM and STEM
workers. Columns 1 to 4 report means (odd columns) and standard deviations (even columns)
whereas column 5 shows the difference in means between the two occupational groups.
Overall the sample consists of 10,977,380 worker-year observations, of which 1,194,952
(10.9%) belong to workers in STEM jobs. With a difference of 51 log points, the average
wage of STEM workers is much higher than that of non-STEM workers. Moreover, STEM
workers exhibit a higher level of education. While only 2% of STEM workers have no
vocational training or university degree, 53% have completed a vocational training and 45%
have obtained a college or university degree. In contrast, 14% of non-STEM workers are
considered as low-skilled and 79% as medium-skilled, resulting in a 6% share of high-skilled
15For a detailed description of the approach, see the online appendix to Dustmann et al. (2009).
16Overall, my sample selection criteria closely follow the data processing by Card et al. (2013). However,
contrary to them, I distinguish between three instead of five education groups based on the imputed educational
attainment. Moreover, since the imputation method for wages by Card et al. (2013) controls for variables that are
not available in the SIAB-R, I opt to impute wages as described above. Finally, to better suit my purposes, I
impose some further minor sample restrictions, namely the exclusion of the agriculture or mining sector and the
requirement for non-missing values in imputed educational attainment and occupation.
17Due to the aggregation of occupations in the SIAB-R, employment in humanities — which is evidently not
regarded as STEM — is comprised in the occupation code 113 (for economics, social scientists, statisticians,
humanities, and other natural scientists). However, using frequency counts from the SIAB, the share of
humanities among STEM employment is on average only 1 to 2% between 1980 and 2010. Moreover, the main
results in the present study are robust to the exclusion of the occupation code 113.
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Table 4.1.: Summary Statistics, Pooled Sample 1980 to 2010
Non-STEM STEM
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log daily wage 4.20 (0.00) 4.70 (0.42) 0.51
Skill groups
Low-skilled 0.14 (0.00) 0.02 (0.27) −0.12
Medium-skilled 0.79 (0.00) 0.53 (0.15) −0.26
High-skilled 0.06 (0.00) 0.45 (0.50) 0.38
Female 0.37 (0.00) 0.15 (0.50) −0.21
Age 38.37 (0.00) 40.28 (10.24) 1.91
Urban area ( ≥ 100.000 empl.) 0.60 (0.00) 0.68 (0.47) 0.08
Industry sectors
Production of rubber and plastic products 0.03 (0.00) 0.02 (0.22) −0.01
Chemical industry 0.02 (0.00) 0.05 (0.36) 0.03
Mechanical engineering 0.10 (0.00) 0.15 (0.39) 0.05
Automotive, electrical engineering 0.08 (0.00) 0.19 (0.21) 0.10
Consumer goods 0.10 (0.00) 0.05 (0.03) −0.05
Hospitality industry 0.03 (0.00) 0.00 (0.21) −0.03
Construction 0.09 (0.00) 0.04 (0.27) −0.05
Wholesale, retail trade and other services 0.15 (0.00) 0.08 (0.13) −0.07
Transport and communication 0.06 (0.00) 0.02 (0.42) −0.04
Financial intermediation and real estate 0.13 (0.00) 0.22 (0.20) 0.10
Public, personal and household services 0.05 (0.00) 0.04 (0.28) −0.01
Education, social and healthcare facilities 0.10 (0.00) 0.08 (0.23) −0.01
Public administration, social security 0.06 (0.00) 0.05 (0.03) 0.00
Unknown/missing 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00
Worker-year observations 9,782,428 1,194,952
Notes: Table shows summary statistics of the baseline sample pooled over the years 1980 and
2010. Sample includes full-time workers in West Germany (including Berlin) age 20-60 who
are not marginally employed, in inactive work relationship or undergoing training. For each
worker, the job spell with the highest total earnings during a calendar year is selected. Real wages
are based on average daily earnings, deflated by the Consumer Price Index to 1995 levels, and
imputed if they exceed the right censoring limit (see text for additional details). Urban areas are
local labor markets with an average size of more than 100,000 employees between 1980 and
2010, based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office. Low-skilled are workers without
vocational training or university degree. Medium-skilled are workers with vocational training.
High-skilled are workers who completed a degree from a college or university degree or more.
Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
non-STEM workers.
The next rows demonstrate further demographic differences between the two occupational
groups: STEM workers are more male dominated (+21%) and on average 1.9 years older. In
addition, STEM employment is more prevalent in urban areas (defined as regions with more
than 100,000 employees) and is particularly present in the industry sectors mechanical engi-
neering and automotive and electrical engineering (34%) as well as financial intermediation,
land and housing, and the real estate (22%). While the large shares in the engineering sectors
do not come at a surprise, the considerable share in the finance and housing-related industry
is to some extent unexpected. However, a closer examination shows that employment in this
industry sector is dominated by computer scientists (32.1%) as well as technical jobs related
to land and housing occupations (49.9%).
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While the summary statistics refer to a combined sample of men and women, I will from
now on focus on each gender separately.18 I do this for three reasons: Firstly, men and
women differ considerably in terms of their employment history. In particular during the first
half of my analysis period, there were persistent societal gender differences and much lower
labor force participation rates among women than among men. Consequently, a combined
analysis may mask important differences in the evolution of gender-specific employment and
wages. And indeed, as I will show in the next sections, there are salient differences between
men and women, especially in terms of the time pattern of changes in wage structures.
Secondly, gender-specific analyses are in line with previous studies on wage inequality in
Germany that also look at men and women separately (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2009; Card et al.
2013; Goldschmidt and Schmieder 2017). Lastly, Card et al. (2013) estimated worker and
firm fixed effects separately for men and women and the data only indicate the 5%-percentile
positions of the firm effects in the overall gender-specific distribution of firm effects. A
comparison of worker and firm effects across both genders requires a normalization on the
basis of the full matched employee-employer data which are not available to me (Card et al.
2016).
4.3. Labor Market Trends
In this section, I establish some stylized facts on the evolution of STEM occupations in
West Germany over a period of three decades. I start by looking at overall trends in wage
inequality between 1980 and 2010 for men and women. Next, I discuss trends in employment
and wages of STEM occupations over the same period. Thereby, I put particular emphasis
on the evolution of wage differentials between STEM and non-STEM workers as well as its
relation to the time pattern of wage inequality. My findings will provide a motivation for the
further empirical analyses presented in sections 4.4 and 4.5.
Panels A and B in Figure 4.1 display the indexed wage growth (in 1995 Euros) of the
15th, 50th, and 85th wage percentile between 1980 and 2010 by gender.19 As pointed out
in previous studies on the West German wage structure (e.g., Steiner and Wagner 1998;
Kohn 2006; Dustmann et al. 2009; Antonczyk et al. 2010; Dustmann et al. 2014; Glitz and
Wissmann 2017), wage inequality has increased substantially within the last three decades.
Notably, wage inequality rose moderately in the 1980s and the early 1990s (for men more
than woman), but dramatically accelerated from the mid-1990s onwards for both genders.
More precisely, the 15th and 85th percentile of men diverged slowly until 1995, with a
growth of less than 10% for the 15th percentile and an increase of almost 20% for the 85th
percentile. The picture looks very different from then onwards. Most importantly, wages
diverged due to an almost 20 percentage points decline of the 15th percentile (below its
18I make an exception in section 4.4 where I study the relationship between supply and demand factors using
a combined sample of men and women.
19Following Dustmann et al. (2009), I focus on the 15th and 85th percentile as the lower and upper tails to
limit the dependence on the wage imputation.
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Figure 4.1.: Indexed Wage Growth of the 15th, 50th, and 85th Percentiles
A. Men B. Women
Notes: Figure shows the indexed log real wage growth of the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentiles of the wage
distribution. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
initial level in 1980) coupled with a 10 percentage points increase of the 85th percentile.
Overall, the rise in the difference between the men’s 85th and 15th percentile was about 10
percentage points between 1980 and 1995 and almost 30 percentage points between 1995
and 2010. Given that the 50th percentile increased by almost 15% until the mid-1990s and
remained fairly constant thereafter, wage inequality for men rose in both the top and the
bottom part of the wage distribution.
The pattern for women looks somewhat different. Until 1995, wages in all percentiles
jointly grew by about 20%, meaning that wage inequality changed very little. However after
1995, women’s wage inequality increased as well, with falling wages in the 15th percentile
(yet, still above the 1980 level) and rising wages for the 85th percentile. Accordingly, also
the rise in the difference between women’s 85th and 15th percentile was much larger in
the last 15 years of the observation period. Specifically, while the difference grew by less
than 5 percentage points between 1980 and 1995, it increased by more than 20 percentage
points between 1995 and 2010. Further taking into account the development of the 50th
percentile, women’s wage inequality rose as well at both the lower and upper ends of the
wage distribution.
Next, looking at employment trends in STEM jobs, Figure 4.2 shows the employment
shares of STEM workers in total employment (plotted with dots) as well as the within skill
group shares of low-skilled (plotted with squares), medium-skilled (plotted with diamonds)
and high-skilled (plotted with triangles) male and female workers. Overall, the men’s share
of STEM employment monotonically increased from 11.4% in 1980 to 16.2% in 2010.
Despite a much lower share in the initial year of only 3.0%, the time pattern for women looks
very similar with a continuous increase in the STEM share up to 6.8% in 2010. Somewhat
surprisingly, however, the share of STEM jobs within the highly-skilled group actually
decreased between 1980 and 2010 for both men and women, while the share of STEM
workers among the group of medium-skilled remained almost constant, and the share within
the group of low-skilled increased slightly (though it was still at a very low level by 2010).
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Figure 4.2.: Evolution of Shares of STEM Workers in Total Employment and Within Skill
Groups
A. Men B. Women
Notes: Figure shows the shares of STEM workers in total employment and within skill groups. Employment of
workers with occupation code 102 (for doctors and pharmacists) is imputed at the level of gender-skill-year cells
between 1996 and 1998. See section 4.2.1 for additional details. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
Yet, the rise in the overall share of STEM employment can be explained by the substantial
educational upgrading, with overall high-skilled shares growing from 6.4% to 17.5% for
men and 2.7% to 15.7% for women coupled with a large share of STEM workers in this skill
group.
Using a standard shift share decomposition, Appendix Table C.2 further reveals that the
rise in STEM employment primarily reflects increased intensity of STEM jobs within rather
than between industries for men and women.20 For men, this is the case in the first two
decades, while in the last decade the growth between industries became more relevant. In
contrast, for women the majority of the employment shifts came from within industry growth
in STEM jobs in all three decades.
Panels A and B in Figure 4.3 further illustrate the overall change in employment shares by
skill deciles between 1980 and 2010 and highlight the contribution of STEM employment (red
colored bars).21 It is apparent that employment growth in the top deciles is to a large extent
20Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), I use a shift share decomposition of the form ∆Eot =∑13i=1∆Eitλoi+
∑120o=1∆λoitEi, where ∆Eot is the change in the share of employment in occupation o over the time interval t,
the first term on the RHS is the change in occupation o’s share of employment due to changes in the industrial
composition, the second term on the RHS is the change in the occupation o’s employment share due to within-
industry shifts. Moreover, ∆Eit is the change in the industry i’s employment share in the time interval t, λoit is
occupation o’s mean share of industry i employment over the time interval, i.e., λoit = (λoit1 −λoit0 )/2. ∆λoit is
the change in occupation o’s share of industry i employment in the time interval t, and Ei is the mean employment
share of industry i over the time interval, i.e., Ei = (Eit1 +Eit0 )/2. The decomposition is conducted for 120
occupations and 13 industry groups separately for each decade as well as the entire observation period.
21As it is common practice in the literature, I use each occupation’s position in the wage distribution as a
proxy for the skill percentile rank (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2009; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Autor and Dorn 2013;
Dauth 2014). To avoid picking up effects of a gender pay gap, I follow Dauth (2014) and maintain the same
percentile ranks for STEM occupations between men and women by using for both genders the 1980 median
wages of men as a proxy. I use Stata code made available online by David Autor and David Dorn (see Autor
and Dorn (2013) for further details). However, instead of plotting smoothed changes in employment by skill
percentiles based on a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression, I sum up the actual change in employment
over each decile. This allows for a better illustration of the actual contribution of STEM jobs along the skill
deciles.
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Figure 4.3.: Observed Changes in Employment by Skill Deciles
A. Men B. Women
Notes: Figure shows the percentage change in the employment share by skill deciles between 1980 and 2010.
The 120 occupations are ranked by the median wages of men in 1980 and then grouped into 10 equally sized
groups. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
driven by growth of STEM employment. Panel A in Figure 4.3 underscores the employment
polarization for men since the 1980s which has been detected in previous studies (e.g.,
Dustmann et al. 2009). Moreover, Panel B shows that women experienced educational
upskilling with employment growth in the upper skill deciles and employment declines in
the lower deciles. Interestingly, in contrast to Black et al. (2015), STEM occupations in
Germany are mostly confined to the top deciles and therefore, growth in STEM employment
did not counteract but rather catalyzed a trend in employment polarization.
Next, Panels A and B in Figure 4.4 illustrate the change in relative employment shares
in STEM occupations between 1980 and 2010 together with the skill percentile rank of
each occupation (in brackets). The increases in relative employment shares in the majority
of STEM jobs highlight changes in the occupational distribution. The overall change in
employment shares of STEM occupations adds up to 4.8 percentage points for men and
3.7 percentage points for women and corresponds to the observed changes in employment
in STEM jobs from Figure 4.3. As expected, computer scientists experienced the largest
increase in the relative employment share, with an increase of 2.5 percentage points for men
and 0.8 percentage points for women. More importantly, STEM jobs are highly clustered in
the top skill percentiles: 10 (men) and 16 (women) out of 16 STEM jobs are located in the
top skill decile and none of the STEM occupations is ranked below the 58th skill percentile
rank for men and the 64th skill percentile rank for women.
Turning to wages, Panels A and B in Figure 4.5 show the evolution of indexed mean log
wages for STEM (plotted with squares) and non-STEM (plotted with triangles) workers for
men and women. While both occupational groups profited from wage gains, wage growth
was larger in STEM than in non-STEM jobs for both genders. Moreover, the figures reveal
that male STEM workers already experienced larger wage gains in the 1980s (relative to
non-STEM workers), while female STEM workers only received higher wages from 1995
onwards. By 2010, total wage growth in STEM jobs was approximately 14 percentage points
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Figure 4.4.: Change in Relative Employment for STEM Occupations Between 1980 and
2010
A. Men B. Women
Notes: Each row presents 100 times the change in employment share between 1980 and 2010 for the indicated
STEM occupation. Values in brackets indicate the skill percentile rank of each occupation based on the median
wages of men in 1980. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
for men and 9 percentage points for women larger than in non-STEM jobs.
In order to shed more light on the relationship between STEM and non-STEM wages, I
next examine the evolution of the annual mean differences between log real wages in STEM
and non-STEM jobs — which I call the STEM premium — between 1980 and 2010 in detail.
I differentiate between an unadjusted and adjusted STEM premium. The former corresponds
to yearly differences in the mean of wages of STEM and non-STEM workers, the latter
further takes into account differences in the workers’ skill-age profiles between the two
occupational groups. To obtain estimates on yearly premiums together with standard errors,
I estimate the following mincer-type equation by ordinary least squares (OLS) separately for
each year t:
wit = αt + x′itβt + sitγt + εit , (4.1)
where wit is the log daily real wage of an individual i in year t, αt is an annual constant,
xit is a vector of individual-level controls (i.e., linear, quadratic and cubic terms in age
fully interacted with skill groups), sit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
individual i is employed in a STEM job in year t and 0 otherwise, and εit is the error term.22
Accordingly, γt for t = 1980, ...,2010 captures the annual wage differential between STEM
and non-STEM workers. However, I note that the estimates of the regression only provide
descriptive evidence, that is the STEM dummies capture correlations and do not allow for a
causal interpretation.
For the unadjusted STEM premium, I only include a constant and the STEM dummy.
Thus, the γi’s reflect the mean difference in log wages between the two occupational groups.
However, since STEM and non-STEM workers differ substantially in terms of their skill-age
22Note that the model assumes equal returns to the xit ’s for both STEM and non-STEM workers.
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Figure 4.5.: Evolution of Indexed Mean Log Wages by Occupational Groups
A. Men B. Women
Notes: Figure shows the indexed mean log wages of non-STEM and STEM workers. Wages of workers with
occupation code 102 (for doctors and pharmacists) are imputed at the level of non-STEM/STEM-year cells
between 1996 and 1998. See section 4.2.1 for additional details. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
composition (see Table 4.1), differences in unadjusted mean wages could potentially reflect
wage premiums for better educated workers. Moreover, if the share of medium-skilled and/
or high-skilled workers in the each occupational group evolves differently over time (as
suggested by Figure 4.2), changes in the unadjusted STEM premium may again only be a
reflection of an educational premium. Consequently, I estimate an adjusted STEM premium
by controlling for the skill-age profiles of individuals such that the estimates of γi mirror
annual STEM premiums conditional on the skill and age distributions.
Panel A and B in Figure 4.6 visualize the unadjusted (plotted with squares) and adjusted
(plotted with triangles) STEM premiums by displaying the estimates for the coefficients
on the STEM dummy (γˆt) from 1980 to 2010.23 Overall, the unadjusted STEM premium
increased by 14 percentage points from 37% to 51% for men and by 9 percentage points
from 36% to 45% for women between 1980 and 2010. By construction, this is equivalent
to the differences in wage growth displayed in Figure 4.5. In contrast, the adjusted STEM
premium rose by 10 percentage points from 20% to 30% for men and by 3 percentage points
from 24% to 27% for women.24 With respect to the time pattern, the figures reveal that both
the unadjusted and adjusted STEM premium for men grew in the early 1980s, plateaued
between 1985 and 1995, and from then on continuously increased until 2010. For women,
the time pattern looks somewhat different with the premium decreasing between 1980 and
1995 and from then on steadily increasing until 2010 to levels above the initial level in 1980.
Altogether, the results highlight that only part of the increasing STEM premium can be
explained by skill-age profiles.25
23The vertical bands represent the 95% confidence interval. Due to the precision of the estimation, the bands
are not visible for men.
24Hanson and Slaughter (2013) estimate a composition-adjusted STEM premium for workers in the U.S.
(combined for men and women) and show that the wage differential rose from 15% in 1967 to 22% in 2011.
However, in contrast to my results, the STEM premium in the U.S. only grew in the 1970s and persisted with
minor fluctuations at a level of 22% until 2011.
25Unreported results show that the time pattern of the STEM premiums look the same when I additionally
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Figure 4.6.: Evolution of Unadjusted and Adjusted Mean Differences in Log Real Wages
Between STEM and non-STEM Occupations
A. Men B. Women
Notes: Figure shows annual estimates of the coefficient on the STEM dummy sit as well as the 95% confidence
interval from OLS estimates of model (4.1). The squares refer to a model without additional controls. The
triangles refer to a model that controls for linear, quadratic and cubic terms in age fully interacted with skill
groups. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
To further disentangle an education premium from the STEM premium, I re-estimate
model (4.1) separately for each skill group controlling only for age profiles. Panel A and B
in Figure 4.7 show the skill-specific STEM premiums for low-skilled (plotted with squares),
medium-skilled (plotted with diamonds), and high-skilled (plotted with triangles) workers.
For men, the STEM premium grew for all three skill groups, although low-skilled and
medium-skilled workers benefited from higher levels in the STEM premium to begin with
and, in addition, moved along a steeper growth curve. In contrast, growth in the skill-specific
STEM premium for women only picked up in the mid-1990s. Before then, the evolution of
the premium for low-skilled and medium-skilled women was flat and the STEM premium
for high-skilled workers fell sharply between 1985 and 1995. Eventually, even by 2010, the
premium for female high-skilled workers was still 9 percentage points below the highest
level in 1985.26
Taken together, two conclusions emerge. First, skill-age profiles can only explain part
of the rise in the STEM premium over time for both men and women which suggests that
the STEM premium is not just a reflection of a growing education premium or observed
compositional changes. Second, and most important, comparing the time pattern of Panel
A and B in Figure 4.1 with the evolution of the STEM premium, we can see that increases
control for 13 industry and 183 local labor market fixed effects, although their inclusion reduces the level of the
premium by approximately 4 to 5 percentage points for men and 4 to 7 percentage points for women. Moreover,
I note that I estimated the unadjusted and adjusted STEM premium without imputing the number of doctors and
pharmacists (occupation code 102) in the years 1996 to 1998 (see discussion in section 4.2.1). Most likely, this
causes the drop in the unadjusted STEM premium for women in the years 1995 and 1996, but seems to have less
of an impact once I control for the skill-age profiles.
26Note that medium- and high-skilled workers comprise 98% of STEM employment (see Table 4.1) since
STEM occupations typically require some higher education. Nevertheless, about 2% of STEM workers are
recorded without vocational training or university degree. This group is to a large extent composed of computer
scientists (24 to 27%) and other technicians (14 to 17%).
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Figure 4.7.: Evolution of Adjusted Mean Differences in Log Real Wages Between STEM
and non-STEM Occupations Within Skill Groups
A. Men B. Women
Notes: Figure shows annual estimates of the coefficient on the STEM dummy sit as well as the 95% confidence
interval from OLS estimates of model (4.1) controlling for linear, quadratic and cubic terms in age. The model is
estimated separately for each skill group. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
in wage inequality coincide with increases in the STEM premiums, in particular for men.
For example, if I regress the difference between the 85th and 15th wage percentile on the
adjusted STEM premium, I obtain highly significant coefficients for men (4.09 with a t-test
of 20.83) and to a lesser extent also for women (2.12 with a t-test of 2.88). In addition,
taking into account that STEM occupations are confined to the top of the wage distribution
(see Figure 4.4) and employment and wages of STEM workers increased in both relative
and absolute terms (see Figure 4.2 and 4.5), the coincident timing suggests that STEM jobs
account for a notable fraction of the accelerated increase in the German wage inequality
since mid-1990s, a point not addressed in the previous literature.
This is not to say that other coincident labor market developments had not contributed
to the rising wage inequality over the same time period. Notably, Dustmann et al. (2014)
present evidence that the more competitive market structure due to the fall of the Iron Curtain,
coupled with the fiscal burden of German reunification, led to increasing deviations from
industry-wide wage agreements since the mid-1990s. Ultimately, this has resulted in lower
wages for many workers and contributed particularly to the decline in wages at the bottom of
the wage distribution.27
Against the backdrop of rising STEM premiums, I apply two empirical approaches to
assess potential drivers that underlie this evolution in the next two sections. First, I use a CES
production function in a competitive labor market environment to relate changes in the STEM
premium to supply and demand factors. Second, I use estimates from a model with additive
worker and firm fixed effects from Card et al. (2013) and compare their distribution between
STEM and non-STEM workers. Lastly, I apply Gelbach (2016)’s decomposition approach
to quantify the contribution of unobservable worker and firm effects as well as observable
27For future research it might be interesting to further disentangle the role of institutional wage agreements
for the wage-setting process of STEM workers.
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time-varying worker characteristics to the STEM premium in different subintervals on the
basis of an auxiliary wage model.
4.4. Supply and Demand Factors
4.4.1. Empirical Approach
To analyze the evolution of the STEM premium through the lens of supply and demand
factors, I use a CES production function framework which allows for imperfect substitutabil-
ity between STEM and non-STEM workers. The approach closely follows previous work
by, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992) and Goldin and Katz (2007) who apply this framework
using low- and high-skilled workers as the two labor input factors.28 Formally, I assume that
aggregate output Qt in each year t is generated by a CES production function depending on
STEM (LSt ) and non-STEM (LNt ) labor supplies
29:
Qt = [α(atLSt )
ρ +(1−α)(btLNt )ρ ]
1
ρ , (4.2)
where α is a technology parameter indexing the share of work allocated to STEM labor
(i.e., extensive margin), at and bt represent the STEM and non-STEM labor augmenting
technological change (i.e., intensive margin), and ρ determines the aggregate elasticity of
substitution between STEM and non-STEM labor, where σ = 1/(1−ρ) ∈ (0,∞). Increases
in (at/bt) reflect STEM-biased technological progress. If the two labor inputs are gross
substitutes (i.e., σ ≥ 1), a STEM-biased technological change will increase the STEM wage
premium.
Under perfect competition, firms choose a level of each type of labor input such that
marginal costs equal the marginal product. Consequently, I can relate the partial derivatives
of Qt with respect to STEM and non-STEM labor supplies to the relative wages by the
following equation:
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Finally, under the assumption that there is a log linear increase in the demand for STEM
workers over time coming from technology, the relationship between relative STEM/non-
STEM wages and supplies in each year t can be expressed by the following linear regression
28Various versions of this modeling approach have been used to study the development and underlying
drivers of skill premiums. Further studies focusing on the U.S. include Bound and Johnson (1992); Juhn et al.
(1993); Card and Lemieux (2001); Acemoglu and Autor (2011); for studies focusing on West Germany see, e.g.,
Dustmann et al. (2009); Glitz and Wissmann (2017).
29Following the common interpretation in the literature on skill premiums, the production function represents
a one-good market that depends on two types of workers: STEM and non-STEM. Alternatively, the model may
represent an economy where the consumer’s utility function is defined over two goods each produced by only
one type of worker. Finally, the model may represent a mixture of the two former interpretations where different
goods are produced in different sectors, and STEM and non-STEM workers are employed in both (Acemoglu
and Autor 2011).
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equation30:
ln
(
wSt
wNt
)
= γ0+ γ1t +β ln
(
LSt
LNt
)
+ εt . (4.4)
I estimate equation (4.4) by OLS. That is, I regress the log of relative wages on a constant,
a time dummy, and the log of relative supplies. The aggregate elasticity of substitution σ
(which is equivalent to −1/β ) is the parameter of interest and determines the relationship
between changes in relative STEM/non-STEM supplies and STEM premiums.
I measure labor supplies LSt and LNt in efficiency units by determining productivity
adjusted full-time equivalents of STEM and non-STEM workers. This is necessary because
the model assumes that workers are perfect substitutes within each group of labor inputs
(Glitz and Wissmann 2017). Moreover, I use composition constant wages to obtain the pure
price for STEM and non-STEM workers net of any compositional differences.31
4.4.2. Results
Before I turn to the estimation results of model (4.4), I want to briefly discuss the identifi-
cation issues of the model. As Glitz and Wissmann (2017) point out, the identification of
the elasticity of substitution σ relies on labor supplies to be predetermined. In the present
case, this means that STEM and non-STEM labor supplies may not be correlated with
any unobservables that also determine the STEM premium. Moreover, there may not be a
contemporaneous correlation between the premiums and labor supplies. As opposed to the
usual specification of the model along the skill dimension, the identification may be more
problematic in my setting. In particular, I define STEM worker by the current job title, and
thus occupational group changes allow for short-term adjustments in relative supplies. In
contrast, the skill-specific labor supply is considered to be less elastic since education is
viewed as a long-term investment into human capital (Glitz and Wissmann 2017). However,
as Figure 4.8 shows, the mobility into and out of STEM jobs — defined as the number of
movers between STEM and non-STEM jobs between two consecutive years divided by the
total number of workers employed in year t−1 and t — is very low. The annual non-STEM-
to-STEM mobility rates (plotted with squares) fluctuate between 0.0030 and 0.0064 resulting
in an average rate of 0.0044 in the years 1980 to 2010. Likewise, the STEM-to-non-STEM
mobility rates (plotted with triangles) fluctuate between 0.0025 and 0.0051 resulting in an
average rate of 0.0036 during the same period. In other words, 0.44% of workers move
into STEM and 0.36% out of STEM jobs between two consecutive years.32 Consequently,
30Formally, the trend in the STEM-biased technological change is of the form: ln
( α
1−α
)
+ σ−1σ ln
(
at
bt
)
=
γ0 + γ1t.
31For details on the determination of labor supplies and composition constant wages, see Appendices C.1.2
and C.1.3.
32The average mobility rate for switches between skill groups during the same observation period is of a
similar magnitude (i.e., 0.006). Note, however, that due to the imputation method for the education variable, skill
changes can only be one-directional.
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Figure 4.8.: Evolution of Mobility Rates Between non-STEM and STEM Occupations
Notes: Figure shows the annual mobility rates between the occupational group of non-STEM and STEM workers,
defined as the number of movers from non-STEM to STEM jobs (plotted with squares) and movers from STEM
to non-STEM jobs (plotted with triangles) divided by the total number of workers employed in two subsequent
periods. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
there is only limited scope for movements between occupational groups that would violate
the identification of the model. In addition, I provide some evidence for the validity of the
model’s identification by excluding workers in their 20s. I do so because young workers
exhibit much higher mobility rates between STEM and non-STEM occupations (1.2% for
workers aged ≤ 31 vs. 0.4% for workers aged > 30). Accordingly, there is more scope for
contemporaneously adjustments of this age group to wage differentials. Finally, if anything, I
expect estimates of β to be upwardly biased due to a simultaneous reaction of labor supplies
to the STEM premiums; that is, I consider the estimated elasticity of substitution σˆ defined
as −1/βˆ as an upper bound.33
Table 4.2 shows the OLS estimates for empirical model (4.4) for the combined sample of
men and women.34 Row 1 refers to the estimate on the relative labor supplies of STEM to
non-STEM workers, βˆ = −1/σˆ . Row 2 captures the log linear trend in the STEM-biased
technological change. Column 1 shows the results for the baseline sample while columns
2 to 6 provide further sensitivity checks. The statistically significant estimate of −0.588
in column 1 suggests that the evolution of the STEM premium can be characterized by an
elasticity of substitution between the two labor inputs of σˆ = 1.70, meaning that the two
occupational groups are gross substitutes. In addition, the positive estimate on the time trend
in row 2 points to a STEM-biased technological change that increased the relative demand
for STEM workers. Interestingly, Glitz and Wissmann (2017) find a similar elasticity of
33Glitz and Wissmann (2017) make the same argument with respect to the relationship between relative wages
and supplies by skill groups.
34Except for column 4, all estimates in Table 4.2 are based on a sample that uses imputed employment and
wages of occupation code 102 (for doctors and pharmacists) at the level of skill-age-gender-year cells between
1996 and 1998.
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Table 4.2.: Estimation Results for CES Regression Model
Med. Full &
Non- Full workers Part- Aged
Baseline Imputed Hetero. excl. Time ≥ 31
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
STEM/non-STEM −0.588∗∗∗ −0.489∗∗ −0.429∗∗∗ −0.412∗∗ −0.450∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗
relative supply (0.196) (0.208) (0.184) (0.158) (0.132) (0.084)
Time trend 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant −0.860∗ −0.744 −0.536∗∗ −0.504∗ −0.555 −0.032
(0.439) (0.468) (0.412) (0.363) (0.295) (0.171)
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31
R-squared 0.739 0.833 0.853 0.815 0.736 0.669
Notes: Table shows results from OLS estimates of empirical model (4.4) for the pooled years 1980
to 2010. Employment and wages of workers with occupation code 102 (for doctors and pharmacists)
are imputed at the level of skill-age-gender-year cells between 1996 and 1998. Estimates in column
1 are based on all full-time workers without trainees and one observation by worker-year (baseline
sample). Estimate in column 2 are based on the baseline sample but use right censored (non-imputed)
wages. Estimates in column 3 are based on the baseline sample but use imputed wages following
the ’normal, full heteroscedasticity’ imputation method (see Appendix C.1.1 for additional details).
Estimates in column 4 are based on the baseline sample but exclude workers with the occupation code
102 (for doctors and pharmacists). Estimates in column 5 are based on all full- and part-time workers
including trainees and multiple observations by worker-year weighted by days worked. Estimates
in column 6 are based on the baseline sample but exclude workers aged ≤ 30. Significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
substitution between college and non-college labor of 1.6 in West Germany between 1980
and 2008.35 In contrast, Dustmann et al. (2009) find a somewhat larger estimate of 4.0 for the
elasticity of substitution between high/medium-skilled to low-skilled men in West Germany
between 1975 and 2004.
To visualize the relationship between relative wages and supplies, Figure 4.9 show the
evolution of the STEM premium (plotted with squares) and relative STEM/non-STEM
supplies (plotted with triangles) by year, each purged of the linear time trend. The negative
relationship suggests that — within the boundaries of the model — decelerating (detrended)
supplies of STEM workers were a driver for the growth in the STEM premium, in particular
since the mid-1990s.
Columns 2 to 5 in Table 4.2 show that the main results are robust to a variety of sensitivity
checks regarding the imputation of wages and the sample selection. Results in columns 2 and
3 are based on the same sample, but the estimation uses right censored (non-imputed) wages
and wages based on the ’normal, full heteroscedasticity’ method by Dustmann et al. (2009),
respectively, in the determination of efficiency units and composition constant wages.36 In
column 4, I estimate the model for a sample that excludes the occupation code 102 (for
doctors and pharmacists) to show that the results do not depend upon the imputation of
35Note that Glitz and Wissmann (2017) use a nested CES framework which further allows for imperfect
substitutability between young and old workers within skill groups.
36See Appendix C.1.1 for details on the alternative imputation method.
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Figure 4.9.: Detrended Changes in STEM/non-STEM Relative Supplies and Relative Wages
Notes: Figure shows residuals from separate OLS regressions of the STEM/non-STEM relative wages and
relative supplies on a constant and a linear time trend. Wages are adjusted holding the skill-, age-, and gender
composition constant. Supplies are measured in efficiency units. Employment and wages of workers with
occupation code 102 (for doctors and pharmacists) are imputed at the level of skill-age-gender-year cells
between 1996 and 1998. See Appendix C.1.2 and C.1.3 for additional details. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
employment and wages for this occupation code.37 Results in column 5 are based on a sample
that closely follows Glitz and Wissmann (2017). Notably, the sample includes part-time
employment weighted by 1/2 and 2/3 (9.5% of total days worked), workers undergoing
training (3.1% of total days worked) and multiple job spells by the same worker during a
year (7.6% of total days worked) to determine supply measures and, in addition, weights
job spells and wages by the spell-length measured in days worked per year. This enlarged
sample could be considered as a more precise measure of supplies and wages. However,
as columns 2 to 5 show, my main estimates (in column 1) are robust to these alternative
specifications. Overall, the estimates for the negative inverse of the elasticity of substitution
range between −0.412 and −0.489 and are always statistically significant.
Finally, to provide a test for the validity of the model’s identification, I exclude workers
aged ≤ 30 from the sample and re-estimate the model once more (see discussion above). As
shown in column 6, I again obtain a statistically significant estimate of β which is, however,
significantly higher than the estimates in columns 2 to 5. Nevertheless, the estimate is of
reasonable size implying an elasticity of substitution of 4.10. Taken together, the framework
provides a simple yet intuitive interpretation of how the demand and supply of STEM and
non-STEM workers shaped the distribution of relative wages between 1980 and 2010.
37As described in section 4.2.1, there is an unusual decline in the number of workers with the occupation
code 102 (for doctors and pharmacists) between 1996 and 1998 compared to the neighboring years.
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4.5. Worker and Firm Effects
While the CES framework provides a coherent model to relate the rise in STEM premiums
to supply and demand factors under the assumption of imperfect substitutability between
different labor inputs and a competitive labor market, the more recent literature takes into
account firm-specific wage differentials that are generally not incorporated in the CES
models (e.g., Card et al. 2013; Macis and Schivardi 2016; Song et al. 2016; Goldschmidt
and Schmieder 2017).38 Using models with additive fixed effects, these studies decompose
wages into worker- and firm-specific components to explain developments in the wage
structure over time. In what follows, I use the same framework and I tie changes in the
distributional pattern of worker and firm effects to the evolution of the STEM premium. In
section 4.5.1, I summarize the empirical approach of Card et al. (2013) to estimate worker
and firm fixed effects and discuss potential caveats for the use of these effects in the present
study. Moreover, I outline an application of Gelbach (2016)’s approach to decompose the
contribution of unobservable worker and firm effects as well as observable time-varying
worker characteristics to the STEM premium. In section 4.5.2, I discuss the results.
4.5.1. Empirical Approach
Worker and Firm Fixed Effects: To investigate the role of worker and firm fixed effects
for the evolution of STEM wages, I use supplementary data provided by the IAB. The
data contain estimates of unobserved worker and firm effects for male and female full-time
workers by Card et al. (2013). Based on a well-established framework developed by Abowd
et al. (1999), Card et al. (2013) estimate the following model with additive fixed effects for
the West German labor market separately for men and women and four subintervals39:
wit = αi+ψJ(i,t)+ x′itβ + rit , (4.5)
where wit is the log daily real wage of worker i in year t, αi is a worker fixed effect
interpreted as a combination of skills and other (unobserved) factors that are rewarded
equally across firms, ψJ(i,t) captures a firm fixed effect that constitutes a proportional pay
premium (or discount) that is common to all workers at firm j, and β captures (observable)
worker characteristics that constitute the time-varying component of an individual’s earnings
power.40 Together, αi and xit constitute worker i’s fully portable earnings capacity. Abowd
et al. (1999) show that under the assumption of conditional random worker mobility across
firms, firm and worker effects can be separately identified and estimated without bias using
38See Card et al. (2017) for a microeconomic foundation of the modeling framework on the grounds of
frictional labor markets.
39See Card et al. (2015) for a detailed description of the model and its estimation.
40xit includes an unrestricted set of year dummies as well as quadratic and cubic terms in age fully interacted
with five education groups.
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OLS.41 Card et al. (2013) estimate the model for West Germany based on the full population
of the IEB for the subintervals 1985 to 1991, 1990 to 1996, 1996 to 2002, and 2002 to
2009. Estimates of the worker and firm fixed effects are provided for the 2% subsample
used in the present study. However, due to data protection regulation, the (weighted) firm
effects are only available as 5%-percentile positions in the overall distribution of (weighted)
firm effects while the worker effects are provided as both the 5%-percentile positions in the
overall distribution of workers effects as well as the exact estimate of the worker effect.42
In section 4.5.2, I use the supplementary data to assess the role of worker and firm
fixed effects for STEM and non-STEM workers in different subintervals.43 However, I
acknowledge that my approach raises some conceptual issues given the data that are available
to me. Most importantly, model (4.5) does not control for the occupational group and
estimated worker and/or firm effects absorb a potential STEM effect. Accordingly, a relatively
high firm effect may describe two (complementary) phenomena: On the one hand, a large
firm effect could represent a high-paying firm which corresponds to the usual interpretation
in the literature. On the other hand, given STEM effects are positive, a relatively high firm
effect might just as well be a reflection of a relatively higher share of STEM workers in
a given firm. Moreover, also part of the worker effect might be contaminated by a STEM
effect. Taken together, the discussion of the results in section 4.5.2 must be seen against
the backdrop of these caveats. In particular, while I interpret the worker and firm effects
as true effects representing low/high wage workers and low/high-paying firms, I recognize
that further research is needed to distinguish the true worker and firm effects from potential
STEM effects. In the following, I outline potential analyses that could be conducted in the
future on the basis of sufficiently large linked-employer-employee datasets.
To begin with, one could augment model (4.5) with a time-varying STEM dummy (sit) —
defined by worker i’s job title in year t — to partial out a market-wide STEM effect. In this
case, mobility has to be exogenous conditional on worker effects, firm effects, the covariate
index and, in addition, the STEM component. Alternatively, one could use a time constant
assignment of workers to the occupational group of STEM and non-STEM, e.g., defined
by the mode of an individual’s job titles. In this case, model (4.5) is correctly specified,
though the STEM effect is absorbed by the worker fixed effect. While this still poses a
problem in terms of the interpretation of the worker and firm effects, it allows quantifying
41Formally, identification requires that E[rit |xit ,αi,ψJ(i,t)] = 0, where the error component in Card et al.
(2013)’s version of the AKM model rit comprises a match-specific wage component (ηiJ(i,t)), a unit root drift
component (ζit ), and a transitory error (εit ). As Card et al. (2013) highlight, the most controversial assumption is
that the residual is uncorrelated with the entire sequence of firm identifiers in a worker’s employment history
which precludes mobility based on the match-specific wage component. Card et al. (2013) provide several tests
probing the exogenous mobility assumption and conclude that it appears approximately satisfied in the West
German labor market. In particular, they show that the match-specific wage component is small, stable over time,
and uncorrelated with the direction of worker’s mobility between firms.
42The firm weights are constructed as the average number of worker-year observation in a firm divided by the
number of years the firm is active. This is necessary to adjust for a left-skewness in the distribution of firm as
large firms (with usually higher firm effects) are overrepresented in the SIAB-R.
43My analytical approach is inspired by Dauth et al. (2016) who estimate model (4.5) for reunified Germany
separately for four five-year subintervals and conduct a descriptive analysis of the role of worker and firm effects
for an urban wage premium.
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the contribution of worker and firm fixed effects to the raw STEM premium in the spirit of
Cardoso et al. (2016). They apply a Gelbach decomposition to quantify the proportion of
the Portuguese gender pay gap due to a covariate index and worker, firm and occupation
fixed effects. Importantly, in their approach the variable of interest is a gender dummy which
is obviously not varying over time. In a similar fashion, estimates from model (4.5) could
be used in a Gelbach decomposition on the time constant STEM dummy. Unfortunately,
this approach is not feasible with the available data as it requires the exact estimates of
all components of the model. However, as described below, I still follow Cardoso et al.
(2016)’s approach by approximating Gelbach’s decomposition for a time constant STEM
dummy on the basis of an auxiliary wage model (see discussion below). Finally, a time
constant definition of STEM workers would allow for applying the approach of Card et al.
(2016) by combining a worker-firm fixed effect model with an Oaxaca-style decomposition
to the STEM wage gap. That is, one could estimate model (4.5) separately for STEM and
non-STEM workers and assess differences in the firm-specific wage component of the two
occupational groups for the largest connected set of firms that employ both types of workers.
Subsequently, an Oaxaca-style decomposition would allow for distinguishing between the
explained part of the difference in the firm-specific pay premium (e.g., sorting effect) and an
unexplained within firm component (e.g., efficiency wages or bargaining power).
Gelbach Decomposition: To approximately quantify the contribution of worker effects,
firm effects and observed time-varying worker characteristics to the unadjusted STEM
premium over time, I apply Gelbach (2016)’s decomposition approach to an auxiliary wage
model in the first and last subinterval. In short, Gelbach’s decomposition allows for an
unequivocal partition of the fraction of a wage gap of interest due to different (groups of)
variables between a basic model and a full model through the formula of an omitted variable
bias formula (OVB) (see Appendix C.2 for a detailed derivation of Gelbach’s decomposition
formula). To apply the approach on the basis of model (4.5), I define a time constant STEM
dummy which is 1 if the majority of a worker’s job titles in a subinterval is considered as
STEM and 0 otherwise.44 This allows me to use the application of the Gelbach decomposition
that is outlined in Cardoso et al. (2016) (see discussion above). In particular, I specify the
full model as in equation (4.5) and define the associated basic model as follows:
wit = γBsi+ rit , (4.6)
where wit is the log daily real wage and si indicates worker i’s STEM status in each subinterval
(defined by the mode). Respectively, γˆB is an estimate of the unconditional STEM wage gap.
Even though a time constant STEM dummy in model (4.5) cannot be separately identified
due to the inclusion of worker fixed effects, it is nevertheless possible to identify the
44I argue that this is a reasonable assumption given the very low mobility between STEM and non-STEM jobs
(see Figure 4.8). Notably, using a worker’s mode of his job tiles in each subinterval as opposed to the current job
title changes the STEM dummy for 3.3% and 3.2% (first and last subinterval) of the worker-year observations
for men and 1.1% and 1.3% (first and last subinterval) for women.
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contribution of the worker effects, the firm effects and the covariate index to the STEM gap
based on the following equation (Cardoso et al. 2016):
γˆB = δˆα + δˆψ + δˆβ , (4.7)
where γˆB refers to the unadjusted STEM premium, δˆα is the contribution of the worker effects,
δˆψ is the contribution of firm effects, and δˆβ is the contribution of the time-varying covariate
index. Accordingly, the relative contribution of each wage component to the unconditional
STEM premium is determined by the ratios δˆα/γˆB, δˆψ/γˆB, and δˆβ/γˆB. Note that if the
allocation of workers to STEM and non-STEM jobs as well as to firms is random, γˆB would
be zero. Thus, γˆB can be interpreted as the log point premium in wages that occurs for STEM
workers due to the allocation of these workers to specific firms with specific worker effects
and observable time-varying workers characteristics.
In the present study, I face the practical issue that I only have the 5%-percentile positions
of firm effects (as opposed to the exact estimate) and, in addition, I do not have Card
et al. (2013)’s exact estimate of the covariate index. As a workaround, I apply Gelbach’s
approach to an auxiliary wage model, acknowledging that this only provides an approximate
quantification. To this end, I base the decomposition on an auxiliary wage model that controls
for worker fixed effects, a series of dummy variables to control for workers’ 5%-percentile
positions of the firm fixed effects (based on CHK estimates), and a time-varying covariate
index:
wit = αi+
20
∑
q=2
ψ˜qFqJ(i,t)+ x
′
itβ + rit , (4.8)
where wit is the log daily real wage, αi is a worker fixed effect, each FqJ(i,t) for q = 2, ...,20
represents a dummy variable that is 1 if an individual i’s weighted CHK firm fixed effect falls
into the qth 5%-percentile of the weighted CHK firm effects and 0 otherwise (with the 1st 5%-
percentile as the reference category), and xit is a covariate index.45 As in model (4.5), a time
constant STEM dummy is absorbed by the worker effect. Given that model (4.8) replicates
the estimates of model (4.5) sufficiently well, an application of Gelbach’s decomposition to
model (4.8) allows for an approximate quantification of the contribution of worker effects
(δˆα ), firm effects (δˆψ˜ ) and observed worker characteristics (δˆβ ).46
4.5.2. Results
Worker and Firm Fixed Effects: To begin with, Figure 4.10 illustrates the distribution of
5%-percentile positions of worker effects in the first (1985 to 1991, panels A and B) and
45xit includes an unrestricted set of year dummies as well as quadratic and cubic terms in age fully interacted
with the skill groups.
46Note that the contribution of the firm effects in the auxiliary wage model is denoted by δˆψ˜ (instead of δˆψ )
to emphasize that it is based on the series of firm dummy covariates as given by model (4.8) as opposed to the
exact estimates of firm effects as given by the model (4.5). For further details see Appendix C.2.
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Figure 4.10.: Distribution of CHK Worker Effects by Occupational Groups
A. Men, 1985-1991 B. Women, 1985-1991
C. Men, 2002-2009 D. Women, 2002-2009
Notes: Figure shows densities of worker effects by 5%-percentiles separately for non-STEM and STEM workers
in the first and last subinterval. The colors indicate the share of each skill group within each 5%-percentile. The
histograms are based on all worker-year observations in a given subinterval. Data sources: SIAB-R 7510 and
supplementary IAB data on CHK effects.
last (2002 to 2009, panels C and D) subinterval.47 In each panel, the left histogram refers
to non-STEM workers and the right histogram to STEM workers. The share of workers by
skill group within each 5%-percentile is indicated by the bar color (i.e., low-skilled in blue,
medium-skilled in red, high-skilled in green).
For both men and women, the distributions of STEM worker effects are clearly left-
skewed.48 In other words, the figures suggest that STEM workers are positively selected
47The histograms are based on all worker-year observations in a given subinterval, thus allowing for multiple
observations of the same worker. This can be seen as an implicit weighting that accounts for the attachment of
each worker to the labor market. Note, however, that the histograms look very similar in samples that include
only one observation by worker-firm or one observation by worker (selected by the highest wage) in a given
subinterval.
48Note that the densities of worker effects in the lowest 5%-percentiles are too low (see Appendix Figure C.1
for histograms of the combined sample of non-STEM and STEM workers). One potential reasons could be that
my selection rules differ slightly from Card et al. (2013)’s sample that underlies the estimation of the fixed effects
(see section 4.2.1). Furthermore, the selection of a 2% subsample in the SIAB-R may yield some deviations
from a uniform distribution of worker effects. However, since the distributions of worker effects of the two
occupational groups are sufficiently different, I do not see this short-coming as too worrisome with respect to the
conclusions I draw.
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Figure 4.11.: Distribution of Weighted CHK Firm Effects by Occupational Groups
A. Men, 1985-1991 B. Women, 1985-1991
C. Men, 2002-2009 D. Women, 2002-2009
Notes: Figure shows densities of weighted firm effects by 5%-percentiles separately for non-STEM and STEM
workers in the first and last subinterval. The colors indicate the share of each skill group within each 5%-
percentile. The histograms are based on all worker-year observations in a given subinterval. Data sources:
SIAB-R 7510 and supplementary IAB data on CHK effects.
in terms of their time constant unobserved worker characteristics.49 Moreover, for STEM
workers, there is a weak reduction in the density at the highest 5%-percentile leading to a
slightly more fat-tailed distribution over time. With respect to the skill group distribution
within each 5%-percentile, the histograms show a monotonous increase in the relative
share of high-skilled workers by 5%-percentiles for both non-STEM and STEM workers.
Furthermore, the figures reveal that the distribution of worker effects for STEM workers is
left-skewed for both medium-skilled and high-skilled, while for non-STEM workers this is
only the case for the high-skilled.50
Next, turning to the distribution of firm effects, panels A and C of Figure 4.11 reveal a
similar left-skewness for the firm effects of male STEM workers.51 In addition, there is an
49With reference to the discussion in section 4.5.1, I acknowledge that the worker effect does not necessarily
reflect the true worker effect, but could also (in parts) be a reflection of an unobserved STEM effect.
50Note that the shape of the distribution of worker effects for each skill group can be deduced by comparing
the bars of each color separately.
51The histograms are based on the 5%-percentile position of the weighted firm effects (see discussion above).
However, note that the densities of firm effects in the lowest and highest 5%-percentiles are too low (see Appendix
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obvious trend for an increasing allocation of male STEM workers into high-paying firms over
time.52 While panel A shows a bimodal distribution where a considerable share of STEM
workers is clustered around the 4th, 5th, and 6th 5%-percentile during the first subinterval
(in addition to a large share of STEM workers located above the 15th 5%-percentile), panel
C unveils an almost monotonous increase in the density of firm effects from the lower to
the upper 5%-percentiles. Interestingly, the lower peak among STEM workers in the first
subinterval (4th, 5th, and 6th 5%-percentile) seems to be driven by a bimodal distribution
of firm effects among the high-skilled and is comprised to a large extent of STEM workers
employed in education, social and healthcare facilities and public administration (on average
62%).
Next focusing on women, panels B and D in Figure 4.11 reveal that female STEM workers
are as well clustered in high-paying firms. As for men, the distribution for female STEM
workers in the first subinterval is bimodal, though the lower peak is less distinct, located
around the 10th, 11th, and 12th 5%-percentile, and driven by bimodal distributions for both
medium-skilled and high-skilled STEM workers. Moreover, the distribution of firm effects
remains bimodal in the last subinterval and there is no clear evidence for an intensified
allocation of women into high wage firms over time. Lastly, the lower peak (10th, 11th,
and 12th 5%-percentile) consists in both subintervals on average to more than 50% of
female STEM workers employed in education, social and healthcare facilities and public
administration.
The results can be lined up well with findings of Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017)
on the effect of outsourcing on wages. They provide evidence for a substantial growth
in domestic outsourcing of workers in food, cleaning, security and logistic (FCSL) since
the early 1990s. Moreover, by using estimates based on model (4.5) for all West German
full-time workers for the entire time period 1979 to 2009 separately for men and women,
they show that an outsourcing event reduces the average firm effect of FCSL workers by
about 10 percentage points for men and 7 percentage points for women, which translates
into wage losses of similar size. In order to relate their analysis to the present study, panel A
to D in Appendix Figure C.3 illustrate the distributions of firm effects of male and female
FCSL workers in the first and last subinterval using a similar definition of FCSL jobs.53 The
Figure C.2 for histograms of the combined sample of non-STEM and STEM workers). In addition to the reasons
mentioned in footnote 51, the non-representativity of the SIAB-R with respect to the distribution of firms coupled
with the weighting scheme for firm effects may constitute an additional caveat. However, since the distributions
of firm effects of the two occupational groups are again sufficiently different, I do not see this short-coming as
too worrisome with respect to the conclusions I draw.
52With reference to the discussion in section 4.5.1, the term high-paying firm is used in a slight abuse of
terminology as the estimated firm effect does not necessarily reflect the true firm effect, e.g. firm-specific pay
premium, but could also (in parts) be a reflection of positive STEM effects coupled with a relatively high share
of STEM workers in a given firm.
53I identify FCLS workers by the occupation codes as described in Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017). Note,
however, that their list is based on the 330 occupations of the KldB 1988 classification while the SIAB-R only
differentiates between 120 occupations. Consequently, the identification of FCSL workers suffers from some
measurement error in that four non-FCSL occupations are part of the FCSL definition used in the present study
(see Appendix Table C.3 for details). Reassuringly, unreported figures for samples that exclude the affected
SIAB-R occupation categories look very similar. Moreover, note that the SIAB-R does not allow to further
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histograms are clearly right-skewed, and, more importantly, there is a shift in the densities
to the left between the first and the last subinterval. This is consistent with Goldschmidt
and Schmieder (2017)’s finding that FCSL workers are increasingly outsourced to firms
with lower firm-specific wage premiums. Ultimately, FCSL workers could be regarded as a
counterpart to STEM workers: While the former are outsourced to low wage firms, the latter
are increasingly allocated at high wage firms.
It is important to emphasize that in the present setting, there are several channels that
may lead to changes in the distribution of firm effects. Between different subintervals, a
worker’s firm effect can either change if the worker moves to a firm with a different firm
effect or if the firm effect itself changes while the worker remains at the same firm (or both).
This is different from Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017) who estimate one firm effect for
each firm based on data for the entire observation period. In consequence, they directly link
outsourcing activities of FCLS jobs to moves between two firms with different firm effects
and disregard any distributional changes in firm effects. While beyond the scope of this
paper, an analysis of the importance of within firm versus across firm changes in STEM
workers’ firm effects may be a promising avenue for future research in this area.
To assess the degree of assortative matching — that is, the assignment of high wage
workers to high wage firms — over time, Table 4.3 displays the rank correlations between
each individual’s 5%-percentile position of the worker effect and the 5%-percentile position
of the weighted firm effect by subinterval. Panel A refers to a sample that includes all
worker-year observations, Panel B and C refer to samples that only include one observation
by worker-firm or one observation by worker, respectively. The table documents a distinct
rise in the assortative matching of workers to firms for men (column 1) which is driven
by both non-STEM and STEM workers (column 2 and 3). That is, the rank correlations
continuously increase by each subinterval for both occupational groups (and sample selection
criteria). Further taking into account the distributional changes shown above, this suggests
that STEM workers moved to the upper part of the joint distribution of fixed effects while
non-STEM workers moved to the lower end. Columns 4 to 6 show a similar pattern for
women, though, the increases in the rank correlations are much smaller. Notably, women
exhibit a somewhat higher assortativeness to begin with, but less growth of assortativeness
over time, which confirms the visual impression that the women’s distribution of firm effects
is (compared to men) more left-skewed in the first subinterval and that there is no distinct
increase in the allocation of women into high-paying firms over time.
Gelbach Decomposition: The increasing assortativeness of STEM workers may be an
important driver for the rising STEM premium over time. To further elaborate on this, I
apply Gelbach’s decomposition approach to the auxiliary wage model (4.8) in the first and
last subinterval. This provides an approximate quantification of the contribution of worker
identify outsourcing activities of FCSL workers which Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017) define as either on-site
outsourcing using worker flows or FCSL workers in business service firms. While the former method requires
linked-employer-employee data, the latter approach is not feasible due to the broader industry classification in
the SIAB-R.
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Table 4.3.: Rank Correlations of 5%-Percentile Position of CHK Worker and Weighted CHK
Firm Effects by Occupational Groups
Men Women
Non- Non-
All STEM STEM All STEM STEM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All worker-year observations
1985-1991 0.056 0.005 0.058 0.103 0.092 0.061
N 1,587,636 1,378,606 209,030 757,302 725,403 31,899
1990-1996 0.113 0.058 0.111 0.148 0.140 0.091
N 1,675,918 1,443,909 232,009 826,997 786,611 40,386
1996-2002 0.203 0.148 0.159 0.178 0.169 0.085
N 1,577,214 1,340,443 236,771 767,060 724,944 42,116
2002-2009 0.300 0.251 0.206 0.209 0.199 0.096
N 1,702,954 1,428,268 274,686 817,475 763,992 53,483
Panel B: One observation by worker-firm
1985-1991 0.110 0.066 0.078 0.110 0.099 0.066
N 477,790 423,219 54,571 263,242 252,371 10,871
1990-1996 0.182 0.132 0.152 0.156 0.149 0.087
N 510,342 448,058 62,284 284,099 270,483 13,616
1996-2002 0.281 0.231 0.191 0.201 0.192 0.082
N 507,842 436,970 70,872 273,763 258,506 15,257
2002-2009 0.381 0.334 0.245 0.234 0.222 0.110
N 497,479 426,039 71,440 269,572 252,370 17,202
Panel C: One observation by worker
1985-1991 0.040 −0.004 0.035 0.089 0.080 0.031
N 312,126 272,488 39,638 180,746 173,009 7,737
1990-1996 0.105 0.059 0.092 0.132 0.126 0.056
N 329,460 285,754 43,706 192,618 183,136 9,482
1996-2002 0.188 0.140 0.116 0.163 0.154 0.048
N 313,185 267,738 45,447 183,498 173,380 10,118
2002-2009 0.282 0.237 0.177 0.190 0.178 0.083
N 301,273 255,321 45,952 178,490 167,142 11,348
Notes: Table shows correlation coefficients between each individual’s 5%-percentile position of worker
and firm effect by occupational groups and subintervals. Estimates in Panel A are based on all worker-year
observations in a given subinterval. Estimates in Panel B are based on one observation by worker-firm in each
subinterval. Estimates in Panel C are based on one observation by worker in each subinterval. Data sources:
SIAB-R 7510 and supplementary IAB data on CHK effects.
and firm effects as well as observable worker characteristics to the STEM premium and
additionally allows to assess changes in the contribution of each component over time.
Before presenting the results, I show some evidence that my auxiliary wage model
replicates (at least) the worker effects of Card et al. (2013) sufficiently well. Therefore, I
regress estimated CHK worker effects — provided in the supplementary IAB data — on
estimated worker effects as given by model (4.8) in each subinterval, expecting highly
significant coefficients that are close to one in case of a good approximation. Appendix
Table C.4 shows the OLS results for the first (columns 1 and 3) and last (columns 2 and
4) subinterval by gender. Reassuringly, I obtain coefficients that are indeed close to one
(i.e., ranging between 0.94 and 1.02) and highly significant (with t-tests well over 1,000).
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Table 4.4.: Gelbach Decomposition of Unadjusted Mean Difference in Log Real Wages
Between STEM and non-STEM Occupations
Men Women
1985- 2002- 1985- 2002-
1991 2009 ∆ Total 1991 2009 ∆ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unadjusted STEM premium (γˆB) 0.41 0.50 0.08 0.35 0.41 0.06
Component attributable to ...
Worker effects (δˆα ) 0.27 0.35 0.09 0.26 0.27 0.01
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
64.9 71.2 73.2 65.6
Firm effects (δˆψ˜ ) 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.03
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
12.0 21.8 20.8 24.4
Covariate index (δˆβ ) 0.10 0.04 −0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
23.0 7.1 6.0 10.0
Number of worker-year observations 1,587,636 1,702,954 757,302 817,475
Number of workers 312,126 301,273 180,746 178,490
Notes: Table shows estimates from a Gelbach decomposition for model (4.8). Column 1 to 3 refer to the
subinterval 1985 to 1991 and columns 4 to 6 to the subinterval 2002 to 2009. The contribution of the worker
effects (δˆα ) is obtained by regressing the predicted worker effects on the STEM dummy. The contribution
of the weighted firm effects (δˆψ˜ ) is obtained by summing over the series of firm dummy covariates for each
worker, and regressing the compound firm index on the STEM dummy. The contribution of the covariate
index (δˆβ ) is obtained by summing over all covariates for each worker, and regressing the compound covariate
index on the STEM dummy (Gelbach 2016). See text for additional details. Entries in parentheses are robust
standard errors for the components indicated in the row headings, retrieved from Gelbach (2016) Stata module
b1x2. Entries in italic are percentage shares of the unadjusted STEM premium attributable to the components
indicated in the row headings. All estimates are based on a time constant definition of the STEM dummy.
Differences between the first and last subinterval do not necessarily add up to total change because of rounding.
Data sources: SIAB-R 7510 and supplementary IAB data on CHK effects.
Moreover, the series of coefficient estimates that control for the 5%-percentile positions of
weighted firm effects ( ˆ˜ψq for q = 2, ...,20) is monotonically increasing from the lowest to
the highest 5%-percentile in both subintervals and for both genders, which is consistent with
the underlying meaning of the firm effects.
Turning to the results of the Gelbach decomposition, Table 4.4 shows the estimation results
for men (left side) and women (right side) in the first and the last subinterval (columns 1, 2,
4, and 5) as well as the total change between the two intervals (columns 3 and 6). The top
row refers to the estimates of the unadjusted STEM premiums.54 The next rows display the
approximate contribution of the worker effects, the firm effects, and the covariate index to
the unadjusted STEM premium. The numbers in italics indicate the share of the contribution
of each component to the total unadjusted premium.
54The unadjusted STEM premiums displayed in the table correspond to the employment-weighted averages
of the annual premiums shown in panel A and B of Figure 4.6. Minor differences may emerge due to the
time constant definition of the STEM dummy in the Gelbach approach. For instance, the unadjusted STEM
premiums for the years 1985 to 1991 are 41.3% for men and 35.0% for women (values shown in Table 4.4).
The counterparts on the basis of a time-varying STEM dummy are 41.9% for men and 35.7% for women
(employment-weighted averages of estimates for the years 1985 to 1991 shown in Figure 4.6).
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The unadjusted STEM premium for men is 41 log points throughout the first subinterval
(1985 to 1991) and rises to 50 log points in the last subinterval (2002 to 2009). This implies
a sizable increase of the raw wage gap of 8 log points (column 2 minus column 1 rounded
to two decimal places). Column 1 further shows that the worker effect explains about two
thirds of the premium in the first subinterval, while the firm effects account for 12% and
covariate index for 23%.55 Comparing these figures with the decomposition results for the
last subinterval, the results show that the fraction explained by the firm effects increases
considerably by about 10 percentage points. At the same time, the fraction explained by
the worker effects increases only by about 6 percentage points, while the fraction explained
by the covariate index decreases by the respective 16 percentage points. The mounting
importance of the firm effects is also reflected by column 3, which displays the contribution
of each component to the total change of the unadjusted STEM premium. Notably, the ratio
between the change attributed to the firm effects to the change attributed to the worker effects
of about 0.66 (= 0.06/0.09) is disproportionately high compared to the ratio of the fraction
explained by the firm effects to the fraction explained by the worker effects, which is only
0.18 (= 12.0/64.9) in the first subinterval and increases to 0.31 (= 21.8/71.2) in the last
subinterval.
Looking at women, columns 4 to 6 in Table 4.4 reveal a rise of the unadjusted STEM
premium of 6 log points leading to a raw differential of 41 log points in the last subinterval.
In contrast to men, the fraction of the wage gap explained by the worker and firm effects
are substantially greater in the first subinterval. While the covariate index explains only
6% of the wage gap, the worker effects explain almost three quarters and the firm effects
another 21%. Contrasting these results with estimates for the last subinterval in column 5,
the results shown in the table reveal that the fraction explained by the firm effects increases
for women as well, yet only by about 4 percentage points. Moreover, contrary to men, the
fraction explained by the covariate index actually increases by 4 percentage points, while
the fraction explained by the worker effects decreases by the corresponding 8 percentage
points. Overall, the results for women suggest that also for them the firm-specific wage
component has become more relevant, though to a lesser extent. Ultimately, the fraction of
the unadjusted STEM premium that is explained by the firm effects for men and women
converge to about one quarter in the last subinterval.
Taken together, the results of the Gelbach decomposition line up well with the visual
impressions from above. For one thing, the increase in the fraction of the men’s unadjusted
STEM premium that is explained by firm effects reflects the right shift of the distribution
of firm effects between the first and last subinterval and suggests that male STEM workers
are increasingly allocating into high-paying firms over time. Moreover, the substantially
higher contribution of the firm effects to the women’s STEM premium in the first subinterval
(relative to men) coupled with a smaller increase in the fraction of the female STEM premium
55Using Gelbach’s approach to decompose the gender wage gap in Portugal, Cardoso et al. (2016) also find
that the worker effect is the most relevant component, that is it accounts for the largest fraction of the wage
differential between men and women (58%).
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that is explained by firm effects reflect the more pronounced left-skewness of the firm effect
distribution of female STEM workers in the first subinterval together with a less distinct
change in the pattern of the firm effect distribution.
4.6. Conclusions
The rising wage inequality in the West Germany over the past 30 years has been and still
is a heavily discussed topic in the economic literature (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2009; Card
et al. 2013; Dustmann et al. 2014; Glitz and Wissmann 2017). At the same time, the last
decade has been characterized by increasing interest in STEM occupations by both policy
makers and researchers (see, among others, Black et al. 2015; Hanson and Slaughter 2016;
Card and Payne 2017). In this paper, I bring these two topics together by documenting
the evolution of STEM occupations and its role for the increase in wage inequality and, in
addition, explore potential drivers underlying the growth of the wage differential between
STEM and non-STEM workers — which I call the STEM premium.
Drawing on detailed administrative data for the West German labor market, I document an
increase in STEM employment and wages in both absolute and relative terms for men and
women. Moreover, the coinciding time pattern between the STEM premium (adjusted for
skill-age profiles) and wage inequality suggests that STEM jobs contributed to the accelerated
increase in the West German wage inequality since the mid-1990s.
Using a CES production function framework in a competitive market environment, I
further show that the rise in the STEM premium can be explained by supply and demand
factors under a STEM-biased technological change. This is interesting because it offers a
refined perspective on the often discussed shortage of skilled workers, in particular in the
field of STEM occupations. That is, within the boundaries of the framework, the results
confirm a relative shortage of STEM workers, in particular since the mid-1990s.
Finally, using estimates from a model with additive worker and firm fixed effects, I show
that both male and female STEM workers are clustered at the upper part of the distributions of
the worker and firm effects. Moreover, there is a pronounced right shift of the distribution of
firm effects for male STEM workers over time. An application of Gelbach’s decomposition
method further provides an approximate quantification of the contribution of unobserved
worker and firm effects as well as observable time-varying worker characteristics to the
STEM premium. Taking my results at face value, I find that the men’s fraction of the STEM
premium that is explained by firm effects increases by 10 percentage points, while the
respective fraction for women increases by 3 percentage points. Overall, my findings are in
line with previous studies in that they emphasize the rising importance of firm-specific rents
in explaining the increase in wage inequality (Card et al. 2013; Goldschmidt and Schmieder
2017).
Technological changes will most likely further spur the demand for STEM workers given
their technical expertise and scientific capabilities. Further studies on the role of STEM
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workers may provide useful guidance to gauge future consequences of this development
and should therefore be a high priority on the research agenda. In particular, the increasing
availability of sufficiently large linked-employer-employee datasets will allow more detailed
investigations of sorting and bargaining aspects of STEM workers in relation to firms.
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A. Appendix to Chapter 2: The Impact of
Immigrants on Native Wages and
Employment: An Analysis of Refugee
Inflows in the Early 1990s
A.1. Sample Processing
A.1.1. Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB
7510) 1975-2010
Our analysis is based on the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB
7510) 1975-2010 from the German Institute of Employment Research (IAB). For a detailed
description, see vom Berge et al. (2013b) The sample provides individual level administrative
data for a 2% sample of employees liable to social security contributions. From the initial
sample, we delete workers in training (stib = 0), workers from home (stib = 7), employees
in partial retirement (erwstat = 103), interns and student trainees (erwstat = 105,106),
and individuals with missing employment information. Marginally employed (erwstat =
109,209) are not considered since they are not consistently observed prior to 1999. For each
individual, we delete parallel employment spells (level2 6= 0), and restrict the sample to
worker spells covering June 30 each year. We consider the remaining sample as the labor
force which is composed of employed persons (erwstat ≥ 101), with part-time employees
weighted by 1/2 (stib = 8) or 2/3 (stib = 9), and unemployed (erwstat ≤ 5) persons.
Since the data do not record the place-of-birth, we follow Bonin (2005), D’Amuri et al.
(2010), and Glitz and Wissmann (2017) using citizenship information to identify natives
and immigrants. We impute missing or inconsistent values for nationality following the
procedure of Drews et al. (2007). After filling gaps, we impute a constant citizenship at
the person level assigning the modal value to all years; in case of ties, we assign German
nationality. We regard individuals whose first employment spell is in East Germany as East
German migrants. We note that since we only observe employment spells in East Germany
after 1991, this method allows us to only partially identify East German migrants. For the
identification of ethnic Germans (then called Aussiedler) who received German citizenship
upon arrival), we follow Brücker and Jahn (2011), exploiting information on the receipt of
any type of subsidy exclusively offered to ethnic Germans to support their integration (e.g.,
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language courses; lart = 1010,1016,1018,1036,1037,1041,1045,1058).
We impute missing or unknown values for education with an individual’s information in
the previous spell, if available, and impose that individuals cannot downgrade education. We
group education levels into two skill groups: Unskilled are individuals with at most a high
school degree (Abitur; bild = 1,3), including individuals with missing information after
the correction (2.9% of observations). This choice is guided by comparing average wages
across education groups between 1985 and 1995. Skilled are individuals who completed an
apprenticeship training or obtained a tertiary degree (e.g., Bachelor, Ph.D.; bild = 2,4,5,6).
We further impute missing or unknown regional information for employed and unemployed
with the most recent information of the previous or next spell, if available.
For our wage analysis, we only keep full-time workers (stib 6= 8,9) and deflate wages by
the German Consumer Price Index (CPI), with 1995 as the base year. We consider wages
that are above the annual social security contribution limits provided by the IAB (rounded
to the nearest lower integer) as right censored. We then impute censored wages following
the approach in Glitz (2012), which fits a series of annual Tobit models of the log wage on
a dummy for immigrants, seven education groups (including missing and no education as
separate categories), gender, and the commuting zone. We then replace each censored wage
observation by an uncensored prediction based on the estimated parameters and a random
draw from the associated truncated normal distribution. This imputation approach is by now
common practice for this data and has been extensively evaluated (e.g., Dustmann et al. 2009;
Glitz and Wissmann 2017).
A.1.2. Other Data Sources
For our instrument, we determine the shortest airline distance between the border of each
local labor market and the eastern and southern border of West Germany using geospatial
data from the Federal Office for Cartography and Geodesy.
To determine the share of immigrants in the population at the regional level in 1961, we use
data from the 1961 Census provided by the Genesis Data Archive. The Stata file is available
online at GESIS data archive, file name ZA2472. Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia are
not included.
In addition, we use district level population data from the German Federal Statistical
Office for years 1985-2001. For years 1985-1989, we converted scanned versions of the
Statistical Yearbooks for Germany (available online) into machine-readable data sets. Since
our analysis refers to June 30 each year, while the Statistical Yearbooks are dated to January
1, we use the arithmetic mean between two consecutive years as the population measure in
our analysis.
We obtain task information on the occupational level from the Qualification and Career
Survey (QCS) conducted by the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesin-
stitut für Berufsbildung, BIBB). We use the 1985 wave and include all workers between 18
and 64 who work between 30 to 90 hours. We distinguish between simple and advanced occu-
114
A.2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
pations based on the task composition associated with each job. As in Prantl and Spitz-Oener
(2014), we classify the following tasks as “advance”: designing, making plans, restoring,
servicing machines and equipping machines, and define “job complexity” as the average
share of advanced tasks in an occupation.1 We consider an occupation as advanced (simple)
if the associated share is above the employment weighted median of the job complexity
index.
A.2. Regulatory Framework
During our analysis period (1988-1993), numerous amendments to the laws regulating the
access of asylum seekers to the West German labor market took place. In general, German
law granted unrestricted access to the labor market to any asylum seeker conditional on a
favorable asylum decision from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt
für Migration und Flüchtlinge).2 However, prior to an asylum decision, access to the labor
market was restricted by waiting periods. With the introduction of the new Asylum law on
January 15, 1987, asylum seekers were not allowed to work for a period of five years unless
they came from former Eastern Bloc countries in which case the waiting period was limited
to 12 months (Gesetz zur Änderung asylverfahrensrechtlicher, arbeitserlaubnisrechtlicher
und ausländerrechtlicher Vorschriften) (Münch 1992; Thränhardt 2015) It was not until
1990/1991, when the waiting period for all asylum seekers was first harmonized to 12 months
on December 21, 1990 and eventually banned on June 21, 1991 (Neunte Verordnung zur
Änderung der Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung). On April 1, 1993, a revision of the asylum
procedure reintroduced a waiting period for asylum seekers while residing in reception
centers. The residence of asylum seekers in these centers was mandatory and lasted from
a minimum of six weeks to a maximum of three months. Only three months later, on July
1, 1993, a fundamental renovation of the asylum law became effective, which introduced
the principle of safe countries of origin and guidelines on third countries (which facilitated
a repatriation of refugees to the EU border countries). These renovations led to a drastic
reduction of immigration inflows to West Germany (Münch 1992).
A.3. Displacement Effect
In this section, we show how to interpret the employment coefficient from our main regression
in different subpopulations. We focus on two aspects that impact on the magnitude of the
coefficient: first, the share of the subpopulation in total employment; and second, the share
of immigrants.
1The occupation variable contains 120 occupational categories, which are aggregates of 330 occupations
from the German Klassifikation der Berufe 1988 classification used in the SIAB data.
2Before 2005, this institution was called Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees (Bundesamt
für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge).
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Let us denote by Nir,t the number of employed natives in group i, region r, and year t.
The total number of employed natives is given by Nr,t = ∑i Nir,t and the total number of
immigrants is given by Ir,t . A simplified version of our regression reads as follows:
∆Nir,t
Nir,t−1
= δi
∆Irt
Nr,t−1+ Ir,t−1
(A.1)
The left hand side represents the percentage change in employment of native skill group i
between t−1 and t, and the right hand side represents the percentage inflow of all immigrants
in total employment over the same time period. In our empirical analysis, we estimate
equation (A.1) for various i, holding the right hand side constant. Rearranging a little bit
yields the following:
∆Nir,t = δi∆Irt
Nir,t−1
Nr,t−1+ Ir,t−1
(A.2)
This expression represents the impact of immigrants on a per worker basis. For example,
for δi = −1, we have that, as one immigrant enters employment in a region (∆Irt = 1)
between t − 1 and t, the number of native workers in group i who are displaced (or nor
longer enter employment) is given by the t − 1 share of that group in total employment
(natives+immigrants). Put differently, if the share of native unskilled in total employment is
about 15%, then a coefficient of -1 implies that 0.15 native unskilled workers are displaced.
Conversely, if more than 0.15 unskilled are displaced, the coefficient is more negative. Note
that in the case of the pooled sample, the share is just equal to the employment share of
natives.
To illustrate, consider the following numerical example. Let Nr,t−1 = 90, Ir,t−1 = 10,
NLr,t−1 = 18 and NHr,t−1 = 72. These figures imply an unskilled share among natives of
about 20%. Substituting these numbers into equation (A.2) gives:
∆Nir,t = δi∆Ir,t
18
72+ 18+ 10
= δi∆Ir,t
18
100
(A.3)
Now, suppose that for every 10 immigrants finding employment in region r, 5 unskilled
natives are displaced (into another region or into nonemployment), i.e. ∆Ir,t = 10 and
∆Nir,t = −5. Then:
−5 = δi×10× 18100 ⇔ δi = −2.78 (A.4)
As indicated above, this numerical example shows that if certain groups exhibit employ-
ment losses larger than their employment share, this leads to coefficients larger than −1 in
absolute values.
Now, consider the second issue, the share of immigrants. Using the equations from above,
it is obvious that a larger number of immigrants in the initial period also increases the
magnitude of the displacement coefficient. To illustrate, assume that Ir,t−1 = 0, i.e., there are
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no immigrants in the base period. Then
∆Nir,t = δi∆Ir,t
18
72+ 18
= δi∆Ir,t
18
90
(A.5)
The same shock of ∆Irt = 10 and the same displacement of ∆Nir,t = −5 then implies:
−5 = δi×10× 1890 ⇔ δi = −2.5 (A.6)
which is exactly 90% (the employment share of natives) the size of the coefficient from an
estimation that includes immigrants in the denominator.
A.4. Modeling Framework: An Equilibrium Model
with Heterogeneous Labor Supply and Wage
Rigidities
This appendix provides the basic modeling set-up along with all necessary calculations
to derive the estimation equations relating native wage and employment responses to an
immigrant-induced labor supply shock. While the basic model has been featured in many
migration studies, the extensions we consider here — in particular, heterogeneous labor
supply — were first introduced by Dustmann et al. (2017). In the following, we stick to their
notation, but provide all additional steps required to arrive at the final equations. Throughout
the following derivations, we focus on a single representative local labor market, and omit
an area-subscript. Each local labor market is considered small, in that wage and employment
adjustments in other areas do not affect the equilibrium outcome in the labor market under
consideration (and vice versa). While an approximation, it is likely to be consistent with our
empirical specification, where a region corresponds to the commuting zone.
A.4.1. Production
Assume that output Q is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Q = AKαL1−α (A.7)
where K denotes capital and L a CES aggregator of unskilled and skilled labor, g={U,S}
L =
[
θU L
β
U +θSL
β
S
] 1
β (A.8)
with θU + θS = 1, and σ = 11−β denoting the elasticity of substitution between the two
skill groups (β ≤ 1). We assume that natives (LNg ) and immigrants (LIg) are perfect substitutes
within each skill group, i.e., Lg = LNg +L
I
g. In our empirical specification, we do not attempt
to assign immigrants to skill groups, so that the question whether immigrants are perfect or
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imperfect substitutes for natives will be part of the parameter that we estimate (in the model,
it would show up as another nest within each skill group).3
A.4.2. Factor Demands
We begin by deriving the labor demand function. With firms being price takers on the
product, labor, and capital markets (we normalize the price of the output good to unity), the
optimal choice of labor and capital requires that marginal costs equal marginal products. For
labor Lg, we obtain:
∂Q
∂Lg
= A (1−α)L−αKα 1
β
[
θU L
β
U +θSL
β
S
] 1−β
β θgβLβ−1g for g=U, S
= A (1−α)L−αKαL1−βθgLβ−1g != wg
⇒ logwg = log (A (1−α))+α (logK− logL)+ (β −1) (logLg− logL)+ logθg (A.9)
and for capital K, we get:
∂Q
∂K
= AL1−ααKα−1 != r
⇒ logr = log (αA)+ (α−1) (logK− logL) (A.10)
Suppose that the local supply of capital depends on the local rental rate of capital, r, and the
rental rates of capital in all other regions, r’, where r’ is a vector. That is
K = h (r,r’) , (A.11)
which implies an (own-)elasticity of capital supply
∂K
∂ r
=
∂h (r,r’)
∂ r
r
h (r,r’)
=
1
λ
. (A.12)
Here, λ denotes the inverse elasticity, i.e., the percentage change of the rental rate r for a 1%
change in the local capital stock.
In the next steps, we will totally differentiate the FOC’s to derive the equilibrium response
in terms of changes. We begin with the demand for capital, and then move on to the demand
for labor. First, rewrite the capital supply elasticity in terms of logarithms:
∂K
∂ r
r
K
=
1
λ
⇔
∂K
K
∂ r
r
r
K
=
1
λ
⇔ d logK
d logr
=
1
λ
⇔ d logr = λd logK (A.13)
3It would make a difference, if we were to give the parameters of the model a structural interpretation, since
then the assumption of perfect substitutability might bias the estimates of, e.g., the elasticity of substitution
between skill groups.
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Next, totally differentiate the FOC of capital demand:
logr = log (αA)+ (α−1) (logK− logL)
⇒ d logr = (α−1) (d logK−d logL)
⇔ λd logK = (α−1) (d logK−d logL)
⇔ d logK (λ + 1−α) = (1−α)d logL
⇔ d logK = − α−1
1−α+λ d logL (A.14)
The third line follows from substitution of (A.13).
A.4.3. Equilibrium
We start by deriving a firm’s change in the demand for native workers (net of immigrant
workers). In what follows, we assume (without loss of generality) that there are no immigrants
in the baseline period. First, we note that total skill-specific employment is given by
Lg = LNg +L
I
g and total employment is given by L = LU +LS. In the baseline period, we
have Lg = LNg for g=U, S.
dLg = dLNg + dL
I
g⇔
dLg
Lg
=
dLNg
Lg
+
dLIg
Lg
⇔ dLg
Lg
=
dLNg
LNg
+
dLIg
LNg
⇔ d logLg =
dLNg
LNg
+
pi Ig
piNg
dLIg
LN︸︷︷︸
=dI
(A.15)
Here, we used the fact that we can express the total skill supply as Lg = piNg LN and dLIg =
pi IgdLI with piNg =
LNg
LNU+L
N
S
and piNg =
LIg
LIU+L
I
S
, i.e., as fractions of the total supply of each
nationality.
We next differentiate the CES aggregator of unskilled and skilled labor:
L (LU ,LS) =
[
θU L
β
U +θSL
β
S
] 1
β
⇒ dL = ∂L (LU ,LS)
∂LU
dLU +
∂L (LU ,LS)
∂LS
dLS
=
1
β
[
θU L
β
U +θSL
β
S
] 1−β
β θUβL
β−1
U dLU +
1
β
[
θU L
β
U +θSL
β
S
] 1−β
β θSβL
β−1
S dLS
= L1−βθU L
β−1
U dLU +L
1−βθSL
β−1
S dLS
⇔ dL
L
= L−βθU L
β−1
U dLU +L
−βθSL
β−1
S dLS
=
θU L
β
U
θU L
β
U +θSL
β
S︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sU
dLU
LU
+
θSL
β
S
θU L
β
U +θSL
β
S︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sS
dLS
LS
⇔ d logL = sU d logLU + sSd logLS (A.16)
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Note that sU + sS = 1, which we will use below. The last row expresses the percentage
change in total labor inputs as an efficiency-weighted average of the percentage changes of
each labor type. We can now substitute d logLg =
dLNg
LNg
+
pi Ig
piNg
dI for g={U, S}, and simplify:
d logL = sU d logLNU + sU
pi IU
piNU
dI+ sSd logLNS + sS
piIS
piNS
dI
⇔ d logL =
(
sU
pi IU
piNU
+ sS
pi IS
piNS
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Π
dI+ sU d logLNU + sSd logL
N
S (A.17)
Next, we turn to totally differentiate the labor demand function, given by equation (A.9):
d logwg = α (d logK−d logL)+ (β −1) (d logLg−d logL)
= α
(
− α−1
1−α+λ d logL−d logL
)
+(β −1) (d logLg−d logL)
= α
(
− α−1
1−α+λ −1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−α−1+α−λ
1−α+λ =− λ1−α+λ
d logL+(β −1) (d logLg−d logL)
= − αλ
1−α+λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ϕ
d logL+(β −1) (d logLg−d logL) (A.18)
In the second row, we substitute for d logK the expression derived in equation (A.14). Now,
we plug in (A.15) and (A.17), and solve for d logLNg .
d logwg =ϕ
[
ΠdI+ sgd logLNg + sg′d logL
N
g′
]
+(β −1)
([
pi Ig
piNg
dI+ d logLNg
]
−
[
ΠdI+ sU d logLNg + sg′d logL
N
g′
])
= ϕΠdI− (β −1)ΠdI+(β −1) pi
I
g
piNg
dI
+ϕsg′d logLNg′− (β −1) sg′d logLNg′
+ϕsgd logLNg +(β −1)d logLNg − (β −1)Sgd logLNg (A.19)
where the last three rows each contain all terms related to one of the three key variables. This
can be simplified to yield:
d logLNg [ϕsg+(β −1) (1− sg)] =d logwg−
(
(ϕ− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi
I
g
piNg
)
dI
− (ϕ− (β −1)) sg′d logLg′
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=
1
ϕsg+(β −1) (1− sg)d logwg
−
(ϕ− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi
I
g
piNg
ϕsg+(β −1) (1− sg) dI
− (ϕ− (β −1)) sg′
ϕsg+(β −1) (1− sg)d logLg
′ (A.20)
This is equation A.7 from the Online Appendix of DSS. It is a function that depends on the
own wage, the immigrant shock, and the labor supply of the other skill group, which itself
depends on its own wage, the immigrant shock, and the labor supply of this skill group. To
solve this means to derive an equation that depends only on wages (or employment) and the
immigrant shock. Therefore, we now replace g by U and g’ by S, and insert the expression
for S into the corresponding expression for U:
d logLNU =
1
ϕsU +(β −1) (1− sU )︸ ︷︷ ︸
sS
d logwU −
(ϕ− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi IUpiNU
ϕsU +(β −1) (1− sU )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sS
dI
− (ϕ− (β −1)) sS
ϕsU +(β −1) (1− sU )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sS
 1ϕsS +(β −1) (1− sS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sU
d logwS
−
(ϕ− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi ISpiNS
ϕsS +(β −1) (1− sS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sU
dI− (ϕ− (β −1)) sS
ϕsU +(β −1) (1− sU )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=sS
d logLNU
 (A.21)
With all 1− sg replaced by sg′ , we next collect all d logLNU terms on the LHS:
d logLNU −
ϕsS− (β −1) sS
ϕsU +(β −1) sS
ϕsU − (β −1) sU
ϕsS +(β −1) sU d logL
N
U
=
1
ϕsU +(β −1) sS d logwU −
ϕsS− (β −1) sS
ϕsU +(β −1) sS
1
ϕsS +(β −1) sU d logwS
+
ϕsS− (β −1) sS
ϕsU +(β −1) sS
(ϕ− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi ISpiNS
ϕsS +(β −1) sU dI
−
(ϕsS− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi
I
U
piNU
ϕsU +(β −1) sS dI (A.22)
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Now, multiply by ϕsU +(β −1) sS and simplify a little bit:
d logLNU
(
ϕsU +(β −1) sS− (ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (ϕsU − (β −1) sU )ϕsS +(β −1) sU
)
= d logwU − ϕsS− (β −1) sSϕsS +(β −1) sU d logwS
+
ϕsS− (β −1) sS
ϕsS +(β −1) sU
[
(ϕ− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi
I
S
piNS
]
dI
−
[
(ϕsS− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi
I
U
piNU
]
dI
⇔ d logLNU ((ϕsU +(β −1) sS) (ϕsS +(β −1) sU )− (ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (ϕsU − (β −1) sU ))
= (ϕsS +(β −1) sU )d logwU − (ϕsS− (β −1) sS)d logwS
+(ϕsS− (β −1) sS)
[
(ϕ− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi
I
S
piNS
]
dI
− (ϕsS +(β −1) sU )
[
(ϕ− (β −1))Π+(β −1) pi
I
U
piNU
]
dI (A.23)
To simplify this expression, we have to work on the coefficient pre-multiplying d logLNU and
dI. We begin with dI, i.e., the last two rows:
[(ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (ϕ− (β −1))Π− (ϕsS +(β −1) sU ) (ϕ− (β −1))Π]
+
(ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (β −1) pi ISpiNS −
ϕsS− (β −1) sU︸︷︷︸
1−sS
 (β −1) pi IU
piNU
dI
=
(ϕ− (β −1))Π
ϕsS−ϕsS︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
− (β −1) sS− (β −1) sU

+
[
(ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (β −1) pi
I
S
piNS
− (ϕsS− (β −1) sS +(β −1)) (β −1) pi
I
U
piNU
]
dI
=
− (ϕ− (β −1))Π (β −1)
sS + sU︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1

+
[
(ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (β −1) pi
I
S
piNS
− (ϕsS− (β −1) sS (β −1)) pi
I
U
piNU
− (β −1)2 pi
I
U
piNU
]
dI
=[− (ϕ− (β −1))Π (β −1)]
+
[
(ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (β −1)
(
pi IS
piNS
− pi
I
U
piNU
)
− (β −1)2 pi
I
U
piNU
]
dI
=
[
− (ϕ− (β −1))
(
sU
pi IU
piNU
+ sS
pi IS
piNS
)
(β −1)
]
+
[
(ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (β −1)
(
pi IS
piNS
− pi
I
U
piNU
)
− (β −1)2 pi
I
U
piNU
]
dI
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=
[
−ϕ (β −1)
(
sU
pi IU
piNU
+ sS
pi IS
piNS
)
+(β −1)2
(
sU
pi IU
piNU
+ sS
pi IS
piNS
)
− (β −1)2 pi
I
U
piNU
+ (ϕ− (β −1)) sS (β −1)
(
pi IS
piNS
− pi
I
U
piNU
)]
dI
=
[
−ϕ (β −1)
(
sU
pi IU
piNU
+ sS
pi IS
piNS
)
+(ϕ (β −1))
(
sS
pi IS
piNS
− sS pi
I
U
piNU
)
− (β −1)2
(
sS
pi IS
piNS
− sS pi
I
U
piNU
)
+(β −1)2
(
sU
pi IU
piNU
+ sS
pi IS
piNS
− pi
I
U
piNU
)]
dI
=
[
−ϕ (β −1)
(
sU
pi IU
piNU
+ sS
pi IS
piNS
− sS pi
I
S
piNS
+ sS
pi IU
piNU︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(sU+sS)
piIU
piNU
=
piIU
piNU
)
+(β −1)2
(
sU
pi IU
piNU
+ sS
pi IS
piNS
− pi
I
U
piNU
− sS pi
I
S
piNS
+ sS
pi IU
piNU
)]
dI
=
[
−ϕ (β −1) pi
I
U
piNU
+(β −1)2
(
pi IU
piNU
− pi
I
U
piNU︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
)]
dI
=−ϕ (β −1) pi
I
U
piNU
dI (A.24)
Now, let us consider the coefficient pre-multiplying the LHS:
((ϕsU +(β −1) sS) (ϕsS +(β −1) sU )− (ϕsS− (β −1) sS) (ϕsU − (β −1) sU ))
=ϕ2sU sS +ϕsU (β −1) sU +(β −1) sSϕsS +(β −1)2 sSsU
−ϕ2sU sS +ϕsS (β −1) sU +(β −1) sSϕsU − (β −1)2 sSsU
=ϕ (β −1) s2U sU +ϕ (β −1) s2S + 2ϕ (β −1) sSsU
=ϕ (β −1) (sU + sS)2
=ϕ (β −1) (A.25)
Inserting expression (A.24) and (A.25) into equation (A.23) and rearranging terms gives:
ϕ (β −1)d logLNU
= (ϕsS +(β −1) sU )d logwU − (ϕsS− (β −1) sS)d logwS−ϕ (β −1) pi
I
U
piNU
dI
⇔ d logLNU =
(ϕsS +(β −1) sU )
ϕ (β −1) d logwU −
(ϕsS− (β −1) sS)
ϕ (β −1) d logwS−
pi IU
piNU
dI
(A.26)
Finally, to arrive at key equation (2) of the main text of DSS, we only need to divide by
dI. The final expression gives the response of native labor to an immigrant-induced change
in labor supply as a function of the own wage, the other skill group’s wage, and the ratio
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of skill intensities of immigrants and natives. For β < 1, the first term on the RHS is
unambiguously negative, i.e., employment and wages of a given skill group move in opposite
directions, whereas the second term might be positive or negative, depending on the slope of
the aggregate demand curve, ϕ . This slope depends on the capital share in output, α and the
degree of capital mobility, λ . The last term shows that a positive immigrant shock will reduce
native employment, and this reduction is more negative, the more unskilled immigrants are
relative to natives.
A.5. Shift Share Instruments for the German Labor
Market
The shift share instrument is widely used in the spatial correlation literature on immigration
to deal with the endogeneity of the regional settlement of newly arriving immigrants. In what
follows, we describe the implementation of two versions of the shift share instrument, both
motivated by the idea that newly arriving immigrants tend to settle in regions in which other
immigrants already settled earlier, and that the settlement decision of earlier immigrants is
uncorrelated with current demand shocks. While the simple version of the instrument only
considers the pattern of the overall immigrant settlement (see, e.g., Altonji and Card 1991),
the more complex version further takes into account the source countries in the construction
of the instrument (see, e.g., Card, 2001, 2007, 2009; Glitz, 2012; Smith, 2012; Peri and
Sparber, 2009; Dustmann and Glitz, 2015).
In the simple version of the shift share instrument, we predict the immigrant inflow into a
local labor market based on the foreign population density in some initial period to instrument
the actual region level changes in immigrant population shares. Formally,
∆I˜Popr,88−93 = γr,t0
IPop93 − IPop88
(NPopr,88 + I
Pop
r,88)
(A.27)
where γr,t0 = I
Pop
r,t0 /I
Pop
t0 denotes the share of foreigners in the population that resides in region
r in some initial period t0, I
Pop
93 − IPop88 is the nationwide net inflow of immigrants between
1988 and 1993, and Popr,88 is the population in region r in 1988. The initial year t0 in our
example is 1961, the earliest year for which population data for natives and immigrants are
available. We use census information from the GESIS data archive (available online under
the file name ZA2472) and combine these data with population data from the German Federal
Statistical Office for years 1985-2001, which we reassembled from Statistical Yearbooks and
published tables (both available online). To obtain first stage results, we regress the changes
in local immigrant employment shares in 1988-1993 on the instrument ∆I˜Popr,88−93. The results
in Table 2.7 (see last rows) suggest that the historical immigrant settlement pattern is indeed
a strong predictor for settlement of immigrants between 1988 and 1993, with F-statistics of
30.24 to 32.56 (depending on the measure for the outcome variable). However, we do not
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use this instrument in our main analysis because it is only available for 112 out of 204 local
labor markets.
A more sophisticated version of the shift share instrument relies, in principle, on a similar
idea, but instead of using the overall share of past immigrant settlements, it uses information
on the source country of arriving immigrants to account for more detailed ties between
specific ethnic enclaves. Formally, the instrument is constructed by interacting past country-
specific immigrant densities across regions with nationwide country-specific net inflows of
immigrants,
∆I˜Empr,88−93 =∑
c
λc,r,t0
IPopc,93− IPopc,88
(NEmpr,88 + I
Emp
r,88 )
(A.28)
where λc,r,t0 = I
Emp
c,r,t0/I
Emp
c,t0 denotes the share of all immigrants from source country c that
work in region r in some base year, and IPopc,93− IPopc,88 is the nationwide net inflow of country
c immigrants between 1988 and 1993.4 The denominator scales the predicted net change
in levels by total employment (natives+immigrants) in region r in year 1988. We choose
1975 as the initial year because it is the earliest year available in our administrative records,
and because it comes as close as possible to the settlement structure underlying our distance
instrument (although the latter dates back one more decade). The results are summarized in
Table A.3. Somewhat surprisingly, column 1 (which corresponds to column 5 in Table 2.3)
shows a low correlation (F-statistic=3.34) between predicted and actual immigrant employ-
ment growth, which disqualifies this instrument for our analysis. The entries in column 2
demonstrate that the performance of the supply push instrument deteriorates further if we (in
analogy to DG) extend the observation period backward and forward to 1985-1995.
The relatively poor performance of the shift-share instrument seems to contradict the
evidence in a recent study of DG. They use the shift-share instrument to predict changes in
the local skill-specific labor supply, reporting F-statistics well above 20 in their analysis of
all skill groups. There is, however, an important conceptual differences between the present
analysis and the study of DG. Notably, we do not use skill-specific inflows of immigrants
(relying on variation in immigration across regions and skill cells) but instead base our
analysis on the overall immigrant inflow. In the following, we show that when we estimate a
first stage specification exploiting skill-specific variation in employment growth, we obtain
very similar results as DG, yet these appear to be driven by native rather than immigrant
employment changes.
We begin by defining the change in skill-specific employment between 1985 and 1995 as
the percentage change of the total (native+immigrant) employment of skill group i in region
r between 1985 and 1995.5 In concordance with the endogenous variable of the first stage
model, we define the shift-share instrument to predict the skill-specific inflow of immigrants
by interacting the predicted inflow in a region with a nation-wide average skill distribution
4We use five nationality groups defined as (1) Poland, the Former Soviet Union, Romania, and Central and
Eastern Europe, (2) Turkey, (3) Italy, (4) Former Yugoslavia, Greece, and Portugal, and (5) Western Europe plus
rest of the world.
5Note that, as in DG, we include ethnic Germans and East Germans in this analysis.
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of immigrants who arrived between 1985 and 1995. Formally,
∆I˜Empi,r,85−95 =
∑cλc,r,t0θc,i(I
Pop
c,95− IPopc,85)
(NEmpr,85 + I
Emp
r,85 )
(A.29)
The three components in the numerator reflect, for each source country c, the initial regional
distribution of immigrant employment in 1975 (λc,r,t0 = I
Emp
c,r,t0/I
Emp
c,t0 ), the average skill dis-
tribution between 1985 and 1995, and the total net inflow between 1985 and 1995. The
denominator scales the predicted inflow by skill-specific employment in the base year (1985).
We use published data from DG to obtain the skill-specific regional immigrants net flows by
source country (numerator).6
Column 3 in Table A.3 shows the first stage relation between the relative change in skill-
specific total employment (natives+immigrants) and the predicted skill-specific inflows of
immigrants (conditional on a full set of region and skill group fixed effects). Although our
slope parameter is somewhat larger and the F-statistic somewhat smaller compared to DG’s
results (slope: 0.448 compared to 0.297 (DG); F-statistic: 16.26 compared to 26.0 (DG)),
we arrive at substantially similar conclusions: the instrument works well in this setting.
However, once we decompose the change in total employment into the change in natives and
immigrant employment, and regress each component (both divided by total employment)
separately on the instrument, we find that the predicted immigrant growth between 1985
and 1995 is highly correlated with native employment changes but virtually uncorrelated
with changes in immigrant employment (see columns 4 and 5 in Table A.3).7 This seems to
contradict the original enclave-based idea of the supply push instrument, which should lead
to a positive correlation between the percentage change in immigrant employment and the
predicted immigrant growth.
In the following, we suggest a possible explanation for why the complex shift share
instrument performs worse than a distance-based measure in the German context: first, the
initial settlements, especially of former guest workers, were highly concentrated in a relatively
small number of regions, leading to exceptionally high immigrant employment rates in some
areas, but still low shares in other, geographically close regions; second, immigrants from
former Eastern Bloc states were virtually non-existent introducing substantial randomness in
the assignment of later flows. For example, based on 1975 data, we find that there are areas of
high concentration in Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia as well as the wider
6DG obtain immigrant net flows by source country from the German Federal Statistical Office and the
skill distribution from the German Microcensus using information on the year of immigration and the current
education level. Note that DG’s data distinguished between 15 nationality groups.
7Note that we focus on the percentage change in immigrant employment rather than the total labor force.
Moreover, we merge medium- and high-skilled workers in the analysis, which stands in contrast to the analysis in
DG. However, we repeated the same exercise for the labor force subdivided into three skill groups and obtained
very similar results: while estimates using the percentage change in the total labor force are even closer to DG’s
results, the F-statistic is close to zero when we use the percentage change in the immigrant labor force. Also
note that DG use weights for total labor force (including immigrants) in the tradable sector, whereas we present
results based on total employment in all sectors, but exclude immigrants. But again, in unreported results, we
found that using the alternative weighting scheme does not have a relevant impact on the results and we arrive at
the same conclusions.
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area of Munich and some dispersed areas further north (like Hamburg). In contrast, the north
and eastern border of Bavaria reveals rather low concentrations of immigrants. Applying
the mechanics of the shift share instrument, we can calculate the counterfactual immigrant
density that would be observed if future immigrant settlements were determined only by the
initial density in 1975 (see Figure A.3). The shift share instrument — using shares in 1975 —
overpredicts changes in immigrant shares between 1985 and 1995 in areas that were initially
high immigrant regions. That is, later immigrants did not move proportionately into areas
that were initially high immigrant regions. This points to some spillover effects, possibly
because the former guest workers who were granted the right to stay, required further and
cheaper housing space as they started to reunify their families in later decades.8 In addition,
the shift share IV performs particularly bad in many southern regions that either share a
border with high immigrant regions as of 1975 or are located further east. This illustrates the
inability of the shift share prediction to adequately predict the settlement of Eastern Bloc
migrants.
8Anecdotal evidence suggests that housing space was scarce in the hot spots of 1975. As immigrants reunified
their families over the subsequent decade, they may have been forced to move to neighboring regions.
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A.6. Appendix Tables
Table A.1.: Fixed Effects Regressions (Worker Level)
Native-Immigrant
Wage Gap Annualized
1985 1995 Change
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline 0.122 0.193 0.70
(0.002) (0.002)
Individuals 315,492 332,605
Baseline + region fixed effects 0.155 0.226 0.71
(0.002) (0.002)
Individuals 315,492 332,605
Baseline + region and occupation fixed effects 0.048 0.095 0.47
(0.002) (0.002)
Individuals 315,338 332,308
Baseline + region and occupation-industry fixed effects 0.044 0.079 0.35
(0.002) (0.002)
Individuals 315,229 332,217
Notes: Table shows coefficients on a dummy for German nationality from regressions of the log
wage (imputed) on a gender dummy and a quadratic polynomial of experience (baseline) plus
fixed effects as indicated in the row heading. We fit the models on cross-sections indicated in the
column heading. Column 3 calculates the annual percentage increase by dividing the log point
difference of columns 1 and 2 by 10. Data source: SIAB 7510.
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Table A.2.: Comparison of Different Estimation Methods
Wages Employment
Plug-in Generated Plug-in Generated
OLS Instr. Var. OLS Instr. Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All skill groups
2nd stage coefficient −0.677 −0.677 −1.125 −1.125
- Robust (0.247) (0.285) (0.700) (0.745)
- No Bootstrap – (0.246) – (0.698)
- Bootstrap (0.281) (0.272) (0.718) (0.697)
Panel B: Unskilled
2nd stage coefficient −0.695 −0.658 −2.610 −2.593
- Robust (0.505) (0.496) (1.123) (1.224)
- No Bootstrap – (0.478) – (1.116)
- Bootstrap (0.459) (0.429) (1.166) (1.160)
Panel C: Skilled
2nd stage coefficient −0.581 −0.586 −0.917 −0.917
- Robust (0.244) (0.274) (0.808) (0.819)
- No Bootstrap – (0.246) – (0.807)
- Bootstrap (0.294) (0.295) (0.779) (0.795)
Local labor markets 204 204 204 204
Notes: Table shows the baseline results reported in Table 5 under two different estima-
tion methods and for different computations of standard errors. Columns 1 and 3 refer
to our main approach which replicates the DSS estimation, whereas columns 2 and
4 report the Generated Instrumental Variable (GIV) approach. All models include a
linear region-specific trend for years 1986-1988. We report up to three sets of standard
errors: robust standard errors for both approaches, non-bootstrapped standard errors
for the GIV approach, and bootstrapped standard errors again for both approaches.
Data source: SIAB 7510.
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Table A.3.: Overview of Shift Share Instruments
Overall Inflow Skill-Specific Inflow
Immigrant Total
Employment Immigrant Employment Native Immigrant
1988-1993 Employment 1985-1995 Employment Employment
(col. 5, Tab. 2.3) 1985-1995 (comp. DG) 1985-1995 1985-1995
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Predicted inflow using 1975 0.045 0.009 0.448 0.529 −0.081
regional distrib. of immigrants (0.025) (0.022) (0.111) (0.125) (0.032)
R-squared (adjusted) 0.027 0.00 0.93 0.92 −0.06
F-statistic (excl. Instrument) 3.34 0.17 16.27 18.02 6.26
Local labor markets 204 204 204 204 204
Observations 204 204 408 408 408
Notes: Table summarizes the relationship between the predicted immigrant inflow and actual changes in
immigrant employment or labor force shares. Column 1 replicates the results of column 5, Table 2.3. Column 2
adjusts the observation period to 1985-1995. In columns 3-5, we use as instrument the predicted skill-specific
inflow from DG, showing that the correlation between an immigrant-induced change in relative skill supplies
and the local employment is primarily driven by changes in the relative supplies of natives and not immigrants.
Data source: SIAB 7510.
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A.7. Appendix Figures
Figure A.1.: Predicted versus Observed Changes in Immigrant Employment Shares Between
1985 and 1995
Notes: Figure shows regional differences between the predicted and observed changes in the immigrant employ-
ment share between 1985 and 1995. The difference is centered around zero by subtracting from each region the
average difference of all regions. The predicted changes are based on a shift share instrument following DG (see
Appendix A.5 for details). Data sources: SIAB 7510 and DG.
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B. Appendix to Chapter 3: Effects of
Relaxed Employment Protection on
Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from
a 2004 German Reform
B.1. Sample Processing
B.1.1. Cross-Sectional Model 2 of the
Linked-Employer-Employee Data 1993-2010 (LIAB QM2
9310)
The Cross-sectional Model 2 of the Linked-Employer-Employee Data 1993-2010 (LIAB
QM2 9310) from the German Institute of Employment Research (IAB) combines survey data
on establishments from the annual waves of the IAB Establishment Panel (IAB EP) with
administrative data on individuals drawn from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB)
(for details see Heining et al. 2013). The data was accessed via on-site use at the Research
Data Center (FDZ) and subsequently via remote data access.
The IAB EP (for details see Fischer et al. 2008) is a stratified sample of German es-
tablishments with at least one employee liable for social security payments as of June 30
in the year prior to the survey. For the years under consideration, the annual sample size
amounts to roughly 16,000 establishments representing approximately 1% of the universe
of German establishments. The data on individuals are drawn from the IEB and entail
administrative data from the Employee History (BeH) which covers all employees liable
for social security payments. Since the data basis of the BeH is the integrated notification
procedure for health, pension and unemployment insurance, it is considered to be highly
reliable. The individual-level data are supplemented with basic establishment information
(e.g., 3-digit industry code) from the Establishment History Panel (BHP) (for details see
Gruhl et al. 2012).
The LIAB QM2 merges the data from these various sources using a unique establishment
identifier. It is constructed according to the following procedure: First, all establishments
from the IAB EP with a valid interview in the respective year are selected. Subsequent, for
each year information on all individuals that are employed at one of these establishments at
the cut-off date June 30 are drawn from the IEB. Although not all surveyed establishments
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can be linked to individual-level data from the IEB, the yearly coverage rate of 89 to 98%
is fairly high and maintains the representativity of the sample for the universe of German
establishments.
I process the LIAB QM2 9310 as follows: I keep individuals who are regular employ-
ees liable for social security payments (erwstat = 101), employees in partial retirement
(erwstat = 103), student trainees (erwstat = 106), or marginally employed (erwstat =
109,209). Individuals in vocational training (stib= 0) or owner and executive staff (beru f =
751 and erwstat = 101,102 and stib 6= 0,1,7) are only considered in the denominator of the
worker turnover rates. Full-time equivalent weights are 0.5 for part-time employees not
eligible for unemployment benefits (stib = 8), student trainees, and marginal employees,
0.75 for part-time employees eligible for unemployment benefits (stib = 9), and 1 otherwise.
All wages are converted in Euros and deflated by the Consumer Price Index, with 2000 as
the base year. I impute missing or unknown values for education following Fitzenberger et al.
(2006) and aggregate education levels to three groups: low for individuals without vocational
training or missing information, medium for individuals with a vocational qualification, and
high for individuals with a university degree or more. Since I do not have information on
the hours of work, I limit the attention to individuals who are working full-time (stib < 8)
in the analysis of firms’ log mean daily wages. I impute right-censored wages following
Dustmann et al. (2009). For each year and gender, I estimate separate Tobit models that
control for all possible interactions between the three imputed education levels and eight age
categories. All individual-level data are aggregated using a unique establishment identifier
(idnum). I exclude establishments in the shipping and aircraft transport industry, agricultural
and mining sectors as well as non-profit firms and private households. Moreover, I abstract
from establishment entries and exits and only keep firms that are always present during the
sample periods 2000 to 2007. For further sample restrictions in each of the four assignment
methods to the treatment and control group see section 3.4.2 and Table 3.2.
To obtain firm-level shares for workers on fixed-term contracts (FTC) or temporary
agency (TA) worker, I merge the aggregated data with establishment-level data from the
IAB EP. Since there are multiple sources for inconsistent establishment matches (e.g., a
new establishment identifier is issued whenever a plant changes ownership only in the IEB),
I follow the procedure described in Alda (2005) and drop establishments with substantial
differences in the establishment size according to the two data sources. Therefore, I define
firm size-contingent limits for the allowed difference in the number of employees according
to the data sources. For establishments with up to five employees, the limit is 40%, for
establishments with five to 19 employees 30%, and for establishments with 20 to 100
employees 20%. If the limit is exceeded in one of the sample periods under consideration,
the establishment is removed from the sample. Depending on the assignment method,
the procedure reduces the sample by 32 to 39%. The reduction in sample size appears
reasonable given Alda (2005) finds annual rates exceeding the tolerance levels of up to 30%.
Furthermore, I drop establishments with a share of FTC or TA employment larger than one
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from the sample used for the analysis of the use of temporary employment. The share of FTC
employment can exceed one only due to misreporting while the share of TA employment
may also exceed one if the number of TA workers in a given firm exceeds its total number of
employees (which does not include TA workers).
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B.2. Appendix Tables
Table B.1.: Overview of Treatment Assignment Methods Used in Other Studies
3-years in ’before’ periods: Martins (2009)
Bellmann et al. (2014)
4-years in ’before’ periods: Bauernschuster (2013)
Always the same: Kugler and Pica (2008)
Period-by-period: Bauer et al. (2007)
Centeno and Novo (2012)
von Below and Thoursie (2010)
Notes: Table lists different assignment methods to the treatment
and control group and studies that applied the respective assign-
ment method. The method 3-Years (4-Years) in ’Before’ Periods
assigns firms to the treatment and control group that remain in a
specified firm size interval for three (four) periods before the treat-
ment. The method Always the same assigns firms to the treatment
and control group that remain in a specified firm size interval for
all observation periods before and after the treatment. The method
Period-by-Period assigns firms to the treatment and control group
based on the firm size in each period.
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Table B.2.: Differences in Means Between Treatment and Control Group by Assignment
Method
2-Years 4-Years
in ’Before’ in ’Before’ Always Adjacent
Periods Periods the same Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment identifier
FTE establishment size −7.404∗∗∗ −7.388∗∗∗ −7.195∗∗∗ −7.404∗∗∗
Outcome variables
Hiring rate −0.004 −0.014 −0.006 −0.005
Separation rate 0.003 0.001 −0.009 0.002
Job flow rate −0.007 −0.015 0.003 −0.007
Churning rate −0.009 −0.018 −0.016 −0.009
Industry distribution
Manufacturing −0.021 −0.019 −0.057 −0.022
Construction 0.006 0.005 −0.021 0.005
Wholesale and retail trade 0.031 0.048 0.030 0.030
Real estate −0.014 −0.020 0.011 −0.011
Others −0.001 −0.014 0.037 −0.002
Geographic distribution
North −0.024 −0.039 −0.030 −0.025
East −0.029 −0.055 −0.032 −0.027
Berlin region 0.015 0.008 0.003 0.014
South 0.047 0.050 0.037 0.046
West −0.008 0.036 0.022 −0.009
Average worker characteristics
Avg. share of women 0.045∗ 0.056∗ 0.068∗ 0.046∗
Avg. share of blue-collar worker −0.028∗ −0.024 −0.031 −0.029∗
Avg. share of part-time worker 0.012 0.027 0.033 0.012
Avg. share of apprentices 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
Mean age −0.002 −0.158 −0.616 −0.003
Mean age squared 8.490 −0.851 −42.205 8.330
Firms 587 422 247 588
Notes: Table shows the mean differences in the indicated variables between the treatment
and control group. Each column refers to one of the four assignment methods described
in section 3.4.2. For details on the industry and geographic categories see notes to Table
3.3. Asterisks denote significance of t-test for mean equality between treatment and control
group. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Data source: LIAB QM2.
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B.3. Appendix Figures
Figure B.1.: Shares of Establishments Exceeding Firm Size Intervals of Treatment and
Control Group
A. 2-Years in ’Before’ Period B. 4-Years in ’Before’ Period
Notes: Figure shows the share of establishments that exceed the firm size intervals of five to 10 full-time
equivalent weighted employees (treatment group) and 10 to 20 full-time equivalent weighted employees (control
group) in the periods beyond the assignment periods. In panel A, the assignment periods are 2002 and 2003. In
panel B, the assignment periods are 2000 to 2003. Data source: LIAB QM2.
138
C. Appendix to Chapter 4: The Role of
STEM Occupations in the German Labor
Market
C.1. Sample Processing
C.1.1. Imputation of Censored Wages
A limitation of the data is that wages are censored at the upper earnings limit for statutory
pension insurance. I consider wages that were two Euros below the maximum wage observed
in each year as right censored. Between 1980 and 2010, censoring affects on average 11.2%
of men (36.2% among STEM jobs) and 2.4% of women (12.8% among STEM jobs). I impute
right censored wages following the approach by Gartner (2005). Specifically, I run separate
Tobit regressions for each year and gender of right censored log wages on indicators for three
skill groups, eight age groups, and all possible interactions.1 Imputed wages are the sum of
predicted wages and a random draw from a truncated normal distribution where the upper
earnings limit provides the lower truncation limit and the two moments of the distribution
are the predicted mean and variance of the corresponding Tobit regression. Dustmann et al.
(2009) refer to this approach as the ’normal, no heteroscedasticity’ method since it restricts
the variance to be the same across skill and age groups.
I examine the sensitivity of my imputation approach using an alternative method. Notably,
I impute censored log wages by the ’normal, full heteroscedasticity’ method that allows for
a separate variance for each skill and age cell by estimating separate Tobit regressions for
each year, gender, skill and age group (Dustmann et al. 2009). The Appendix Figure C.4
compares the evolution of the unadjusted and adjusted mean difference in log real wages
between STEM and non-STEM jobs, for censored wages, the imputation method of the main
results (i.e., ’normal, no heteroscedasticity’), and the alternative imputation method (i.e.,
’normal, full heteroscedasticity’). Reassuringly, despite a minor shift in overall levels, the
time pattern for the mean differences in log wages between STEM and non-STEM is very
similar.
1The eight age groups are defined as: 20-25; 26-30; 31-35; 36-40; 41-45; 46-50; 51-55; 56-60.
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C.1.2. Efficiency Labor Supplies
I determine labor supplies in efficiency units in analogy to Glitz and Wissmann (2017). To
this end, I differentiate between STEM and non-STEM workers and calculate the efficiency
weighted number of full-time workers in each group and year. The efficiency weights are
calculated in a two-step procedure: First, I normalize wages by dividing the mean wage
in each STEM/non-STEM-skill-age-gender-year cell by a baseline wage which I define as
the mean wage of male medium-skilled STEM worker in the age group 41-45.2 Second, I
average the normalized wage for each STEM/non-STEM-skill-age-gender-year cell over
all years to obtain time constant efficiency weights for each cell. Formally, the supplies
of STEM and non-STEM workers Lw where w ∈ {N,S} (S: STEM and N: non-STEM)
in year t is determined by the sum of efficiency units of all full-time workers in each
STEM/non-STEM-year cell:
Lwt = ∑
i∈Cellw,t
Efficiency-weightwsag, (C.1)
where w is defined as above, s denotes the skill group, a the age group, and g gender.
C.1.3. Composition Constant Premium
In analogy to the adjusted STEM premium, I want to net out changes in wages that reflect
compositional differences between the group of STEM and non-STEM workers. Conse-
quently, I calculate skill, age and gender composition constant wage differentials. The
composition constant wages are composed of two components: (1) The cell specific wage de-
fined by the mean log wages in each STEM/non-STEM-skill-age-gender-year cell, and (2) the
fixed cell weight defined by each cell’s STEM/non-STEM group share of full-time workers
averaged over all years. The annual composition constant log real wage of STEM/non-STEM
workers is the weighted average of all cell specific wages and their corresponding fixed cell
weights. For example, the composition constant log wage for STEM workers (w = S) in year
t is defined by lnwageSt = ∑s∑a∑g lnwagew=S,s,a,g,t ×weightw=S,s,a,g, where w ∈ {N,S} (S:
STEM and N: non-STEM), s denotes the skill group, a the age group, and g gender.3
2In line with the imputation method for wages, I use eight age groups defined as: 20-25; 26-30; 31-35; 36-40;
41-45; 46-50; 51-55; 56-60. Moreover, skill groups are defined as low, medium, and high.
3In contrast to Glitz and Wissmann (2017), I only consider the main employment spell of full-time workers
in my baseline sample for both the supply and wage measures (see section 4.2.1). I test the sensitivity of my
results at the end of section 4.4.2 by using a sample that is more similar to Glitz and Wissmann (2017). Notably,
for the determination of supplies, I include part-time workers weighted by 1/2 and 2/3, workers undergoing
training, and multiple job spells by the same worker during a year, and weight each spell by the spell-length
(measured in days worked per year). Moreover, for the calculation of the composition constant wages, I take into
account multiple job spells per worker during a year and further take the spell-lengths into consideration when
determining the fixed cell weights.
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C.2. Gelbach’s Decomposition
To quantify the contribution of unobserved worker and firm effects as well as observed
time-varying worker characteristics to the unadjusted STEM premium, I apply Gelbach’s
decomposition to a linear wage equation. In the following, I illustrate the working of
Gelbach’s standard decomposition approach for model (4.5) in analogy to Gelbach (2016)
and Cardoso et al. (2016). The application of the approach to my auxiliary wage model (4.8)
can be conducted analogously and will be discussed briefly at the end of this section.
In general, Gelbach’s decomposition links the change of a coefficient of interest between
a basic model and a full model using the formula of omitted variable bias (OVB).4 Notably,
in the present study, the coefficient of interest is a (time constant) STEM dummy which
captures the unadjusted STEM premium in a basic model and is absorbed in the full model.
I start by defining a full model as a linear wage equation of the following form:
wit = αi+ψJ(i,t)+ x′itβ + rit , (C.2)
where wit is the log wage of an worker i in year t, αi is a worker fixed effect (absorbing
the time constant STEM dummy), ψJ(i,t) is a firm fixed effect, and β captures the effect
of observable time-varying worker characteristics. The idea is to interpret the estimated
coefficient on the STEM dummy si in a basic model of the form:
wit = γBsi+ rit (C.3)
as a biased estimator of returns to STEM jobs.5 Using the formula of omitted variable bias
(OVB), Gelbach’s approach allows for an unequivocal quantification of the portion of the
difference in the STEM premium between the basic model and the full model (γˆB) due to
worker effects, firm effects, and a time-varying covariate index. To show this formally, I
rewrite the stacked system of model (C.2) in matrix notation:
W = Lα+Dψ+Xβ + r, (C.4)
where W is a (N×1) vector of log wages, L is a (N×N) design matrix for the worker effects,
D is a (N×F) design matrix for the firm effects, and X is a (N× k) matrix containing
observed time-varying worker characteristics, and r is a (N × 1) vector of disturbances
(assumed to be orthogonal to the design matrices due to the exogenous mobility assumption).
4The omitted variable bias formula is based on a least-squares identity that links estimates of a base
specification Y = X1β base1 + ε
base and a full specification Y = X1β
f ull
1 +X2β2 + ε
f ull via the formula βˆ base1 =
βˆ f ull1 +(X
′
1X1)
−1X ′1X2βˆ2. To this end, standard results imply that β
f ull
1 is a consistent estimate for β1 “without
assuming anything about either β2 or the correlation between X1 and X2, since all X2 variation is partialed out
in the full specification” and, accordingly, β base1 is biased in the traditional sense of an omitted variable bias
(Gelbach 2016).
5Note that γˆB corresponds to the average unadjusted STEM premium for the periods underlying the estimation
of the model.
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Further, I rewrite equation (C.4) in terms of fitted values:
W = Lαˆ+Dψˆ+X βˆ + rˆ. (C.5)
Likewise, the stacked system of model (C.3) can be written as:
W = γBS+ r, (C.6)
where S is a (N× 1) vector that indicates the assignment of workers to the occupational
group of STEM or non-STEM workers. Next, I plug equation (C.6) into equation (C.5) and
left-multiply both sides by MS ≡ (S′S)−1S′. Given Ms is orthogonal to rˆ due to the assumed
exogenous mobility, this yields:
γˆB = MSLαˆ+MSDψˆ+MSX βˆ , (C.7)
or written in the notation of Cardoso et al. (2016):
γˆB = δˆα + δˆψ + δˆβ , (C.8)
where δˆα = MSLαˆ is the contribution of worker effects, δˆψ = MSDψˆ is the contribution of
firm effects, and δˆβ = MSX βˆ is the contribution of the covariate index. Empirically, the three
terms on the RHS of equation (C.8) are coefficients of regressions of Lαˆ , Dψˆ , and X βˆ on
the vector S, whereby Lαˆ , Dψˆ , and X βˆ are obtained as predicted values from model (C.4).
The approach can be applied analogously to alternative wage equations. Notably, in the
present study, I use an auxiliary wage model that has the following form:
wit = αi+
20
∑
q=2
ψ˜qFqJ(i,t)+ x
′
itβ + rit , (C.9)
where wit is the log daily real wage, αi is a worker fixed effect, each FqJ(i,t) for q = 2, ...,20
represents a dummy variable that is 1 if an individual i’s weighted CHK firm effect falls
into the qth 5%-percentile of the weighted CHK firm effects and 0 otherwise (with the 1st
5%-percentile as the reference category), and xit is a covariate index. While the contribution
of the firm effects in model (C.2) are obtained by regressing the predicted firm effects on the
STEM dummy, the contribution of the firm effects in the auxiliary model (C.9) are obtained
by regressing each of firm dummy covariate on the STEM dummy and then summing over the
estimated coefficients or equivalently by summing over the series of firm dummy covariates
for each worker, and regressing the compound covariate index on the STEM dummy (see
notes to Table 4.4).
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C.3. Appendix Tables
Table C.1.: Overview of Occupations Classified as STEM
Empl. Empl. %-Change Log Mean Log Mean %-Change
Share Share in Empl. Wage Wage in Log
in 1980 in 2010 Share in 1980 in 2010 Mean Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
... on total employment
Non-STEM 0.91 0.87 −0.04 4.11 4.21 0.11
STEM 0.09 0.13 0.04 4.57 4.76 0.20
... on STEM employment
Engineers
Architects, civil engineers 0.06 0.04 −0.02 4.74 4.65 −0.09
Electrical engineers 0.06 0.06 0.00 4.79 5.07 0.28
Mechanical, motor engineers 0.06 0.06 0.00 4.81 5.02 0.21
Survey engineers until other engineers 0.05 0.10 0.05 4.79 4.92 0.13
Computer scientists 0.00
Computer scientists 0.07 0.20 0.12 4.58 4.75 0.17
Technicians
Biological, physical and math specialists 0.03 0.01 −0.01 4.28 4.50 0.23
Chemical until photo laboratory assistants 0.03 0.02 −0.01 4.22 4.54 0.32
Electrical engineering and building techn. 0.10 0.08 −0.02 4.49 4.66 0.17
Foremen, master mechanics 0.10 0.04 −0.06 4.58 4.76 0.18
Manufacturing technicians 0.06 0.03 −0.03 4.46 4.56 0.09
Mechanical engineering technicians 0.06 0.04 −0.02 4.57 4.73 0.16
Other technicians 0.14 0.13 −0.01 4.48 4.68 0.20
Technical draughtspersons 0.07 0.04 −0.03 4.17 4.38 0.20
Math, Physics, Chemistry, Economics 0.00
Chemists, physicists, mathematicians 0.02 0.02 0.00 4.82 5.00 0.18
Economics, social scientists, statisticians, 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
humanities, and other natural scientists1 0.03 0.05 0.02 4.70 4.67 −0.03
Medical workers
Physicians and Pharmacists 0.06 0.08 0.02 4.80 4.885 0.09
Notes: Table lists the occupations defined as STEM. 1Humanities as a non-STEM occupation within the
aggregated occupation category of Economics, social scientists, statisticians, humanities, and other natural
scientists constitutes a share of about 1 to 2% of all STEM workers between 1980 and 2010 (based on frequency
counts of the SIAB 7510.). Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
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Table C.2.: Shift-Share Decomposition of Changes in Share of Employment due to Changes
in Industry Shares and Changes in Occupational Shares Within Industries
Decade Change Total Change
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 1980-2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Men
Non-STEM
Total ∆ −1.79 −1.86 −1.17 −4.82
Industry ∆ −0.46 −0.39 −0.72 −1.41
Occupation ∆ −1.32 −1.48 −0.45 −3.41
STEM
Total ∆ 1.79 1.86 1.17 4.82
Industry ∆ 0.46 0.39 0.72 1.41
Occupation ∆ 1.32 1.17 0.45 3.41
Panel B: Women
Non-STEM
Total ∆ −1.29 −1.24 −1.22 −3.75
Industry ∆ −0.07 −0.11 −0.13 −0.27
Occupation ∆ −1.22 −1.13 −1.09 −3.48
STEM
Total ∆ 1.29 1.24 1.22 3.75
Industry ∆ 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.27
Occupation ∆ 1.22 1.22 1.09 3.48
Notes: Each set of three rows presents the change in the share of employment
in percentage points in the indicated occupational group and time interval and
decomposes this change into between and within-industry components. The decom-
position is based on 120 occupations and 13 industry groups. See section 4.3 for
additional details. Data source: SIAB-R 7510.
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Table C.3.: Food, Cleaning, Security and Logistics Occupation Codes in KldB 1988 and
SIAB-R
KldB1988 SIAB-R Ambiguous
Occ. Occ. Occ. Occ.
Type Label Code Code Code
Food Restaurant, inn, bar keepers, hotel proprietors,
catering trade dealers
911 115
Food Waiters, stewards 912 115
Food Others attending on guests 913 116
Food Cooks 411 40
Food Ready-to-serve meals, fruit, vegetable preservers,
preparers
412 40
Cleaning Other housekeeping attendants 923 117 921,922
Cleaning Household cleaners 933 119
Cleaning Glass, buildings cleaners 934 119
Cleaning Vehicle cleaners, servicers 936 120 935
Cleaning Machinery, container cleaners and related occupations 937 120
Security Factory guards, detectives 791 96
Security Watchmen, custodians 792 96
Security Doormen, caretakers 793 97
Logistics Motor vehicle drivers 714 81
Logistics Warehouse managers, warehousemen 741 84
Logistics Transportation equipment drivers 742 85
Logistics Stowers, furniture packers 743 86
Logistics Stores, transport workers 744 86
Notes: Table lists occupations defined as food, cleaning, security and logistics (FCSL) occupations using the
KldB 1988 classification and the SIAB-R classification. The definition of FCSL occupations in the KldB 1988
classification results from Table A-3 of the Appendix to Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017).
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Table C.4.: Estimation Results of OLS Regressions of CHK Worker Effects on Estimates of
Worker Effects Based on SIAB-R
Men Women
1985-1991 2002-2009 1985-1991 2002-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beta 1.02 0.94 0.94 0.97
(se x100) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
T -test 3,405 4,593 2,315 2,849
R-squared (adjusted) 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.91
Worker-year observations 1,587,636 1,702,954 757,302 817,475
Notes: Table shows results from OLS regressions of Card et al. (2013)’s estimated worker
effects (provided in the supplementary IAB data) on own predictions of worker effects
as given by empirical model (4.8) using the SIAB-R. Data sources: SIAB-R 7510 and
supplementary IAB data on CHK effects.
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C.4. Appendix Figures
Figure C.1.: Distribution of CHK Worker Effects
A. Men, 1985-1991 B. Women, 1985-1991
C. Men, 2002-2009 D. Women, 2002-2009
Notes: Figure shows densities of worker effects by 5%-percentiles in the first and last subinterval. The histograms
are based on all worker-year observations. Data sources: SIAB-R 7510 and supplementary IAB data on CHK
effects.
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Figure C.2.: Distribution of CHK Firm Effects
A. Men, 1985-1991 B. Women, 1985-1991
C. Men, 2002-2009 D. Women, 2002-2009
Notes: Figure shows densities of weighted firm effects by 5%-percentiles in the first and last subinterval. The
histograms are based on all worker-year observations in a given subinterval. Data sources: SIAB-R 7510 and
supplementary IAB data on CHK effects.
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Figure C.3.: Distribution of CHK Firm Effects for FCSL Occupations
A. Men, 1985-1991 B. Women, 1985-1991
C. Men, 2002-2009 D. Women, 2002-2009
Notes: Figure shows densities of weighted firm effects by 5%-percentiles for FCSL workers in the first and last
subinterval. The histograms are based on all worker-year observations in a given subinterval. Data sources:
SIAB-R 7510 and supplementary IAB data on CHK effects.
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Figure C.4.: Evolution of Adjusted and Unadjusted Mean Differences in Log Real Wages
Between STEM and non-STEM Occupations Using Alternative Imputation
Method
A. Men B. Women
Notes: Figure shows annual estimates of the coefficient on the STEM dummy sit as well as the 95% confidence
interval from OLS estimates of the model (4.1) controlling for linear, quadratic and cubic terms in age fully
interacted with skill groups. Estimates based on right censored (non-imputed) wages are plotted with pluses
and crosses. Estimates based on imputed wages following the ’normal, no heteroscedasticity’ method (baseline
sample) are plotted with dots and diamonds. Estimates based on wages following the ’normal, full heteroscedas-
ticity’ method are plotted with squares and triangles. See Appendix C.1.1 for additional details. Data source:
SIAB-R 7510.
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